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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between economic restructuring, the 
changing division of labour and social stratification, with particular reference to New 
Zealand in the period since the 1980s. It begins with a critique of theories of capitalist 
development, leading to the adoption of an approach which focuses on both the long-
term evolution of the division of labour and the ways in which production and 
employment are subject to periodic upheavals from episodes of economic crisis and 
restructuring. The regulation approach is used to analyse the restructuring of the New 
Zealand economy following the global crisis of the 1970s, which transformed it from a 
model based on mass production and interventionist regulation to one based on flexible 
production and liberal regulation. This provides a context for analysing related changes 
in employment, focussing particularly on the massive job losses in New Zealand’s 
goods-producing industries, the subsequent period of high unemployment and the 
eventual resurgence in job growth based on more flexible use of labour, expansion in 
producer and consumer service industries, and growth in both skilled and routine white-
collar occupations. The remainder of the thesis is concerned with the effects of these 
changes on patterns of social stratification. A consideration of the theoretical and 
conceptual issues surrounding class, stratification and the division of labour leads to the 
development of a model of class structure based on relations of production and 
hierarchical divisions of labour. Census data is reclassified to fit the model and analysed 
to show changes in patterns of stratification since the 1980s, looking particularly at 
shifts in the relative size and composition of middle-class and working-class 
employment and the implications for class formation. The model is also used to analyse 
changes in structural inequalities between the sexes and between ethnic groups, with a 
focus on the ways in which different groups were affected by the restructuring process 
and how this was influenced by historically gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour. 
The thesis concludes with an assessment of the extent of change in employment and 
stratification and whether this is indicative of a transition to a post-industrial economy.  
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 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is generally considered that there have been some fundamental changes in the nature 
of work over recent decades. The perceptions are that employment has become less 
secure and stable, and standard working arrangements have given way to more flexible 
and atypical forms of employment. Work is seen to be increasingly concerned with the 
production of information rather than the production of goods, requiring workers to 
obtain ever-greater levels of specialised skills in order to survive and succeed in the 
labour market. Many commentators identify wider social implications in these changes: 
it is argued that a diminishing attachment to stable long-term employment means our 
lifestyles and identities increasingly centre on consumption rather than production, 
while the decline of traditional working-class employment is said to have eroded the 
importance of class as a form of social differentiation. And there is a frequent refrain 
that these changes are driven by the inexorable forces of globalisation and technological 
progress over which we have little control and to which we must adapt and conform in 
order to prosper.  
Many regard these changes as indicative of a transition to a new type of economy 
and society, variously described as post-industrial society, the new capitalism, 
informational capitalism or the knowledge economy. Against this, sceptics argue that 
the extent of change has been greatly exaggerated and the shifts that are observable are 
not fundamentally new but rather manifestations of long-term trends resulting from the 
enduring dynamics of industrial capitalism. As is often the case with such debates, the 
truth is likely to lie somewhere between the polarised positions of those dominating the 
discussion, and can best be revealed by rigorous empirical research in specific national 
contexts. In New Zealand, there has been surprisingly little research of this nature. 
Although the transformation of the New Zealand economy in the 1980s and 1990s 
generated considerable literature and there has been a fair amount of research into 
specific aspects of labour market and employment change, as yet there has been no 
comprehensive analysis of the multi-faceted shifts in employment and social structures 
which contextualises them within broader processes of capitalist development.  
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This thesis seeks to address this gap by examining two broad and interrelated 
questions. Firstly, to what extent have these shifts in employment and related patterns of 
social stratification occurred? And secondly, to the extent that they have occurred, is 
this indicative of the emergence of a new type of economy and society or a development 
of more longstanding trends? These questions are addressed by means of two distinctive 
analytical perspectives. The first is a focus on the division of labour, a foundational but 
now much neglected concept within sociology, which provides a useful angle from 
which to approach structures and processes of change in the realms of production, 
employment and stratification. The second perspective is that of the regulation 
approach, a neo-Marxist school of political economy, which interprets the progression 
of capitalist economies in terms of a succession of different modes of development 
emerging from periods of crisis and restructuring. The marriage of these two 
perspectives results in an approach situating the analysis of New Zealand’s changing 
employment and social structures within the context of long-term evolution in the 
division of labour, while also highlighting the manner in which that process was 
disrupted by a more concentrated period of upheaval associated with the crisis and 
restructuring of the late twentieth century.   
The narrative of the thesis at various points touches on much of New Zealand’s 
economic history from the colonial era onwards, but the focus is very much on the years 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. In this period, a neoliberal restructuring project 
transformed the highly protected and regulated New Zealand economy into an 
exemplary model of free-market capitalism, in the process changing the nature of what 
we produce and how we produce it, and thus the ways in which labour is utilised. In 
New Zealand, as elsewhere, the neoliberal project had devastating effects on some 
sectors of production and on large numbers of workers. It eventually delivered renewed 
job growth in different sectors, but economic growth was modest and punctuated by a 
succession of crises, culminating in the global financial crisis which began in 2007. 
While the long-term effects of the crisis are as yet unknown, the developed capitalist 
economies may well be destined for another long period of stagnation which could lead 
to further rounds of restructuring and reform, and further changes to the nature of 
production and employment. In terms of this thesis, it means that the period under 
analysis is bookended by two major episodes in New Zealand’s economic history: the 
restructuring project begun in the mid-1980s in an effort to resolve a prolonged 
economic crisis, and the collapse of the new regime amidst a further major crisis just 
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over two decades later. That crisis occurred after the thesis was begun and changed the 
tenor of the study from an account of a period of development in full swing and 
showing no obvious signs of imminent collapse, to one which might well have run its 
course.   
The empirical analysis in the thesis is based on official employment data, 
particularly from the censuses of 1986 to 2006, but also drawing on earlier censuses for 
the purposes of some longer-term comparisons, and supplemented where appropriate by 
other data sources. The starting point was partly determined by availability of data and 
post-dates the beginning of the restructuring project in 1984, but this does not unduly 
constrain the exercise as it was only after 1986 that the effects of restructuring on the 
labour market became apparent in the form of massive job losses and major structural 
shifts in employment. As events transpired, the end point of 2006 also proved to be 
appropriate as it saw the last census before the emergence of the global financial crisis 
in the following year. It should also be noted that the analysis is largely confined to paid 
employment. While the interface between paid and unpaid work raises a number of 
important issues, which are touched on at several points, detailed analysis of changes in 
unpaid work is constrained by a lack of good time-series data.  
The structure of the thesis moves from a consideration of theories of change within 
capitalism, through analyses of transformations in the economy, the labour market and 
the division of labour in New Zealand, to an examination of the effects on patterns of 
social stratification. In Chapter One, a theoretical perspective is developed by means of 
a critical appraisal of themes of change and continuity in theories of capitalist 
development. The argument challenges those accounts which contend that changes in 
production and employment signify a transition to a new epoch of post-industrialism, 
and suggests that the regulation approach provides a more balanced perspective on 
issues of change and continuity and a better framework within which to explore recent 
upheavals in the division of labour. 
In Chapter Two, the regulation approach is applied to interpreting the course of 
capitalist development in New Zealand, with a particular focus on the transformation of 
the economy in the 1980s and 1990s. The restructuring project is explained as a delayed 
response to the crisis which emerged in the 1970s, and is seen to involve a transition 
from a Fordist mode of development based on mass production and interventionist 
regulation to a market-oriented post-Fordist mode based on flexible production and 
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liberal regulation. This provides a context for analyses of changes in the labour market 
and the division of labour which follow in subsequent chapters.  
Transitions in the labour market are discussed in Chapter Three. The analysis looks 
firstly at the surge in unemployment resulting from restructuring and recession during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the subsequent improvement in labour demand as 
the new mode of development was consolidated. It highlights the fact that the recovery 
was based in quite different sectors of production from those which experienced the 
earlier job losses, and that levels of joblessness and underemployment remained 
relatively high by historical standards. This is followed by a consideration of the extent 
to which employment has been destandardised as the conventional model of full-time 
and long-term waged or salaried employment has been eroded by the growth of more 
varied and flexible working arrangements.  
In Chapter Four, the changing division of labour within employment is analysed in 
terms of the redistribution of work between industries and occupations, both over the 
long term and as a more immediate consequence of the restructuring project. In very 
general terms this has involved shifts from goods-producing to producer and consumer 
service industries, and from manual to non-manual and lower-skilled to higher-skilled 
occupations. This can be seen as a further development of long-term trends within 
industrial capitalism, which have involved a progressive decline in the direct labour 
required for goods production and a simultaneous expansion in the extended division of 
labour surrounding the production of commodities in the form of both goods and 
services. 
The remaining chapters are concerned with the effects of the changing division of 
labour on patterns of social stratification. Theoretical and conceptual issues surrounding 
class are discussed in Chapter Five, in particular debates over the ‘death of class’, the 
merits of economic and cultural approaches to class analysis, and the relationship 
between class, gender and ethnicity. The argument of the chapter is that economic class 
analysis still has an important role to play in the study of material inequality, but can be 
enhanced by greater attention to the inter-relationship between relations of production 
and divisions of labour. This leads to the development of a typology of class structure 
which is utilised in the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters.  
In Chapter Six, changes in New Zealand’s class structure are analysed using census 
employment data for the two decades from 1986 to 2006. The analysis shows, not 
surprisingly, that there has been a decline in working-class employment and an 
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expansion in middle-class employment, but that the former still accounted for over half 
of the workforce in 2006. The analysis also reveals a widening of income inequality 
between those at the upper and lower reaches of the class structure over the two 
decades. The chapter concludes with some comments on the implications of these 
changes for processes of class formation. 
Gender and ethnic inequality provide the focus of Chapter Seven. The analysis 
explores the ways in which the division of labour is gendered and ethnicised, in the 
sense that women and non-European ethnic groups are disproportionately located in 
particular types of work and therefore inequitably distributed within the class structure. 
While these inequalities have longstanding historical origins, they also had significant 
implications for the ways in which different groups were affected by the process of 
restructuring. Changing patterns of labour demand over recent decades and efforts to 
achieve greater gender and ethnic equality in employment have reshaped gendered and 
ethnicised divisions of labour to some degree, but the legacy of historical inequalities is 
still very evident.  
While the empirical analysis in the thesis is firmly focused on the New Zealand 
context, the themes it traverses and the approach it employs have a much wider 
relevance. The trajectory of the New Zealand economy through the process of crisis and 
restructuring and the emergence of a new mode of development has significant 
commonalities with other developed capitalist economies, particularly those of other 
Anglophone nations which adopted similar free-market models of capitalism in the 
1980s and 1990s. The ways in which the division of labour has evolved over the long 
term and as a consequence of restructuring also closely parallel the experience of 
similar economies, as do the shifts in patterns of social stratification. It is to be hoped 
this thesis will therefore offer some insights of value to the wider understanding of the 
changing division of labour in contemporary capitalism.  
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Change and Continuity in Capitalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a widespread perception that in recent times we have been living through a 
major economic and social transformation. A fin de siècle mood has pervaded the social 
sciences, where concepts representing the old order have been increasingly prefixed 
with a ‘post’ – post-industrialism, post-modernity, post-Fordism and so on – and 
established ways of understanding have been dismissed as outmoded. The mood of 
change also infects public discourse, where concepts such as post-industrial society and 
postmodernism have become common currency along with ideas like the new economy, 
the knowledge economy and the information society. Such epochal conceptions clearly 
appeal to our notions of economic progress and social evolution. By encapsulating 
visions of change, defining our era and speculating about the future they stimulate both 
sociological and popular imaginations. But in the exhilaration of capturing the zeitgeist 
there is a temptation to overstate the extent of change, to neglect continuities and to 
disregard the familiarity of the forces of change. Certainly there is no denying that there 
have been important transitions in the advanced capitalist nations in recent times: the 
information technology revolution, economic and cultural globalisation, changing forms 
of production and employment, fragmentation of consumption patterns, weakening of 
class-based identities and the rise of new social movements. But equally there are 
continuities: capitalism is still driven by pursuit of profit, industrial production remains 
fundamental to economic activity, nation-states are still bounded and largely sovereign, 
established social divisions and inequalities persist, and for most of us the daily routine 
of work is little changed and of no less consequence for our material wellbeing. 
The changing nature of work is at the centre of many of the accounts of societal 
transformation. There are perceptions that conventional forms of work are disappearing, 
that employment is increasingly characterised by flexibility and insecurity, that the 
production of goods has been superseded by the production and circulation of 
information, that there has been a fundamental reshaping of the relationship between 
capital and labour, and that new patterns of social inequality and identity are emerging 
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from the turmoil. None of these contentions is without some foundation, but critical 
scrutiny can show them to be exaggerated and reveal that the changes arise from the 
development and intensification of longstanding forces within industrial capitalism 
rather than some epochal rupture with the past. Striking a balance between the themes 
of change and continuity is a difficult task and one which tends to be eschewed by both 
the prophets of transformation and sceptical critics in their eagerness to establish cases 
for or against the new order. This chapter attempts to achieve such a balance by means 
of a critical examination of the recurrent themes relating to the emergence of a new 
capitalism or a post-industrial society and their implications for the nature of work and 
inequality. In the process, it attempts to establish the case for a reconsideration of the 
neglected concept of the division of labour in understanding the nature of such changes, 
and advocates a periodisation of capitalism which allows us to situate the analysis of the 
changing division of labour within cycles of crisis, restructuring and growth in capitalist 
economies. This approach will provide a framework for the empirical analysis of 
changes in capitalism and work in New Zealand, which will follow in subsequent 
chapters. The first step is to revisit the concept of the division of labour.  
 
 
The division of labour in industrial capitalism 
 
The division of labour is as old as human society, existing wherever there is a division 
of even the most basic subsistence activities between sexes and age groups, wherever 
there is even a rudimentary form of occupational specialisation, or wherever there are 
relations of exchange between communities with different productive resources or 
skills. Over the course of history the division of labour has become increasingly 
complex and specialised as population growth, social development, technological 
advancement and economic progress have encouraged ever more diversification and 
specialisation of economic roles. Within this gradual evolution there have also been 
particular historical junctures at which the division of labour has been subject to more 
concentrated transformation as a result of upheavals in the nature of economic activity. 
The Industrial Revolution was undoubtedly one such juncture and it might be argued 
that we are currently living through another.1  
                                                 
1
 The term ‘Industrial Revolution’ is used here to refer the first such revolution, originating in Britain in 
the late eighteenth century and involving the mechanisation of production by means of water and steam 
power. Distinctions are often made between successive industrial revolutions based on distinct phases of 
technological development (Freeman and Louçã 2001) but these are best seen as part of the ongoing 
development of the forces of production unleashed by the original Industrial Revolution.  
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The Industrial Revolution entailed profound changes to the way labour was utilised, 
divided and organised, and these had such far-reaching social ramifications that the 
division of labour became a central concern in the attempts of the classical social 
theorists to interpret the period (Kumar 1978). For Marx and Weber, the expansion and 
development of the division of labour was expressive of what each saw as the central 
dynamic driving the development of capitalism – accumulation in Marx’s case and 
rationalisation in Weber’s.1 Both made an important distinction between two 
dimensions of the division of labour which are now generally referred to as the social 
and technical divisions of labour (Marx 1976 [1867]: 455-491; Weber 1978 [1922]: 
114-137). In broad terms, the social division of labour consists of producers – whether 
they be enterprises, communities or individuals – performing specialised economic roles 
within a web of interdependent relationships, while the technical division of labour 
involves the compartmentalisation of production processes whereby a number of 
workers perform different parts of a single process. Marx contrasted the ‘anarchy’ of the 
social division of labour in which relations between many producers are mediated by 
the vagaries of the market, with the ‘despotism’ of the technical division of labour 
where workers combine as one producer or ‘collective worker’ under the authority of 
the capitalist. Thus, “the division of labour within manufacture presupposes a 
concentration of the means of production in the hands of one capitalist; the division of 
labour within society presupposes a dispersal of those means among many independent 
producers of commodities” (Marx 1976 [1867]: 476). 
Marx and Weber, along with Durkheim, located the origins of the social division of 
labour in pre-industrial societies while highlighting the increasing complexity and 
interdependency of economic relations entailed by the development of industrial 
capitalism. This represented not just a quantitative leap but also a qualitative shift in the 
division of labour, with ramifications well beyond the economic realm. In The Division 
of Labour in Society (1964 [1893]), Durkheim argued that the functional 
interdependence of the expanding division of labour represented a new basis of social 
integration or ‘organic solidarity’, superseding the ‘mechanical solidarity’ based on the 
                                                 
1
 For Marx, accumulation refers to the ongoing expansion of the stock of capital as surplus value 
appropriated from the labour effort of workers is reinvested in production to generate further surplus 
value. For Weber, rationalisation has a broad range of meaning but in the economic context refers to the 
organisation of economic activity in ways designed to maximise efficiency and calculability. The two 
concepts are linked in that the rationalisation of economic activity enhances profitability and thus 
stimulates capital accumulation. They should not, however, be conflated: accumulation is an economic 
process which may be pursued by means other than rationalisation, while rationalisation is a more 
ideational concept which is also manifested in a variety of contexts outside the economic realm.  
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collective conscience, which typified pre-modern societies. While Durkheim’s focus 
was primarily on the occupational level and the relationship of the individual to society, 
Marx’s conception of the social division of labour was broader – encompassing 
relations of exchange between different producers, industries, regions and nations – and 
more firmly situated in the context of capitalist development. For him, the social 
division of labour was a necessary precondition for capitalist commodity production, as 
without it there would be no market for the exchange of goods between independent 
producers. The development of capitalism in turn greatly expanded the social division 
of labour, as its competitive dynamic encouraged the proliferation of commodities and 
the multiplication of specialised operations involved in their production and circulation 
(Marx 1976 [1867]: 470-480). 
The technical division of labour is a more recent phenomenon than the social 
division of labour, but also originated prior to the Industrial Revolution when teams of 
skilled craftsmen were employed in workshops to perform different parts of single 
production processes under the charge of an entrepreneur. However, it received 
significant impetus from the development of large-scale mechanised production which 
allowed greater sub-division of tasks and the replacement of skilled craftsmen by 
unskilled labourers (Marx 1976 [1867]: 455-491). Adam Smith, on the cusp of the 
Industrial Revolution, lauded the increases in productivity to be gained by dividing 
manufacturing processes into partial and repetitive tasks performed by teams of 
workers, while also recognising that this may be to the detriment of their physical and 
mental wellbeing (Smith 2003 [1776]). Charles Babbage later contributed what would 
become known as the ‘Babbage principle’, pointing to the cost advantages of 
minimising the amount of skilled labour employed in the production process: higher-
paid skilled workers need only be used for those limited parts of the process which 
required their particular skills, while other steps in the process could be performed by 
lower-skilled and lower-paid workers, thus resulting in significant savings on labour 
costs (Babbage 1963 [1832]). Marx recognised the advantages for capital of such 
rationalisation and cost-cutting, but brought a more critical perspective to these themes. 
He observed that the substitution of trained craftsmen by unskilled labourers made for 
greater exploitation by increasing the rate of surplus value which could be appropriated 
from workers, while also enhancing the domination of labour by capital through strict 
work routines and close supervision. For workers, the result was greater alienation due 
to the degradation of work and denial of the fulfilment inherent in more creative acts of 
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labour: “It converts the worker into a crippled monstrosity by furthering his particular 
skills … through the suppression of a whole world of productive drives and 
inclinations” (Marx 1976 [1867]: 481). While Marx focussed on manufacturing, 
Weber’s work on bureaucracy illustrated that elaborate technical divisions of labour 
were not confined to material production, but were also a feature of the rationalisation 
of administration and management typical of modern large-scale organisations (Weber 
1978 [1922]: 956-1005). 
Growing specialisation within both the technical and social divisions of labour saw 
the workforce become increasingly fractured by hierarchical distinctions of skill and 
authority – and therefore of status and remuneration. Diverse production processes and 
the compartmentalised tasks within them called for different levels and types of skill, 
while the increasing complexity of production and exchange expanded the tasks of co-
ordination, administration and management which entailed varying degrees of privilege 
and authority. All this served to stratify labour and add greater complexity to class 
relations. In Marx’s unfinished statement on class in the final volume of Capital, his 
very last sentence speaks of “the infinite fragmentation of interests and positions into 
which the division of social labour splits not only workers but also capitalists and 
landowners …” (Marx 1981 [1894]: 1026). However, for Marx these divisions were 
secondary to the fundamental divide between capital and labour, and would not prevent 
society polarising into ‘two great hostile camps’ with the progressive concentration of 
capital and immiseration of labour. Weber was unconvinced of the inevitability of such 
polarisation and – defining class in terms of market situation rather than production 
relations – identified a large number of economic ‘class situations’ which reflected the 
complexity of the division of labour in capitalism. These consisted of ‘positively 
privileged’, ‘negatively privileged’ and intermediate property and commercial classes, 
in which owners were differentiated by types of property and spheres of industry while 
workers were distinguished by levels of skill. Weber suggested that these economic 
positions coalesced into a smaller number of social classes within which social mobility 
was ‘easy and typical’, although the unity of such classes was highly variable. These 
were the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, the propertyless intelligentsia, and those 
privileged through property and education (Weber 1978 [1922]: 302-307).1  
While Marx argued that industrial capitalism took the division of labour to new 
levels of complexity, he was somewhat equivocal on what would become of it once 
                                                 
1
 The relationship between class and the division of labour is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
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capitalism was overthrown. The younger Marx waxed romantically about a communist 
society “where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity, but each can become 
accomplished in any branch he wishes” (Marx and Engels 1965 [1845]: 45). But 
Rattansi (1982) suggests that Marx’s early views on the subject reflected a tendency to 
conflate the concepts of class and the division of labour – with the consequence that his 
vision of the classless society which would succeed capitalism was one without a 
specialised division of labour. Rattansi argues that in later works such as Capital Marx 
is less sanguine about the prospects for the abolition of the division of labour, 
distinguishing it from class and accepting it as a necessary feature of large-scale 
industrial production even in a classless post-capitalist society. Subsequent history 
could be said to support such a conclusion, inasmuch as no socialist or communist 
society has succeeded in abolishing specialised divisions of labour and the inequalities 
they entail – although Marxists dispute the belief that these societies represent 
genuinely socialist societies of the type envisaged by Marx (eg Callinicos 1991).  
Marx was less equivocal when it came to the future of the division of labour within 
capitalism. The imperative of capital accumulation would drive capitalists to maximise 
the exploitation of markets and the exploitation of workers, producing an increasingly 
extensive social division of labour on the one hand and an increasingly intensive 
technical division of labour on the other. Continued elaboration of the division of labour 
was inherent in the expansive dynamic of capitalist commodity production with its 
“ever growing specialization of the products produced as commodities” and “ever 
greater division of complementary production processes into independent ones” (Marx 
1978 [1885]: 119). Further developments in technology and methods of production 
would only give greater impetus to these processes: “each new productive force, insofar 
as it is not merely a quantitative extension of productive forces already known … 
causes a further development of the division of labour” (Marx and Engels 1965 [1845]: 
32). Subsequent history has borne out these expectations as capitalism has spread its 
reach into ever expanding domestic and global markets, revolutionised labour processes 
through new technologies and methods of production, and churned out an ever greater 
range of goods and services through increasingly complex networks of production and 
circulation. Indeed, the classical theorists would likely have been staggered by the 
extent to which both the social and technical divisions of labour had progressed by the 
late twentieth century: the social division of labour through the proliferation of 
enterprises and industries performing specialised functions within production, 
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circulation and consumption (Sayer and Walker 1992: 56-107); and the technical 
division of labour through the marriage of assembly-line technology and Taylorist 
scientific management, which encouraged extreme fragmentation and intense 
managerial control of labour processes (Braverman 1974).  
The division of labour clearly played a dynamic role in the development of 
industrial capitalism during the twentieth century, but at the same time it seemed to fall 
out of favour as part of the conceptual apparatus social scientists brought to the analysis 
of that development. Over recent decades there has been some attention to specific 
dimensions of the division of labour in the context of debates about the labour process 
(technical divisions of labour), gender relations (the sexual division of labour), and 
globalisation (the international division of labour). But in the voluminous literature on 
the economic and social transformations of recent times, very little emphasis has been 
placed on the dynamic role which the evolving division of labour has played in 
processes of change. A notable exception is the work of Sayer and Walker (1992), who 
are highly critical of this neglect and offer their own corrective by showing how 
attention to the division of labour can shed light on a number of changes commonly 
discussed under the rubrics of the service economy, post-industrialism, post-Fordism 
and so on. At the core of their work is a contention that the latest phase of capitalist 
development is marked not by a break with industrial capitalism, but by a widening and 
deepening of the division of labour in a further development of forces which have been 
with us since the Industrial Revolution. Their argument unfortunately appears to have 
made little impression and the division of labour continues to languish in the shadows 
cast by the grand ideas of epochal transformation. But as the following discussion 
attempts to show, the division of labour still has much to offer in informing our 
understanding of the changing face of capitalism.  
 
 
From post-industrialism to informationalism 
 
The demise of industrial capitalism and the rise of post-industrial society emerged as 
important currents in sociological thought in the 1960s and early 1970s, most notably 
through the work of Daniel Bell (1999 [1973]) and Alain Touraine (1971). Although 
encompassing a range of different perspectives, the post-industrial literature identified a 
number of common features in the emerging society: shifts in the focus of economic 
activity from goods-producing to service industries; the growth of white-collar jobs and 
particularly professional and technical work at the expense of manual production jobs; 
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the centrality of scientific or theoretical knowledge as a source of innovation and 
planning; the increasing importance of tertiary education and of the university as an 
institution; the emergence of new forms of social stratification in which the possession 
of knowledge rather than property is the axis of inequality; and the decline of working-
class radicalism and the politics of class. Together these developments were held to 
represent not just a further progression in the evolution of industrial capitalism, but a 
transition to a whole new type of society which differed in fundamental respects from 
the industrial society which preceded it (Kumar 1978; Badham 1986).  
Early post-industrial theory was to some extent an exercise in ‘social forecasting’ as 
Bell put it, and its predictions were soon overtaken by developments which would shape 
the nature of economic and social change over the next few decades – principally the 
rapid advances in information technology, the global crisis in capitalism in the 1970s 
and the extensive economic restructuring which followed. As the IT revolution gathered 
pace, post-industrial society was identified more precisely by Bell (1979) and others as 
an information society in which new technologies played a defining role. There were a 
number of recurring themes in the early literature on the information society which built 
on those in earlier depictions of post-industrialism: the information revolution 
represented a transformation comparable to the Industrial Revolution; information was 
becoming the principle source of innovation and growth and the main economic activity 
as measured by shares of production and employment; knowledge rather than labour 
was becoming the main source of value; the constraints of time and space were being 
transcended by instant communication and globalised infrastructures; and these 
transformations would bring with them a raft of social and cultural changes (Kumar 
1995: 6-35; Webster 2002).  
Others were less concerned with the exhilarating possibilities of new technologies 
than with the sober realities of the crisis in capitalism which signalled the end of the 
post-War boom, and sought to identify the new model of capitalism which would 
succeed the ailing Fordist-Keynesian version. A number of different schools of thought, 
which can be loosely grouped under the heading of post-Fordist theory (Amin 1994), 
saw the crisis of the 1970s as marking a break not with industrial capitalism as such, but 
with the particular mode of development which had characterised the advanced 
capitalist economies since the Second World War – one in which accumulation was 
based on mass production and mass consumption, and in which national economies 
tended to be highly regulated and insulated. The restructuring which followed the crisis 
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was generally held to involve a shift towards more flexible production and fragmented 
consumption along with a liberalised mode of regulation favouring greater market 
competition. Some argued that there was an affinity between these economic changes 
and the emergence of a postmodern social condition, marked by the weakening of 
established social structures and identities and increasing cultural fragmentation, 
individualisation and impermanence (Harvey 1990; Lash and Urry 1987). However, 
post-Fordist theory generally stopped short of claiming that the economic 
transformation would usher in a new type of society along the lines of the post-
industrial or information society. It also tended to attribute less significance to 
technology as the driver of change – technology would certainly facilitate changes in 
economic activity, but those changes were driven by the imperatives of restoring 
profitability and growth to the capitalist economy rather than by technological forces. 
We will return to a more detailed consideration of post-Fordism later in the chapter. 
These two developments of the 1970s and 1980s – the IT revolution and post-crisis 
restructuring – were both seen as providing the impetus for the development of a new 
form of informational capitalism by Manuel Castells in his Information Age trilogy 
(Castells 2000a; 2000b; 2004). This is a work worth considering in greater detail as it 
encapsulates many of the themes from other strands of the literature, and paints the most 
detailed and empirically-grounded picture of the emerging capitalist society. It is, 
however, an epic work which traverses the vast domains of economy, society and 
culture, and so in the interests of brevity the following discussion is confined to the key 
dimensions of what Castells identifies as the ‘new economy’ and the implications for 
work and inequality. Those key dimensions are threefold: the new economy is 
informational, in that productivity and competitiveness depend on the production and 
application of information; it is global in that production, circulation and consumption 
are organised on a global scale; and it is networked in that economic activity is carried 
out within networks of interaction between businesses (Castells 2000a: 77).  
In conceptualising the new economy as informational, Castells makes a distinction 
between modes of production and modes of development (2000a: 14-18). The mode of 
production is still capitalist as conventionally understood by Marxism, but the history of 
capitalism has been marked by successive modes of development based on different 
types of technology. These are agrarianism, industrialism and informationalism: the 
agrarian mode involved the application of human labour to natural resources; the 
industrial mode involved the application of new energy sources to manufacturing 
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processes; and the informational mode involves the application of information 
technology to improve the generation of knowledge and information itself. Agrarian, 
industrial and informational production may all occur simultaneously within particular 
economies, but the mode of development is defined by the major source of productivity 
in a particular age. Information is to informational society what industry was to 
industrial society – a technology which permeates all aspects of economic and social 
organisation. Castells argues that the information technology revolution is just as 
significant as the Industrial Revolution was in transforming economy, society and 
culture (2000a: 29).  
For Castells, the new economy is global in a way that is qualitatively different from 
the erstwhile world economy linked by trade and investment: it has overcome the 
constraints of time and distance between different parts of the world, using the 
infrastructure of information communications technologies and abetted by the 
liberalisation of trade and financial regulations, and can thus operate “as a unit in real 
time, or in chosen time, on a planetary scale” (2000a: 102). Nowhere is this more 
evident than in globalised financial markets, in which high volumes of capital circulate 
around the globe through instantaneous electronic transactions which create a web of 
interdependence between national economies. International trade has not only grown 
substantially in volume but also changed in character: a growing proportion of trade is 
in services and high-tech goods, which accentuates trade imbalances between high-tech 
and low-tech economies; developing countries are accounting for an increasing 
proportion of international trade; there has been increasing liberalisation of international 
trade; and there is a growing network of trade relations between firms which cut across 
regions and countries. A further dimension of globalisation is the increasing 
internationalisation of production through growth of foreign direct investment, 
increasing penetration of multinational corporations, and development of international 
production networks. The latter is distinctive to the new economy, enabling production 
processes which incorporate components produced in different locations by different 
firms, and in which sophisticated manufacturing and communications technologies play 
a critical role (2000a: 101-123). 
The networked character of the new economy links closely to its informational and 
globalised dimensions, in that the dominant forms of economic activity occur within 
networks which are global in scale and dependent on flows of information and capital, 
enabled by information communications technology. The logic of the network, 
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according to Castells, exerts a greater influence over economy and society than the 
specific interests within the networks, so that “the power of flows takes precedence over 
the flows of power” (2000a: 500). The supreme manifestation of the power of flows in 
the economic sphere is found in the hegemonic role of the global financial markets, 
where the instantaneous flow of capital through electronic circuits exerts a determining 
influence over all other forms of economic activity. The logic of the network also 
provides the morphology for what Castells sees as the dominant organisational form in 
the new economy – the network enterprise. This concept encompasses a variety of 
organisational strategies which arose from attempts to enhance flexibility in production, 
management and marketing following the crisis of the 1970s. Although diverse, these 
strategies together represent the superseding of the traditional model of the large vertical 
corporation by interdependent networks between or within businesses, which are 
integrated by means of information technology (2000a: 166-180). 
In looking at the effects of these changes on work, Castells identifies some common 
trends in the employment structures of what were then the G-7 nations: the decline of 
agricultural and traditional manufacturing employment; the rise in producer services and 
social services; the growth of ‘informational’ work in managerial, professional and 
technical occupations; simultaneous increases in work at the upper and lower levels of 
the occupational structure, including the formation of a ‘white-collar proletariat’ of 
routine clerical and sales workers; and overall upgrading of the occupational structure, 
as jobs requiring higher levels of skill and education grow more quickly than jobs at the 
lower end of the scale (2000a: 244). The other major trend is towards individualised and 
flexible forms of employment, as the flexible production models enabled by information 
technology and encouraged by the network enterprise undermine the standard 
employment model of stable, full-time, waged or salaried employment governed by 
standard employment contracts. Thus, we have the rise of what Castells generically 
labels the ‘flexi-timer’: part-time workers, temporary workers, the self-employed, sub-
contractors and teleworkers. While these trends are not necessarily confined to those at 
the lower-end of the labour market, Castells does see the emergence of a dualised 
employment model consisting of a core labour force of skilled informational workers 
and a disposable labour force of lower-skilled workers whose jobs can be automated, 
sent offshore, outsourced or sub-contracted according to the dictates of market demand 
and labour costs (2000a: 281-296).  
Change and Continuity in Capitalism     17 
This dual model is reflected in changes in class relations, which see labour divided 
between ‘generic labour’ and informational or ‘self-programmable’ labour. Self-
programmable workers have education which enables them to remain flexible and 
adaptable to changing skill requirements, while generic workers lack this ability and are 
confined to routine tasks in which they are expendable due to automation or business 
decisions (2000b: 372-373). The capitalist class, meanwhile, is still concerned with 
producing and appropriating profits, but exists on three levels: the holders of property 
rights, including shareholders, family owners and individual entrepreneurs; the 
managerial class who control capital assets on behalf of shareholders; and the global 
financial markets, where “profits from all sources ultimately converge in search of 
higher profits”, effectively constituting a ‘collective capitalist’ (2000b: 373-374). By 
investing in financial markets, informational workers themselves often become owners 
of collective capital, and so their relationship with the capitalist class is very different 
from the schism between labour and capital in industrial capitalism, and indeed less 
significant than the cleavage between informational and generic labour (2000b: 375-
377). In this context, there is a decline in class identity and in the strength of organised 
labour, which is increasingly superseded by new social movements based on the power 
of primary identities such as sex, ethnicity, nation and religion (Castells 2004). 
In many respects, Castells’s work can be seen as post-industrial theory for the 
information age – essentially an updating and expansion of the themes explored by the 
likes of Bell and Touraine more than two decades earlier. Substitute Castells’s 
‘information’ or ‘informational’ for Bell’s ‘knowledge’, and we find several familiar 
ideas: the centrality of technology in processes of social change; information as the 
material foundation of a new society; the growth of informational employment; the 
replacement of a labour theory of value with an information theory of value; the 
transformation of class relations through the emergence of a new class of informational 
workers; the decline of organised labour, and so on. Castells’s vision of the emerging 
society also resonates in key respects with those of many other leading contemporary 
social theorists who see the events of recent decades as marking fundamental economic 
and social transformations. Notable examples include Ulrich Beck on the 
destandardisation of work and decline of class in ‘reflexive modernity’ (1992; 2000a); 
Zygmunt Bauman on the passage from heavy to light capitalism and from a society of 
producers to a society of consumers in ‘liquid modernity’ (2000); Richard Sennett on 
the personal consequences of instability and insecurity in the employment culture of the 
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‘new capitalism’ (1999; 2006); David Harvey on the relationship between the flexible 
accumulation regime of post-Fordism and the condition of postmodernity (1990); Scott 
Lash and John Urry on informational and globalised production in ‘economies of signs 
and space’ (1994); and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri on the ‘informatization of 
production’ and the rise of ‘immaterial labour’ in the age of Empire (2000; 2004).  
Not all of these writers couch their arguments explicitly in terms of post-
industrialism, but they all to varying degrees convey a sense that we have moved 
beyond industrial society into a new type of economy and modernity. The changes they 
depict are not just cumulative or cyclical, but epochal; not simply the latest episode in 
industrial capitalism’s long history of development and reinvention, but a decisive 
rupture with the past (Savage 2009). Against this, there are two major strands of 
criticism: firstly, that empirical scrutiny can show the trends proposed by these writers 
to be greatly exaggerated, and in some cases even contrary to the empirical reality 
(Bradley et al 2000; Williams 2007; Doogan 2009); and secondly, to the extent that the 
trends are verifiable, they are not so much the product of a fundamental break with the 
past, but rather the outcome of the same dynamics which have driven the development 
of industrial capitalism since its inception (Kumar 1995; Webster 2002). There is truth 
to both these strands of criticism, but there is a fine line to tread between scepticism and 
denial. Rejection of the more grandiose epochal scenarios can lapse into a stubborn 
refusal to acknowledge some very real changes, and so debates tend to become 
polarised. Steering a path between those polar positions – acknowledging change while 
maintaining a scepticism towards epochal thinking – is the aim of the critique in the 
following sections.  
 
 
A new capitalism? 
 
The variety of transformations envisaged by the writers cited in the preceding 
discussion makes generic criticism difficult. However, by focussing on the key themes 
identified by Castells – who exemplifies and systematizes the key ideas within the broad 
genre of what can loosely be called post-industrial theory – we can impose some 
necessary order and limits on the discussion. Those themes with a bearing on the current 
thesis are the informational, globalised and networked dimensions of the ‘new 
economy’, which are reviewed in this section; and their effects on the nature of 
employment and class relations, which will be discussed in the next section. From a 
brief assessment of each of these points, we can arrive at some tentative conclusions 
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about whether or not we have truly crossed a great divide into a new epoch of post-
industrial or informational society. In the course of this discussion, the neglected 
concept of the division of labour will be coaxed from the shadows to help shed some 
light on the issues.  
 
Informationalism 
 
Bell’s post-industrial society was a knowledge society in that theoretical knowledge 
drove the increasingly important functions of innovation and planning, while 
knowledge-based activities such as education, science, and research and development 
accounted for growing shares of production and employment. While this may be true, it 
is difficult to see how it constitutes a break with industrial society: capitalism has 
always relied on advances in knowledge to maintain competitiveness and profitability 
through technological development, product innovation and rationalisation of labour 
processes; and the growing importance of knowledge in processes of planning and 
policy formulation has accompanied growth in the scale and complexity of industrial 
capitalism throughout its development (Kumar 1978: 219-230; Webster 2002: 51-57).1 
More recent writers in the post-industrial tradition have progressed from a concern with 
the instrumental role of knowledge or information in economic activity, to a concern 
with the production of information as a commodity in itself. In this view, the 
commodification of information has progressed to such an extent that information rather 
than material goods provide the focus of economic activity in the new economy. Thus, 
Castells claims that the informational society is distinguished by the application of 
information and its related technologies to the production of information, so that 
“information generation, processing and transmission become the fundamental sources 
of productivity and power” (2000a: 21). This is echoed in Hardt and Negri’s depiction 
of the ‘informatization of production’ which sees a progression from an industrial 
paradigm to an informational paradigm in which “providing services and manipulating 
information are at the heart of economic production” (2000: 280). Similarly, in Lash 
and Urry’s economies of signs and space, “what is increasingly produced are not 
material objects but signs” (1994: 4), in the form of both informational products and 
‘aestheticised’ commodities (including material goods) which embody symbolic 
information. 
                                                 
1
 Bell here distinguishes between the empirical knowledge of industrialism and the theoretical knowledge 
of post-industrialism but this appears to be more of a heuristic convenience than a meaningful distinction 
(Webster 2002: 51-57).  
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It is extremely difficult to gauge empirically whether we have indeed moved from a 
goods-producing to an information-producing economy. The customary approach is to 
identify industries that can be defined as informational and then measure their 
contribution to production and employment. However, there is a tendency in such 
exercises to cast the net very widely and include as informational practically every 
activity which is not a direct act of material production, thus embracing many service 
industries which in fact produce very little in the way of information – an issue to which 
we will return when we look at the matter of employment structures. Moreover, much 
informational production is not distinct from material production, but is part of the 
extended division of labour surrounding material production, feeding into the many 
activities involved in the production, circulation and consumption of material goods. 
These sorts of intermediate informational products are becoming more visible (and 
measurable) due in part to increasing specialisation within the social division of labour, 
which sees informational activities once hidden within the internal operations of goods-
producing or goods-circulating enterprises increasingly externalised and purchased from 
specialised service enterprises – functions such as research and development, marketing, 
communications, management consultancy, legal and accounting services and so on. 
This is not to deny that informational activities are becoming more important, but it 
does cast doubt on the argument that informational production represents the basis of a 
new economy. Informational activity conducted for the ultimate purpose of producing 
and selling goods hardly represents a shift away from a goods-producing economy, 
although it may indicate that information is becoming a more important part of those 
activities. Goods production which relies on information is still goods production. And 
it might be added that goods which embody symbolic information are still goods – 
rather than signs as Lash and Urry would have us believe. 
The idea of informationalism also rests on the power of information technology as a 
transformative force – it is not just about the production of information but also about 
how information technology provides the means for the transition to an economy and 
society based on informational production. Information society theory is often charged 
with technological determinism, in that technology is seen to be an exogenous driver of 
change rather than being socially embedded. This is certainly true of many populist 
accounts of the information society (eg Toffler 1980), but perhaps less true of more 
sophisticated accounts such as that of Castells, although he too is often accused of 
technological determinism (Stehr 2000; Garnham 1998). Castells in fact suggests at the 
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outset that there is a dialectical relationship between technology and society, that while 
scientific discoveries and technological innovation may occur autonomously, they do so 
within particular social and economic contexts which influence how they are developed 
and applied, and which in turn are shaped by the use of technology (2000a: 5). This is 
an entirely reasonable position, but one that is not sustained in the course of his 
substantive analysis where information technology repeatedly appears at the heart of an 
extraordinary range of changes, while the longstanding forces of capitalist development 
are downplayed. Thus, globalisation appears as the triumph of technology over the 
constraints of time and space rather than the result of capitalism’s expansionary quest 
for new sources of profit; organisational restructuring appears as a revolutionary 
marriage of information technology and networking logic rather than a further stage in 
the ongoing rationalisation of production; and employment change is conceptualised in 
terms of a disjunctural surge in informational production rather than as a continuation of 
long-term trends in the division of labour. While information technology has clearly 
played an important role in all these changes, it is debatable as to whether it provides 
the impetus behind them or is rather an enabling technology which facilitates and 
perhaps accelerates processes of change which are built into the logic of capitalism.  
It is tempting to attribute considerable transformative power to information 
technology because of the pace at which it has developed, the extent to which it has 
colonised our workplaces and homes, and the sheer ingenuity of many of its 
achievements. However, this does not necessarily make it a transformative force on a 
par with the industrial technology which changed economy and society so radically 
during the Industrial Revolution. In this respect, Golding (2000) makes a useful 
distinction between two types of technology: one which “allows existing social action 
and process to occur more speedily, more efficiently, or conveniently”; and one which 
“enables wholly new forms of activity previously impracticable or even inconceivable” 
(Golding 2000: 171). Golding contends that information technology generally falls into 
the former category, that it has not fundamentally changed what we do, but rather how 
we do it. If we apply this to the realm of production, it could be argued that for the most 
part information technology provides us with some very impressive tools to enhance 
production processes, accelerate and expand communications, facilitate networking and 
improve the gathering and dissemination of information. For all the wizardry involved 
in these advances, they are essentially improvements rather than new forms of activity 
and do not entail the sort of transformations in methods of production, relations of 
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production and divisions of labour unleashed by industrial technology. From a 
contemporary perspective, the personal computer might seem a far more impressive 
piece of machinery than the spinning jenny, and the microprocessor a more staggering 
invention than steam power, but arguably their consequences have not been as great. 
However, this should be qualified with the observation that the IT revolution may still 
be in its infancy and we cannot yet discern where it may take us – just as the full 
implications of industrial technology may not have been apparent to those living 
through the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.  
 
Globalisation 
 
Globalisation features strongly in the transformational perspectives of a number of 
major theorists including Castells (2000a), Bauman (1998), Beck (2000b), Giddens 
(2003) and Hardt and Negri (2000). While this literature and the topic of globalisation 
in general encompasses a range of economic, cultural and political dimensions, our 
concern here is primarily with the economic dimension – again covered most 
systematically by Castells. He and others of a strongly globalist persuasion posit the 
existence of a single integrated global economy in which the autonomy of nation-states 
is severely diminished, signalling a new stage in capitalist development. Against this, 
others question both the novelty and extent of globalisation and warn against 
downplaying the importance of national economies and national policies (Hirst and 
Thompson 1999; Gilpin 2001). This debate is too extensive and complex to adequately 
canvas here, but there is scope for some very general comments about the novelty and 
extent of globalisation and about that aspect which has the greatest bearing on the 
current thesis – the international division of labour.1  
The novelty of globalisation is disputed by world-systems analysis, which argues 
that capitalism has operated as a globally integrated system based on an international 
division of labour since the sixteenth century (Wallerstein 1974; Arrighi 1994). Castells 
acknowledges this, but makes a distinction between the world economy of old and the 
global economy of today on the basis that the latter operates on a planetary scale in real 
time (2000a: 101-102). This is not entirely convincing: both global and world 
economies are planetary by definition (what is the world if not planetary?) and while 
financial markets may operate in real time, this is not the case for international trade and 
transnational production, which are still constrained by the need to move goods between 
                                                 
1
 See Held and McGrew (2003) for a range of different perspectives on globalisation issues.  
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countries, even though new technologies have accelerated and enhanced communication 
within trade and production networks. Most importantly, it is difficult to make a 
qualitative distinction between the historic world economy and the contemporary global 
economy when the forces of global interdependence are fundamentally unchanged. 
Today’s globalisation, like that of preceding centuries, is still driven by the 
expansionary dynamic of capital accumulation which impels capital to seek out new 
production opportunities, open up new markets and exploit new sources of cheap labour 
and materials (Wallerstein 2004). In this respect, we should be wary of over-
emphasising the role of technological change as a driver of global integration while 
underestimating the global imposition of neoliberal economic models through 
international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
the World Trade Organization in their efforts to revive and sustain capital accumulation 
in the wake of the crisis of the 1970s (Harvey 2005). 
Even if globalisation is not new, we might justifiably apply the term to the current 
era if global integration is accelerating at a faster rate than previously. Evidence for this 
can be found in the ascendancy of global financial markets, liberalisation of 
international trade, penetration of transnational corporations, and internationalisation of 
production (Castells 2000a: 101-147). However, Hirst and Thompson argue that such 
evidence does not necessarily support a strong globalisation thesis, for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the current phase of integration and openness is not unprecedented, but 
is in fact a reversion to the state of affairs that existed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Second, genuinely transnational corporations are rare, as most large 
companies remain nationally based in terms of assets, production and sales while 
trading multinationally. Third, foreign direct investment is highly concentrated among 
the advanced economies rather than flowing freely into the less developed countries. 
Fourth, trade, investment and financial flows are not genuinely global, but tend to be 
dominated by the major economic powers. And fifth, because of their dominance, those 
major powers have the capacity to exert regulatory governance over the supposedly 
uncontrollable global markets should the will exist (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 2). 
While this position is contentious, it does provide a valuable corrective to the 
exaggerated accounts of globalisation that tend to dominate academic and political 
discourse. Hirst and Thompson are not suggesting that there has been no change in the 
international economy, but dispute the extent of global integration and argue that the 
principal economic entities are still nations, interconnected through trade and 
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investment rather than subsumed into a single global entity. Hence, they characterise the 
world economy as ‘inter-national’ rather than global, and the process of increasing 
interdependency as one of internationalisation rather than globalisation. The distinction 
is more than semantic – it highlights the importance of national economies and national 
strategies, and provides grounds for challenging the legitimacy of neoliberal economic 
policies which have been imposed worldwide on the pretext of maintaining ‘global 
competitiveness’ in an inexorably globalising world. 
For the purposes of the current study, the most pertinent aspect of interdependence 
within the international economy is the international division of labour (Dicken 2003). 
A distinction must be made here between the ‘classical’ international division of labour 
and the ‘new’ international division of labour. The classical international division of 
labour consists of countries specialising in production of particular types of 
commodities exchanged though trading relationships. In the perspective of world-
systems analysis, this involves relations of unequal exchange between core states 
producing predominantly high-value products and peripheral states producing 
predominantly low-value products, while semi-peripheral states occupy intermediate or 
transitional positions between the two (Wallerstein 2004). The new international 
division of labour involves transnational manufacturing operations, in which producers 
locate different parts of their production processes in different countries offering 
different comparative advantages. This is achieved through a range of networking 
arrangements involving branch plants, subsidiary companies or sub-contracting 
relationships – all varieties of Castells’s network enterprise. The newness of this 
phenomenon is relative – Fröbel et al (1980) identified it as an important model of 
production in the 1970s, and it has its origins in the growth of transnational enterprises 
after the Second World War (Wright 2002b). Like the classical international division of 
labour, this new version also entails global inequalities as capital exploits low-cost 
labour in developing countries and repatriates the profits to developed economies 
(Munck 2002). Both the classical and new international divisions of labour can be 
viewed as global manifestations of the more localised divisions within national 
economies and local enterprises. The classical international division of labour is a 
global version of the social division of labour as it involves many producers trading 
different commodities in international markets, while the new international division of 
labour is a global manifestation of the technical division of labour as it involves single 
producers dividing up their production processes on a transnational basis. In terms of 
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the latter, we can also see the Babbage principle at work on a grand scale: just as factory 
production enabled skilled labour to be replaced by cheaper unskilled labour in local 
contexts, so transnational production enables the more expensive labour in core 
countries to be replaced by cheaper labour in less developed countries. 
The international division of labour has become increasingly interdependent and 
complex in recent decades as market liberalisation and technological developments have 
facilitated greater movement of goods and capital.1 In terms of the classical 
international division of labour, exports and imports constitute increasing shares of 
production and consumption for most countries. In terms of the new international 
division of labour, manufacturing operations (and more recently some service functions) 
have been increasingly relocated from developed to developing countries offering 
competitive advantages, particularly in respect of labour costs. The old divide between 
core and periphery has blurred somewhat as newly industrialising countries have 
become less dependent on the production of food and raw materials, diversifying into 
the production of both manufactures and services for both international and domestic 
markets. These changes obviously exercise critical influences over divisions of labour 
within nations: in the less developed nations, increasing numbers of workers are 
engaged in secondary production and services; while in the advanced capitalist nations, 
the direct labour of material production declines relative to the indirect labour of 
product development, strategy, marketing, distribution, administration and management. 
Therefore, while globalisation or internationalisation itself may not be particularly 
novel, increasing interdependency within the international division of labour is an 
important factor to be considered in any analysis of national employment structures.   
 
Networks 
 
The network is not quite as ubiquitous a theme in the post-industrial literature as 
informationalism and globalisation, but it is central to Castells’s vision of the new 
society, which for him is a ‘network society’. While others might not go this far, echoes 
are found in Hardt and Negri’s depiction of network production as the dominant 
organisational form in the ‘deterritorialized’ world of informational production, while in 
Lash and Urry’s ‘economies of signs and space’ there is an emphasis on the flows of 
                                                 
1
 Technological factors here are not confined to information communications technologies, but include 
developments in production techniques which have enabled parts of manufacturing processes to be 
deskilled and outsourced, and advances in transportation which have enabled goods to be transported 
more quickly and more cheaply – including an invention as humble and low-tech as the shipping 
container, which has dramatically reduced the cost of international shipping (Levinson 2006). 
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capital, commodities and information through space via the architecture of networks. 
These accounts regard networks as a distinguishing feature of a new economy even 
though, as with informationalism and globalisation, networks are not in themselves 
fundamentally new but are a longstanding feature of economic and social organisation. 
Castells concedes this, but argues that the distinctiveness of today’s network 
organisation is that information technology “provides the material basis for its pervasive 
expansion throughout the entire social structure” (2000a: 500). This again raises issues 
of technological determinism, but perhaps most disquieting is the sense that technology 
has transformed the network into a social force which seems to exercise a determining 
influence over economy and society independently of human agency – as expressed in 
the idea that the ‘power of flows’ is more important than the ‘flows of power’ (Tonkiss 
2006: 46-49). This deflects attention from the very real exercise of power by capital and 
political elites and – like the impression of inexorable globalisation – has a potentially 
depoliticising effect by conveying a sense that human actors are helpless in the face of 
the irresistible logic of the network (Marcuse 2002).  
We should not, however, dismiss the concept of the network altogether. Others 
argue more reasonably that while networks are becoming an increasingly important 
form of organisation, society is not constituted by networks but by individuals, groups 
and organisations who increasingly relate to each other within networks (Van Dijk 
1999). In the economic sphere, networks are above all a means by which to rationalise 
the organisation of complex economic activities for the purpose of maximising profits. 
Information technology has come to play an important enabling role in such networks, 
but it is a new tool to achieve old ends: global financial networks are a technologically 
sophisticated means by which to organise the circulation of capital on a global scale in 
real time; and the network enterprise is a technologically integrated means to achieve 
organisational efficiencies in the production and circulation of commodities. It was 
observed in the previous section that transnational production networks are a 
manifestation of the division of labour, and the same applies to networked production 
on more localised levels where different firms within networks or different units within 
networked firms perform specialised and inter-related roles as a collective producer or 
as interdependent individual producers. The various types of organisational change 
encompassed by the concept of the network enterprise are essentially ways of 
reorganising or restructuring the division of labour. In this context it is useful to 
remember that the division of labour is not just about how work is divided, but also 
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about how specialised roles are integrated. As Sayer and Walker (1992: 6) put it: “The 
puzzle is this: how are the various specialized activities to be connected so that they 
function in a reasonably coherent and efficient manner?” The network enterprise can be 
seen as one approach to solving that puzzle. 
 
 
Transformations in work and class 
 
Work 
 
In the perspective of post-industrial theory, social forces such as informationalism, 
globalisation and networking are considered to transform employment in the advanced 
economies in two key respects: there is a structural shift in employment from goods-
producing industries and occupations to service or informational industries and 
occupations; and there is a destandardisation and individualisation of employment 
relationships, which engenders increasing insecurity and instability in employment. 
There is evidence for both these trends, although as with the topics discussed in the 
previous section there is a tendency to exaggerate both the extent and the novelty of 
such developments. These issues are the focus of substantive analysis in later chapters, 
so this discussion will briefly highlight the key issues. 
Structural employment changes involve the redistribution of work across both 
industries and occupations. In terms of industries, post-industrial theory conventionally 
interprets the shift in employment from manufacturing to service industries as a sign of 
the coming of post-industrial society, just as the shift from agricultural to manufacturing 
employment was indicative of the rise of industrial society (Bell 1999 [1973]: 123-142). 
The category of services, however, is problematic for a couple of reasons. One is that it 
is a catch-all residual category encompassing diverse activities linked only by the fact 
that they involve neither the direct extraction of raw materials nor their processing into 
manufactured goods, and so expansion in such a category in itself tells us little. Hence 
there are varied attempts to sub-divide services more meaningfully, but the axial divide 
remains that between goods and services, and analysis tends to be focussed on the 
transition between the two. This brings us to the second problem with services, which is 
that much of the activity of service industries is not distinct from that of goods 
industries, but is part of the extended social division of labour surrounding the 
production and circulation of goods (Sayer and Walker 1992; Gershuny 1978; Cohen 
and Zysman 1987). Growth in service employment is not new but has been occurring 
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since the Industrial Revolution when the demand for transport, communication, 
financial, commercial and mercantile services accelerated in tandem with the production 
of material goods and their distribution through a market economy (Kumar 1978: 200-
204). Recent decades have seen more marked structural changes as the automation and 
internationalisation of production has reduced manufacturing employment in the 
advanced economies and more labour has moved into those industries not directly 
involved in material production. However, may of these industries play indirect roles in 
goods production in the form of either pre-production, post-production or ancillary 
work. And as noted earlier, this work is becoming more visible and measurable as 
growing specialisation in the division of labour sees it increasingly split off from goods-
producing industries. Not all the work of service industries is related to material 
production, but it is too simplistic to interpret their growth as evidence of a fundamental 
shift from goods to services when much of it is due to the proliferation of material 
goods and the expansion and specialisation of the division of labour involved in their 
production, circulation and consumption (Sayer and Walker 1992: 56-107). The 
changing international division of labour is also a key element in this, as much of the 
direct production work once done in the advanced capitalist nations has not simply 
disappeared but has been shifted offshore, leaving the more developed countries to 
concentrate on the indirect work surrounding production. Any shift from goods to 
services, therefore, is primarily one within the domestic economies of particular 
countries rather than within capitalism as a whole.  
Castells is well aware of the problems with the concept of services (2000a: 219-
223), but retains it in his analysis while introducing alongside it an alternative 
distinction between goods-handling and information-handling industries, designed to 
illustrate his contention about the rise of informational employment. This distinction is a 
minor advance in that it broadens the class of industries concerned with goods to 
include activities such as transportation, wholesaling and retailing. However, many of 
the industries he classes as information-handling also play important roles in the 
business of producing and circulating goods – industries such as communications, 
finance, insurance and real estate. Even if we accept Castells’s categories, his analysis 
does not show that information handling has become a more important source of 
employment than goods handling – goods-handling industries still accounted for a 
greater share of employment in the advanced economies in the early 1990s, albeit within 
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the context of a long-term shift towards information-handling industries (Castells 
2000a: 318-324).  
Occupational shifts in employment are obviously closely linked to industry shifts, 
but they also reflect changes in employment structures within industries. Post-industrial 
theory tends to interpret growth in white-collar work as another indicator of the 
transition to post-industrialism, but many white-collar workers are employed in either 
secondary industries or enterprises which service secondary industries. And just as there 
has been an expanding social division of labour between industries and enterprises 
involved directly or indirectly in material production, so there has been an expanding 
technical division of labour within goods-producing enterprises which has resulted in 
growth in the indirect labour of supporting, augmenting and managing the direct labour 
of physical production. Thus, in a typical manufacturing enterprise the number of 
workers on the factory floor has been dwindling as jobs have been automated or sent 
offshore, while at the same time the offices have been filling up with white-collar 
workers involved in tasks of management, administration, planning, research and 
development, communications, marketing and so on. It is a fallacy to see such workers 
as the embodiment of post-industrialism when they are part of the extended division of 
labour involved in goods production (Sayer and Walker 1992: 67-75).1   
There is also a tendency in post-industrial theory to treat white-collar jobs as 
qualitatively superior to blue-collar jobs, not only embodying greater skills and 
knowledge but also enjoying better working conditions, greater autonomy and more job 
satisfaction. This is not always the case. At around the time Bell was lauding the growth 
of white-collar work as the harbinger of a new era, Braverman (1974) was pointing out 
that white-collar jobs were subject to the same processes of deskilling and degradation 
which accompanied the technical division of labour and mechanisation in 
manufacturing. While Braverman was criticised for overlooking the fact that job 
degradation in some areas was accompanied by job enhancement in others, it did not 
alter the reality that many white-collar or service jobs were subject to increasing 
routinisation, mechanisation, subdivision and supervision. This is no less true today as 
pressures to achieve efficiencies through rationalisation and computerisation have de-
skilled and de-humanised much of the work of clerical, sales and service occupations 
                                                 
1
 In the same vein, Hardt and Negri’s concept of ‘immaterial labour’ is misleading when many of the 
workers it embraces are contributing to the business of material production, particularly as they extend 
the concept to include the work of producing goods which have an informational dimension (Hardt and 
Negri 2000: 289-294).  
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and in many cases created conditions more typical of industrial assembly lines than the 
idealised world of the knowledge economy (Ritzer 2000; Head 2003). Data-entry clerks, 
call-centre workers, checkout operators and fast-food workers are not necessarily of a 
higher order than those on the assembly line simply because they work in an office, 
shop or restaurant rather than a factory.  
With the benefit of having seen the consequences of technological and 
organisational change, today’s commentators are perhaps more aware than earlier 
forecasters such as Bell that change and restructuring can lead to the degradation as well 
as the enhancement of work. Thus, many rightly highlight the polarisation of work in 
today’s economy, as in Castells’s distinction between the skilled and privileged class of 
informational labour and the de-skilled and disadvantaged class of generic labour. 
However, at the same time there is a tendency to adopt a very catholic definition of 
categories such as informational labour and thus to over-estimate their significance. 
Castells claims that informational workers make up about a third of the employed 
population in OECD countries (2000b: 376), but this encompasses such a broad and 
disparate range of occupations – many of which can only be described as informational 
to the extent that they involve some sort of job-specific credentialing and skills – that 
informational labour becomes of questionable value as an analytical category (Halcli 
and Webster 2000). This is exacerbated by the upgrading of job titles, which has seen 
increasing numbers of workers classified as managers on the basis of minimal levels of 
authority or autonomy, or as professionals on the basis of modest levels of specialised 
knowledge. There is no doubt that there has been considerable growth in the genuinely 
informational labour of education, research, design, innovation, communication, 
strategy and so on. But that is only obscured, not illuminated, by the indiscriminate 
application of the concept to a much wider range of less fitting occupations.  
The other aspect to claims about the transformation of work is the idea that flexible 
production models, organisational restructuring, technological change and economic 
uncertainty have made work increasingly insecure, impermanent and individualised. 
This is a particular concern of Beck (1992; 2000a), Sennett (1999; 2006) and Bauman 
(2000; 2001), all of whom convey a sense that long-term and full-time waged 
employment is becoming outmoded as flexible and precarious employment becomes the 
norm. In much of this literature the trends are assumed rather than empirically 
demonstrated, and where empirical support is provided – as in Castells’s discussion of 
the ‘flexi-timer’ (2000a: 281-296) – the evidence is less than conclusive. In a trenchant 
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critique of this perspective, Doogan (2009) marshals persuasive empirical evidence to 
demonstrate that not only are the claims greatly exaggerated, but some are actually 
contrary to the reality – for instance long-term employment is shown to be increasing 
rather decreasing in advanced economies (see also Fevre 2007). There has undoubtedly 
been some destandardisation of work associated with increasing rates of part-time 
employment, temporary work, self-employment and teleworking. But not all such work 
is insecure or precarious, and with the exception of part-time work each of these types 
of employment still accounts for relatively small proportions of the workforces of 
advanced economies. In the case of part-time work, the growth is not solely attributable 
to changes in labour demand, but also reflects an increasing supply of people who want 
to work part-time rather than full-time. Much of the growth in part-time employment 
has been among mothers with dependent children, people of retirement age and tertiary 
students – groups for whom part-time work provides a means of maintaining 
engagement in the workforce rather than being symptomatic of a broader weakening of 
attachment to employment. 
Nonetheless, there is certainly a popular perception that employment has become 
increasingly precarious and insecure. Doogan suggests that the gap between perception 
and reality indicates a ‘manufactured uncertainty’. Following Bourdieu (1998), he 
claims that it amounts to a new ‘mode of domination’ whereby systematic exaggeration 
of the threats posed by global market competition is used by employers to coerce 
workers into accepting unfavourable conditions in the interests of maintaining 
competitiveness and retaining jobs. And he argues that many who are sympathetic to the 
cause of workers – including trades unions and social commentators – unwittingly 
contribute to this pervasive sense of anxiety by overstating the threats of globalisation 
and technological change and their effects on the labour market. Thus, Doogan suggests 
there is a ‘confluence of narratives’ between post-industrial social theory and neoliberal 
management discourse – in which Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) identify a ‘new spirit 
of capitalism’ celebrating the virtues of flexibility and adaptability as requirements for 
both businesses and workers to succeed in the competitive environment. This is not to 
say that social theorists have been complicit in neoliberal strategies, but rather that they 
may have been a little too uncritical in accepting vested ideological representations of 
economic change. 
There may also have been a misreading of the trends of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
when restructuring of production and deregulation of labour markets made many 
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workers redundant or forced them into precarious working arrangements. This was 
compounded by technological developments that raised fears about the extent to which 
jobs would be automated or exported. These developments were unusual at the time in 
that they significantly affected the security of middle-class white-collar workers as well 
as manual production workers, who had hitherto been the most affected by recession 
and restructuring. In what might be described as a case of premature extrapolation, 
many commentators seem to have interpreted this not as a temporary consequence of 
readjustment but as the genesis of a long-term trend, and extrapolated it into a future 
increasingly devoid of stable and secure employment (Beck 2000a; Rifkin 1995; 
Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994).1 In fact, it was more a matter of what Schumpeter (1987 
[1942]) might call a process of ‘creative destruction’ whereby the destruction of jobs in 
some sectors was followed by the creation of jobs in others. When the worst of this 
process was over, there were indeed higher levels of unemployment and higher levels of 
non-standard employment than had previously been the case, but the revival of job 
growth exposed the gloomier forecasts as unduly alarmist. In the meantime, however, 
the perception that work was changing fundamentally and irrevocably had become 
entrenched as conventional wisdom and has proved difficult to dislodge. The current 
economic crisis has lead to more waves of redundancies and reawakened the threat of 
insecurity and the reality of precarious employment for many workers, but this too is 
likely to be a temporary phenomenon rather than a harbinger of a jobless future. While 
we should not ignore the fact that for many people flexible and insecure employment is 
the reality and that this can have serious economic and personal consequences (Sennett 
1999), it is important to keep the changes in perspective and not lose sight of the fact 
that conventional full-time employment is still the norm and likely to remain so for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
Class 
 
The transformation of employment is widely considered to have been accompanied by a 
transformation of class relations. There are two main variations on this theme: firstly 
that the importance of class per se has diminished, and secondly that class remains 
relevant but the class structures of industrial society have been fundamentally 
transformed. The first position is discussed extensively in Chapter Five, but some brief 
                                                 
1
 Strangleman (2007) suggests that the literature on the end of work is also characterised by a nostalgia 
for a lost sense of the permanence of work, which is not new but is also found among earlier generations 
of writers and thinkers on work.   
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observations can be made here. In essence the argument about the decline of class is that 
diminishing attachment to stable employment, the growing importance of consumption 
as a source of social differentiation and the general fragmentation and individualisation 
of social life have greatly weakened the significance of class as a form of social 
organisation and identity. This perspective is expressed most strongly in postmodernist 
arguments that class is effectively dead (Pakulski and Waters 1996), but there are 
elements of it in Beck’s claim that individualisation dissolves the social institutions of 
industrial society including class (Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002), and 
Bauman’s contention that we are moving from a society of producers to a society of 
consumers where identity is derived not from work but from consumption choices 
(Bauman 2005).1 To some extent, these arguments are premised on the false assumption 
that standard employment is in serious decline and we therefore have a diminishing 
attachment to work and to class affiliations and identities formerly centred on work. A 
more plausible argument is that class is becoming less visible not as a consequence of 
the decline of work as such, but as a consequence of the decline of the manual 
production work which traditionally provided the basis for working class cultures and 
solidarism, and which tended to bring the contours of class relations into stark relief. 
This may mean that class consciousness is waning, but it does not mean that class is 
dead. Class will remain an important dimension of social differentiation as long as work 
remains a fundamental aspect of most people’s lives – as the key determinant of their 
material circumstances, as a site where they form social relationships and share 
collective interests, and as an element in how they define themselves and perceive 
others. The material dimension of class remains particularly salient, as disparities in 
wealth and income have grown in most advanced capitalist nations over recent decades 
as a consequence of neoliberal economic and social policies. It is somewhat ironic and 
unfortunate that this occurred at the same time as social theorists were proclaiming the 
demise of class.  
The other approach to the transformation of class relations is that changes in the 
nature of production have fundamentally altered the class structures of industrial 
society. We find this in both Bell’s post-industrial society and Castells’s informational 
society, where the possession of knowledge or information is considered more critical 
than ownership or control of the means of production in structuring class relations. This 
is a theme which is very common in post-industrial theory, but it is not entirely 
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 See Atkinson (2007; 2008) for critiques of Beck and Bauman on class. 
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convincing. For Bell, status replaces economic interests as the axis of stratification, and 
the highest status group is the professional class or knowledge class, which consists of 
four estates – scientific, technological, administrative and cultural – each with different 
collective interests (Bell 1999 [1973]: 374-377). Ownership does not feature at all in 
Bell’s stratification model, and his classes (a term used interchangeably with status) are 
nothing more than occupational categories. As a result, the division between capital and 
labour appears to be of less consequence than the division between say a technician and 
a clerk – a notion that is arguable at best. The elevation of professionals to the summit 
of the stratification hierarchy also obscures the fact that salaried professionals are 
subordinate to capital and bureaucratic elites, and generally operating at their behest 
rather than being in the vanguard of the post-industrial society as Bell would have us 
believe (Giddens 1980: 262-263).  
For Castells, the divide between capital and labour still matters, but within the 
category of labour there is what appears to be a more important split between 
informational labour and the low-skilled workers he calls generic labour. The former, as 
the most valued producers in the new economy and as owners of ‘collective capital’ in 
the form of investments, have interests which appear to coincide more with those of 
capital than those of generic labour (2000b: 375-377). Castells seems to suggest that 
while the division between capital and informational labour is blurring, the division 
between informational and generic labour is becoming sharper. This dualistic 
conception of informational and generic labour can be disputed on a number of grounds. 
Firstly, as noted earlier, informational labour is a very heterogeneous category ranging 
from humble technicians to corporate executives and encompassing diverse material 
circumstances and interests, so they are unlikely to have much cohesiveness as a class. 
Secondly, there is no sharp dividing line between informational and generic labour, but 
rather a graduated stratification of workers with different levels and types of skill 
ranging from unskilled labourers to higher professionals – quite where generic labour 
ends and informational labour begins is difficult to tell. Thirdly, whatever their 
differences in education, informational and generic labour do share common interests as 
workers who lack ownership of the means of production. The fact that informational 
workers may be owners of collective capital is of little consequence. Many low-skilled 
workers are also owners of collective capital as members of superannuation funds. And 
while workers and owners may share a common interest in seeing a healthy 
sharemarket, this does not alter the fact that they also have conflicting interests: owners 
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have an interest in extracting as much surplus as they can from their workers (skilled or 
unskilled), while workers have an interest in resisting exploitation and domination by 
owners. This basic fact about the capitalist mode of production does not change just 
because of a shift towards informational production.  
This is not to deny that differences in education or skill are important dimensions of 
stratification, nor that they are becoming more important as the nature of production 
changes. In capitalist societies better qualified workers have always tended to occupy 
more privileged positions than those less qualified, and the possession of credentialed 
knowledge is becoming an increasingly important determinant of life chances. But skill 
differences do not replace differences in ownership; rather, they intersect and overlap in 
ways that produce complex patterns of inequality. There are two important dimensions 
to stratification: relations of production based on ownership and non-ownership of the 
means of production, and divisions of labour involving hierarchical gradations of skill 
and authority. The challenge is to develop an understanding of the relationship between 
the two which can capture the complexity and changing character of contemporary class 
relations – a challenge which is taken up in Chapter Five.  
 
 
The regulation approach 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that the case for a distinctively new form of 
capitalism and a new social epoch – whatever we should choose to call it – is not built 
on solid foundations. While capitalism has undoubtedly evolved, the extent of change 
has been routinely exaggerated and erroneously identified as something qualitatively 
new rather than a development of the longstanding dynamics of industrial capitalism 
pointed out so long ago by Marx and Weber. The imperatives of capital accumulation 
and rationalisation have always driven developments of the sort we have observed here: 
the expansion of capitalism though internationalisation and commodification; the 
constant specialisation and reorganisation within the division of labour; the utilisation of 
scientific techniques and expert knowledge to enhance production and planning; and the 
development of new technologies to gain competitive advantages and exploit new 
sources of profit. All of this has been characteristic of capitalism since the Industrial 
Revolution. The theories discussed to date do draw attention to some important trends, 
but if anything these trends represent the development and intensification of industrial 
capitalism rather than its demise. Industrial capitalism has evolved and changed but it is 
resilient, and we should be wary of proclaiming its passing without critically examining 
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the nature of change or observing the continuities. And in so doing, the alluring gloss of 
post-industrialism begins to chip away, revealing the old juggernaut of industrial 
capitalism hidden beneath. 
The question remains that if we reject the idea of an epochal transformation in 
capitalism, how are we to interpret the undeniable changes that have occurred over the 
last few decades? The answer may lie in theories which contend that capitalism is 
subject to periodic transformations as a result of economic crises and/or technological 
changes, identifying a number of phases of capitalist development since the Industrial 
Revolution but without positing a fundamental rupture with industrial society. This 
brings us back to the theories of post-Fordism mentioned earlier in the chapter. In these 
schools of thought industrialism persists but in a different form, the dynamics of change 
are familiar from earlier phases of capitalism, and the social consequences tend to be 
less profound than in the post-industrial and informational models. These theories 
identify a significant transition in the development of industrial capitalism around the 
1970s when the mass production methods of Fordism gave way to more flexible forms 
of production, enabled by technological change and institutional reforms.  
There are three main schools of thought within this broad approach. One is the 
flexible specialisation approach, which suggests that there have been two significant 
‘industrial divides’ since the late nineteenth century, the first involving the rise of mass 
production, and the second involving a transition to flexible production utilising skilled 
workers and adaptable machinery and processes to produce more diversified goods 
(Piore and Sabel 1984). The second is the neo-Schumpeterian approach, which suggests 
that there have been five long-waves of development since the Industrial Revolution, 
each based on different ‘techno-economic paradigms’ and ‘socio-institutional 
frameworks’: the age of cotton, iron and water power; the age of railways, steam power 
and mechanisation; the age of steel, heavy engineering and electrification; the age of oil, 
motorisation and mass production; and the current age of information and 
communications technology (Freeman and Louçã 2001). The third is the regulation 
approach, which identifies four modes of development since the Industrial Revolution, 
each separated by periods of crisis which result in the adoption of new forms of 
accumulation and regulation, with the latest involving a transition from Fordism to post-
Fordism (Boyer and Saillard 2002). Of these three schools, the regulation approach is 
the most influential and avoids problems of dualism in the flexible specialisation 
approach and technological determinism in the neo-Schumpeterian approach. Before 
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considering the regulation approach in greater detail, it is worth expanding on the 
concept of Fordism. 
Fordism is sometimes narrowly conceived as a particular type of production 
process, but more broadly it encompasses both production and consumption norms, 
supportive institutional frameworks and even entire social configurations.1 In the first 
instance, Fordism refers to a system of production exemplified by the assembly lines of 
Henry Ford’s automobile plants and the scientific management techniques of F.W. 
Taylor, which together rationalised production processes through a detailed technical 
division of labour and close hierarchical supervision of workers. But beyond this, Ford 
also sought to intensify the labour effort and promote consumption, along with the 
welfare and morality of workers, through pay incentives for those who conformed to 
certain standards both within and outside the workplace. The extension of this sort of 
social contract from the individual workplace to the wider society lead to the idea of 
Fordism as the foundation for a whole new social order. This was to some extent 
realised in the advanced capitalist nations after 1945, when an economic regime based 
on mass production was supported by a social contract between labour, capital and the 
state. Workers accepted the rigours of Fordist labour processes, in return for which 
employers allowed them a greater share in productivity gains through wage increases, 
while the state brokered the relationship through an active role in centralised bargaining 
and pursued Keynesian policies of stimulating aggregate demand through public 
spending and expanded welfare provision. The result was a virtuous circle of mass 
production and mass consumption: productivity gains lead to higher wages, which lead 
to increased demand, which lead to higher profits and further investment in production. 
This provided the foundation for a sustained period of economic growth which only 
began to falter in the late 1960s and to collapse in the 1970s when declining 
productivity and profitability, exacerbated by the oil crises of the 1970s, plunged 
capitalist economies into crisis and initiated a period of extensive restructuring and 
reform (Harvey 1990: 125-145; Jessop 2002: 55-94). 
 The regulation approach originates with a group of French political economists of a 
broadly Marxist persuasion known as the Parisian school, starting with the seminal 
work of Michel Aglietta (1979) on the historical development of the US economy and 
continuing in the form of an extensive international research programme today (Boyer 
                                                 
1
 The use of the term in the broadest sense owes much to Antonio Gramsci’s essay on “Americanism and 
Fordism” (Gramsci 1971: 277-318) which has been influential as a reference point for much Marxist 
writing on Fordism and post-Fordism.  
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and Saillard 2002).1 Beginning from the problematic of crises in capitalist economies, 
the Parisian regulationists reject both neoclassical assumptions of economic equilibrium 
and Marxist predictions of an inevitable and final breakdown of capitalism. Instead, 
they seek to demonstrate how periodic crises are resolved through economic and 
institutional transformations which enable capital accumulation to remain relatively 
stable over long periods of time. This general approach has spawned a number of 
different schools of thought across the social sciences, concerned not just with 
economic change but also with locating various patterns of social change within 
economic contexts (Jessop 1990; 1997).2 Rather than attempting to survey this diversity 
of thought, the following summary focuses on the core features of the approach 
developed by the Parisian school and outlined in introductory works by Robert Boyer 
and colleagues (Boyer 1990; Boyer and Saillard 2002).  
The regulation approach sees the history of capitalism as progressing through 
successive modes of development consisting of different regimes of accumulation and 
modes of regulation. Regimes of accumulation involve particular configurations of 
production and consumption which allow periods of sustained capital accumulation and 
the postponement or resolution of cyclical tendencies towards disequilibrium. Such 
regimes are based on distinctive technological paradigms consisting not just of 
particular types of technology, but also associated labour processes and production 
methods. Accumulation regimes can be broadly categorised into two main types: 
extensive and intensive. Extensive accumulation is based on increasing the level of 
absolute surplus value by utilising greater quantities of labour to expand the scale of 
production, while intensive accumulation involves increasing the rate of relative surplus 
value through new methods of production which enable greater productivity and more 
intensive exploitation of labour. Because intensive accumulation brings productivity 
gains which can be passed on in wage increases, it is more conducive to the expansion 
of consumption. These two types of accumulation are not mutually exclusive but one or 
                                                 
1
 Some confusion has resulted from the direct translation of the French term ‘régulation’ into the more 
narrowly understood English term ‘regulation’. Régulation, to the Parisian school, refers to the way in 
which institutionalised social relations operate to ensure the systemic reproduction of the mode of 
production, which is far broader than the type of microeconomic management signalled by the English 
understanding of regulation (Boyer and Saillard 2002: 1). Where the term ‘regulation’ is used here, it 
should be understood in the broader sense intended by the French writers. 
2
 Notable examples of the use of the regulation approach in other branches of the social sciences include 
Jessop’s work which focuses primarily on the changing nature of the state in capitalist societies (Jessop 
2002; Jessop and Sum 2006), Peck’s work on the social regulation and spatial contexts of labour markets 
(1996) and the transition from the welfare to the workfare state (2001), Koch’s analysis of labour markets 
and patterns of social inclusion and exclusion in post-Fordism (2006), and Harvey’s work on the 
relationship between post-Fordism and postmodernity (1990).  
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other will tend to predominate in given contexts. Each accumulation regime is 
supported by a mode of regulation, which is a set of institutionalised norms, behaviours 
and organisational forms that support the accumulation regime and ensure its 
reproduction. Here again, two main types of regulation are identified: competitive and 
monopolistic – the former involving the liberal play of market forces and the latter 
involving a more managed economy dominated by monopoly capital and an 
interventionist state. A mode of regulation is characterised by a particular constellation 
of institutional forms which include the nature of the capital–labour relation, the forms 
of competition between enterprises, the monetary and financial regime, the nature of the 
international regime and the role of the state. In a given mode of regulation, institutional 
forms tend to be complementary so that each contributes to their collective reproduction 
and the overall cohesion of the mode of regulation. Modes of regulation are not 
explained teleologically as a functional requirement of the accumulation regime, but as 
an outcome of political struggles in which particular groups are able to force 
compromises that support their interests. The conjunction of a particular accumulation 
regime and a compatible mode of regulation in a distinctive and relatively stable 
economic configuration constitutes a mode of development.1 Modes of development can 
vary cross-nationally within any given era as distinctive national histories, cultures and 
political relations play an important role in shaping the nature of institutions and 
determining national growth models.  
New modes of development originate in attempts to resolve structural economic 
crises which threaten accumulation. Such crises arise from endogenous rather than 
exogenous causes and can take two forms: a crisis of the mode of regulation in which a 
failure to overcome cyclical fluctuations destabilises the institutional forms and 
necessitates reform to the mode of regulation; and a crisis of the accumulation regime, 
in which the limits of the regime are reached and the recovery of profitability and 
accumulation requires alternative methods of production, types of products, 
technologies and locations for production. If such crises are not resolved, they have the 
potential to develop into a crisis of the mode of production which threatens the viability 
of capitalism, but to date capitalism has proved remarkably resilient in recovering from 
crisis through restructuring. This has seen it move through a succession of different 
                                                 
1
 The concept of mode of development is used in a somewhat different sense from Castells’s usage. In 
both cases it refers to a particular historical phase within capitalism, but for Castells modes of 
development are defined by the dominant technologies of the age while in regulation theory they are 
defined by distinctive forms of accumulation and regulation. 
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modes of development since the Industrial Revolution, based on different combinations 
of accumulation and regulation. Initially there was an expansionary phase of extensive 
accumulation and competitive regulation lasting through most of the nineteenth century. 
This was followed by a transitional period of intensive accumulation in which mass 
production techniques developed but a competitive mode of regulation restrained wages 
and prevented the development of mass consumption, leading to overinvestment and the 
crisis of the 1930s. This contradiction was resolved during the Fordist period, in which 
intensive accumulation was further enhanced by mass production methods, but was now 
accompanied by a monopoly mode of regulation in which compromises between capital 
and labour, mediated by the state, delivered real wage growth which enabled mass 
consumption and sustained an unprecedented period of growth between the Second 
World War and the early 1970s. The regime began to falter in the late 1960s for a 
number of reasons: mass production techniques started to exhaust their potential for 
productivity gains; increasing internationalisation of economic activity destabilised the 
domestic circuits of mass production and mass consumption; increases in wages and 
social expenditure created inflationary pressures; and consumer preferences began to 
shift away from standardised mass-produced goods and services. All this was 
exacerbated by the oil crisis of 1973 and developed into a major structural crisis which 
eventually initiated a period of extensive restructuring of capitalist enterprises and both 
national and international economies, beginning the new phase of capitalism loosely 
referred to as post-Fordism.1 
There is no single hegemonic model of post-Fordism, but rather a variety of national 
models which share some characteristics and differ in others, representing the outcomes 
of political struggles in different national contexts.2 Boyer and Amable amongst others 
have identified four major varieties of post-Fordist capitalism in the OECD based on 
different modes of regulation (Boyer 2000; 2005; Amable 2000; 2004). Firstly, there is 
the market-oriented model typical of most English-speaking countries, in which market 
logic provides the organising principle, with an emphasis on competitiveness and 
innovation and a reduced role for the state. Secondly, there is the meso-corporatist 
                                                 
1
 The regulationists’ periodisation of capitalism is disputed by some, particularly in terms of whether it is 
possible to distinguish different eras according to different regimes of accumulation (Brenner and Glick 
1991). These issues are too complex to enter into here, but in terms of this thesis the important point is 
that there is generally accepted to have been a shift in the nature of capitalism following the crisis of the 
1970s involving a departure from mass production and monopolistic regulation – though there are 
differing perspectives on how this should be interpreted. 
2
 The same was true of Fordism, of which Tickell and Peck (1995) identify nine variations based on 
different couplings of accumulation and regulation.   
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model which prevails in countries like Japan and Korea, in which large firms dominate 
the economy and the state has an important co-ordinating role. Thirdly, there is the 
statist model typical of some continental European countries such as France and to a 
lesser extent Germany, which is a state-driven form of capitalism with a relatively high 
level of public intervention in economic activity. And finally, there is the social-
democratic model found in the Scandinavian countries, which is characterised by 
greater social partnership between different interest groups and negotiation over the 
nature of regulation.  
New Zealand conforms most closely to the market-oriented model, which will be 
described in more detail in the next chapter when we investigate the restructuring of the 
New Zealand economy. But in very broad outline we can identify some critical shifts in 
the nature of accumulation and regulation in countries adopting this model. The virtuous 
circle of mass production and mass consumption gives way to one of flexible 
production and fragmented consumption, utilising microelectronic technology and 
flexible labour to produce short runs of diversified products, which together with 
customised services cater to an increasingly differentiated and fast-changing market – a 
regime which has been characterised as one of ‘flexible accumulation’ (Harvey 1990).1 
This is accompanied by a return to a more competitive mode of regulation based on 
neoliberal principles of unfettered market competition. Institutional reforms within the 
mode of regulation involve a number of important changes: dissolution of the capital–
labour compromise, which weakens the bargaining power of labour; enhancement of 
competition through deregulation of product markets; loosening of restrictions on the 
flow of capital within financial markets; prioritisation of inflation control as the goal of 
monetary policy; withdrawal of the state from its formerly interventionist role in the 
economy; and greater integration of national economies within the international 
economy (Jessop 2002). Although this model enabled capitalist economies to recover 
from the crisis of the 1970s and set a new trajectory for development, it failed to deliver 
the sort of stable long-term growth experienced during the Fordist era. Growth was 
slower and more intermittent, sustained by rising debt and a series of short-lived 
                                                 
1
 While the transition to post-Fordism undoubtedly involved some ‘flexibilisation’ of production, critics 
have rightly observed a tendency in some of the literature to overstate the degree of flexibility and the 
contrast with the inflexibilities of Fordism – Fordism was perhaps not as universally inflexible as some 
would paint it, and post-Fordism not as exceptionally flexible (Pollert 1991; Curry 1993; Sayer and 
Walker 1992: 191-223). Moreover, mass production methods do survive in some large manufacturing and 
service enterprises – although even here there does tend to be a greater diversity of products and services 
and more flexible production processes, which some have termed ‘flexible mass production’ (Boyer and 
Durand 1997). 
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bubbles based on speculation in financial and property markets, which resulted in a 
succession of crises culminating in the major financial crisis which began in 2007 
(Foster and Magdoff 2009).  
The regulation approach stresses the role of class interests in determining 
trajectories of economic development. It has already been noted that the Fordist mode of 
development was based on a quid pro quo compromise between capital and labour, 
under which workers accepted Fordist production methods in return for collective 
bargaining rights, real wage growth and expanded welfare provisions. While capital 
benefited from the resulting expansion of consumption, by the 1970s there was growing 
resistance among employers and business interests to the power of organised labour, 
high levels of industrial action, the inflationary effects of wage growth and the tax 
burden imposed by the welfare state. This fuelled the rise of neoliberalism, which some 
commentators see as a reassertion of capitalist class power in response to the advances 
made by labour over preceding decades (Harvey 2005; Duménil and Lévy 2004).1 
While it might be arguable whether the actors concerned perceived it in such terms, 
there is no doubt that the eventual triumph of neoliberalism greatly benefited capital at 
the expense of labour, initiating a marked redistribution of income from wages to 
profits, a loosening of restraints on capital’s ability to pursue those profits, a restriction 
of labour’s ability to organise for higher wages and better conditions, and an abdication 
by the state from the responsibility of compensating labour through an adequate social 
wage in the form of state welfare (Glyn 2006). 
In a sense, the Fordist and post-Fordist modes of development can be characterised 
as contrasting and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to resolve an irresolvable 
contradiction within capitalism – the fact that workers constitute both costs of 
production and sources of consumption. In the Fordist period, the emphasis was on 
workers as consumers and wage growth was seen as a means to stimulate consumption, 
but this proved unsustainable once productivity growth slowed and the cost of labour 
began to undermine profitability and stimulate inflation. In market-oriented post-
Fordism, the emphasis shifted to treating workers as costs of production and containing 
those costs by deregulating labour markets, weakening organised labour and relocating 
                                                 
1
 Neoliberalism is variously understood as an ideology, a policy framework and a form of 
governmentality (Larner 2000). In this thesis it is used to refer to the ideological legitimation for the 
market-oriented mode of regulation. Thus, following Harvey, it can be defined as “a theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices” (2005: 2).  
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production to low-wage countries. This had two significant consequences which 
ultimately lead to the current financial crisis. Firstly, the redistribution of income from 
labour to capital and from low to high income earners meant a greater share of that 
income was invested in financial and property markets as opposed to consumption, 
shifting the locus of economic activity from production to speculation. This 
financialisation of the economy was encouraged by deregulation and globalisation of 
financial markets, which enabled excessive speculation by financial institutions 
supported by massive debt-leveraging. Secondly, the constraint on wages meant private 
consumption could only be sustained by rising household debt, facilitated by easy credit 
and high levels of borrowing against rapidly appreciating property values. This debt 
filtered through the deregulated financial system in the form of mortgage-backed 
securities repackaged into complex and opaque financial products. Large volumes of 
household debt turned ‘toxic’ with the bursting of the US housing bubble in 2006–2007, 
destabilising already highly leveraged financial institutions and precipitating the global 
financial crisis in 2007 (Foster and Magdoff 2009; Harvey 2010). 
Neoliberal capitalism was thus hoist with its own petard, although it remains to be 
seen whether this will prove fatal. Attempts to remedy the crisis have already been some 
retreat from neoliberalism, with moves towards re-regulation, greater state intervention 
and a revival of Keynesian stimulus spending. But these may be short-term fixes rather 
than long-term strategies, and have not as yet fundamentally altered the neoliberal 
framework. Most importantly, the underlying problems – income inequality, stagnating 
production, unsustainable debt levels and a rapacious financial sector – remain 
unresolved and require more than mere tinkering in order to be remedied. The last major 
crisis in the early 1970s was followed by protracted political struggles over economic 
directions before the neoliberal solution in the form of Thatcherism and Reaganomics 
emerged triumphant almost a decade later (Harvey 2005). It is likely that efforts to solve 
capitalism’s current problems will also play out over several years of political struggle, 
compromises and failed strategies before we can discern the long-term consequences of 
the present crisis and the shape of the capitalism to come.  
It might seem that we have now travelled some distance from our initial concern 
with the changing division of labour in capitalism. In fact, much of the post-Fordist 
literature has little to say about the social division of labour, while its concern with the 
technical division of labour is largely confined to the issue of changes in labour 
processes. But what the regulation approach does is provide us with a way of 
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interpreting the changes in capitalism which have in turn shaped changes to the division 
of labour and its manifestations in employment and class structures, and so enables us to 
contextualise the analysis of those topics within an understanding of processes of 
capitalist development. An example of this is Koch’s (2006) comparative study of post-
Fordist labour markets and social structures in Europe, which he presents as an attempt 
to address a dual gap: “on the one hand, social structure played only a minor role in 
regulation theory and, in particular, in the debate on the transition from Fordist to post-
Fordist growth strategies; on the other hand, regulation theoretical concepts have been 
hitherto rarely considered in the debate on social inequality and stratification” (2006: 1-
2). The current thesis can be seen as a similar attempt (albeit somewhat different in 
approach) to address this dual gap in the New Zealand context – although in New 
Zealand the task is magnified as neither the regulation approach nor the study of social 
stratification have been strong currents in academic thought.  
The ways in which restructuring reshapes labour markets, employment structures 
and social inequalities depends very much on the specifics of the national context, 
particularly a nation’s economic history, its natural resources, its location in the 
international division of labour and the mode of regulation it adopts. The specifics of 
the New Zealand situation will unfold over the course of the following chapters, but in 
broad terms they are the changes already highlighted in the discussion on post-industrial 
theory. These include: structural shifts from goods production to producer and 
consumer services and circulation activities; occupational shifts from manual 
production work to a combination of low-skilled and knowledge-based work which 
either provides services or indirectly supports goods production; and a limited shift 
away from the standard full-time wage-earner model towards more destandardised 
forms of employment. In terms of class structure, this means a shift from working-class 
to middle-class jobs; a shift within the working class from blue-collar to white- or grey-
collar work; and a shift within the middle class towards professional and managerial 
work. All these trends also have important implications for gender and ethnic 
inequality, as gender and ethnic groups are distributed inequitably within the division of 
labour and are therefore differentially affected by changes in the nature of production 
and employment. 
It might be reasonably asked that if these are all changes which are highlighted by 
post-industrial theory, what is to be gained from discarding that approach and opting for 
the regulation approach? One reason is that the regulation approach is not an epochal 
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theory which rests on demonstrating a decisive break from industrial capitalism, but is 
instead concerned with changes in the nature of industrial capitalism and is therefore 
less prone to the hyperbole which we observed in the discussion on post-industrial 
theory (a point of difference which is obscured by some critics who mistakenly seem to 
regard post-Fordism as synonymous with post-industrialism). Another related reason is 
that if we wish to locate the changes in the division of labour within the context of 
capitalist development we need a sound understanding of how capitalism develops and 
the ways in which it has changed. The regulation approach is better equipped than post-
industrial theory to capture the way that capitalism progresses through stuttering steps 
rather than giant leaps, through a succession of different modes of development of 
varying success rather than through quantum jumps from agrarianism to industrialism to 
informationalism. And it is better equipped to analyse those changes in terms of 
capitalism’s own internal logic – its cycles of growth, crisis and restructuring and the 
play of class interests – rather than attributing them to exogenous and uncontrollable 
forces of technological change or globalisation or networking logic. The regulation 
approach balances themes of both change and continuity by highlighting the transitions 
between Fordism and post-Fordism while explaining them in terms of the established 
imperatives of capitalism: the need to sustain capital accumulation and resolve crisis 
tendencies through viable forms of production and consumption and compatible forms 
of regulation. While post-industrial theory puts an overwhelming emphasis on change 
and its staunchest critics counter with a stubborn emphasis on the continuities of 
industrial capitalism, the regulation approach shows how change and continuity go hand 
in hand, and how industrial capitalism survives in its essential features by changing.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, we can return to where we began, with the classical perspectives on the 
division of labour. That discussion highlighted the fact that the progressive expansion of 
and specialisation within the division of labour was an enduring feature of the growth of 
human society, but also that industrial capitalism gave considerable impetus to that 
process by virtue of its expansionary dynamics and its intensification and rationalisation 
of production processes. This is the theme developed by Sayer and Walker (1992), who 
show that many of the developments we have discussed here can be seen as aspects of 
the ongoing widening and deepening of the division of labour and efforts to better 
organise and integrate it. In this sense, the division of labour should be seen not just as 
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an outcome of other developments, but as a dynamic force in its own right and a 
concept with considerable explanatory power. There is undoubted merit in this 
argument and much to be said for restoring the division of labour to its former position 
as a central concept in the analysis of industrial capitalism. However, it would be wrong 
to suggest that the division of labour simply expands and complexifies constantly and 
inexorably in tandem with the expansion of capitalism. Within the ongoing long-term 
evolution of the division of labour, there are particular conjunctures at which it is 
subject to more sudden and severe upheavals. These episodes accelerate the demise of 
some industries and occupations, hasten the rise of others, and bring about new ways of 
organising the complex whole at both the micro-level of technical divisions of labour 
and the macro-level of the social division of labour. Such instances of creative 
destruction occur most dramatically at those conjunctures where economic crises 
precipitate the restructuring of capitalism through new models of accumulation and 
regulation, abetted by new technologies. The regulation approach provides an 
understanding of these periods of upheaval and can therefore complement the focus on 
the long-term evolution of the division of labour, allowing an integration of the themes 
of change and continuity. This is the perspective which informs the empirical analysis 
of the changing nature of work and stratification in New Zealand in the following 
chapters, beginning with a look at the economic transformations resulting from the 
neoliberal restructuring project of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 2 
 
Economic Transformation in New Zealand  
 
 
 
 
 
 
There can be few better examples of capitalism’s capacity for reinvention than the 
transformation of the New Zealand economy in the 1980s and 1990s. Over a few short 
years of intense reform and restructuring, it went from being an exemplary model of 
Fordist accumulation and monopolistic regulation to an almost antithetical example of 
flexible accumulation and competitive regulation. The stimulus for the transformation 
lay in the global crisis of capitalism in the 1970s, which severely damaged the New 
Zealand economy, and the subsequent failure of Keynesian-Fordist strategies to reset 
the country on the path of growth and prosperity. The neoliberal solution adopted by 
New Zealand from 1984 onwards was not its own creation but was already being 
implemented in some of the world’s most powerful economies such as the USA and the 
UK. However, New Zealand arguably took the neoliberal path further and faster than 
any other developed country at that time, at considerable human cost in terms of 
unemployment, inequality and poverty. While the strategy eventually delivered renewed 
growth in production and jobs, it was a faltering and short-lived recovery which ended 
resoundingly with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007–08. This cycle of 
crisis, restructuring, growth and further crisis conforms closely to the interpretation of 
capitalist development provided by the regulation approach, but this perspective is 
rarely brought to bear on the analysis of New Zealand’s economic transformation.1  
This chapter attempts to show the utility of the regulation approach to 
understanding the transition between the two contrasting modes of development which 
prevailed before and after the crisis of the 1970s. It begins with a brief account of the 
development of the New Zealand economy prior to that crisis, then provides a narrative 
                                                 
1
 Of the many general accounts of the restructuring of the New Zealand economy, only O’Brien and 
Wilkes (1993) draw on the regulation approach, but this is largely confined to a characterisation of the 
before and after economies as models of Fordism and post-Fordism. Neilson applies the French 
regulationist perspective more systematically to interpreting the changing nature of the state (1998) and 
the implications for the labour movement (1993). Elsewhere in the literature there are scattered references 
to Fordism and post-Fordism which owe little explicit debt to the regulation approach, while more 
systematic applications of the approach are generally confined to rather narrow research topics. 
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of three phases in the subsequent transition to a new mode of development – the stages 
of crisis, restructuring and consolidation – before concluding with an outline of the key 
features of post-Fordist accumulation and regulation. This is a necessarily brief and 
schematic account as the objective is not to provide a detailed analysis of New 
Zealand’s economic development, but to establish a context for the analysis of 
accompanying transitions in the labour market and the division of labour which will 
follow in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
From colonialism to Fordism 
 
The development of capitalism in New Zealand can be periodised into four relatively 
distinct phases or modes of development separated by periods of economic crisis which 
were resolved through extensive programmes of reform and restructuring. The first is 
the colonial period, which established the pre-conditions for the capitalist economy and 
the subjugation of the Maori economy through the appropriation of land and an influx 
of labour – a period which is framed by the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 
and the start of the Long Depression in the late 1870s.1 The second is the neo-colonial 
period, an age of agrarian capitalism which saw the consolidation of a pastoral economy 
linked closely to Britain through flows of trade and finance, spanning the period from 
the 1890s to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The third is the Fordist period, which 
began with the election of the first Labour Government in 1935 and matured during the 
long boom from the end of the Second World War until the crisis of the 1970s. And the 
fourth phase is the post-Fordist era which commenced with the election of the fourth 
Labour Government in 1984 and takes us up to the beginnings of the new crisis in 2007.  
In terms of the time periods, these phases broadly accord with the periodisation of 
capitalism identified by the Parisian regulationists and discussed in the previous 
chapter. However, the nature of capitalism in the earlier periods was obviously very 
different in New Zealand to that in the more advanced economies of Western Europe 
and North America. New Zealand was still very much a frontier society when Britain 
was in the full throes of the Industrial Revolution, and industrialisation in New Zealand 
was constrained until after the Second World War. Despite considerable growth in 
manufacturing and service industries since 1945, New Zealand is still distinguished 
                                                 
1
 This phase was preceded by a period of initial contact between 1769 and 1840 in which the European 
presence consisted mainly of sealers, whalers, traders and missionaries. As there was no large-scale settler 
colonisation in this period, and capitalist relations of production were therefore not prevalent, this era is 
excluded from the periodisation of capitalism in New Zealand.  
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from most of the larger capitalist economies by its dependence on agricultural exports. 
However, periods of growth and crisis in the New Zealand economy have clearly been 
linked to the vicissitudes of the more advanced economies to which it exports its 
primary products. And as the New Zealand economy has developed, the modes of 
regulation which have emerged from periods of crisis have borne increasing 
resemblance to those of the larger capitalist economies. By the time of the post-1945 
boom, New Zealand exhibited a mode of regulation which was as thoroughly Fordist as 
those of the USA and Britain – although it was much less dependent on Fordist mass 
production. After the collapse of Fordism, New Zealand even became something of a 
global pacesetter in its programme of restructuring and reform and its commitment to 
the tenets of neoliberalism. The focus in this chapter is very much on the transition from 
Fordism to the market-oriented post-Fordist mode of development, but before 
examining that we need to briefly consider New Zealand’s integration into the 
international division of labour as an agricultural producer, which played a critical role 
in its subsequent development.  
The colonisation of New Zealand in the mid-nineteenth century has been explained 
by Bedggood (1980: 19-22) as the outcome of a crisis in British capitalism which 
necessitated colonial expansion in a quest for outlets for surplus capital and surplus 
labour. The initial phase of capitalism in the colony can be seen in Marxian terms as a 
period of primitive accumulation in which the necessary conditions for capitalist 
agriculture were established through dispossession of Maori land and the creation of a 
class of wage labourers, drawn primarily from landless immigrants and supplemented 
where necessary by indigenous labour. Land was acquired by a variety of means 
including legitimate purchase, fraudulent transactions, military conquest and 
government confiscations (Sorrenson 1992). By the 1870s the vast majority of the 
country’s productive land was in the hands of Pakeha settlers, and public works 
schemes were opening up more land for farming and establishing the infrastructure for 
capitalist agriculture. The main focus of agriculture in this period was the production of 
wool for the British market, while cereals, meat and dairy products were mainly 
produced for the domestic market. Growth in agriculture also stimulated expansion in 
the social division of labour, which saw the development of service industries such as 
mercantile, financial and transport services along with secondary industries concerned 
with primary product processing and public works. New Zealand’s integration into the 
world economy as an agricultural exporter made it susceptible to international crises, 
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and the contraction in export markets resulting from the Long Depression stalled the 
development of the fledgling economy and mired it in a protracted period of stagnation 
lasting from the late 1870s to the early 1890s (Gardner 1992; Hawke 1985; McAloon 
2009). 
The next phase of New Zealand’s development saw further consolidation of its 
position as an agricultural producer and a sustained period of growth from the mid-
1890s until the start of the 1920s, followed by more faltering growth until the onset of 
the Great Depression (Hawke 1985; Brooking 1992). The initial recovery owed much to 
the fortuitous combination of a revival in export markets and a crucial technological 
development in the form of refrigerated shipping, which allowed the export of meat and 
dairy products to Britain. Accumulation thus became centred on pastoral production of 
wool, meat and dairy products for export, with the earnings funding the importation of 
manufactured goods and further investment in agricultural production. Reciprocal flows 
of goods and capital tied New Zealand closely to Britain in what Denoon (1983) 
characterises as a relationship of ‘unforced dependence’, determined not by imperial 
control but by internal social forces. This involved the consolidation of a mode of 
regulation which favoured the allied interests of farmers, merchants and financiers over 
those of industrial capital and urban labour (Armstrong 1978). Industrialisation 
remained a distant prospect, with secondary production confined largely to the 
processing of primary products, while the domestic market for manufactures was 
constrained by low wages and poor living standards among the working class. But while 
New Zealand’s fortunes may have been heavily reliant on agricultural exports, it was 
not exactly a nation of farmers. Mechanisation of agriculture and expansion of the 
surrounding social division of labour meant that by the mid-1920s only about three in 
every ten New Zealand workers were employed in primary industries – slightly more 
than the proportion in the secondary sector (25 percent), but considerably less than the 
proportion in service industries (45 percent).1  
Heavy dependence on agricultural exports and foreign capital meant that New 
Zealand was again hit hard by an international crisis when the Great Depression struck 
in 1929. A period of massive unemployment and widespread hardship was followed by 
the election of the first Labour Government in 1935, which set the foundations for the 
Fordist mode of development that would deliver renewed growth and prosperity after 
                                                 
1
 The figure for primary industries includes forestry, fishing and mining as well as farming. The figure for 
secondary industries includes construction and utilities as well as manufacturing. Less than 16 percent of 
workers were engaged in manufacturing. 
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the Second World War. We observed in the previous chapter that the regulation 
approach highlights the role of class struggle and compromise in setting trajectories of 
economic development, and this was certainly true of New Zealand in the 1930s. 
Labour’s election and subsequent strategy built on disaffections which emerged in the 
preceding period: real wage increases had been constrained while farmers, merchants 
and speculators enjoyed prosperity; the industrial arbitration system had proved 
generally unfavourable to workers’ interests; and Depression-era policies failed to 
alleviate widespread unemployment and hardship. All this created a tide of support for 
the advancement of working-class interests through both trade unions and parliamentary 
representation (Richardson 1992). The Labour Government’s response was a 
compromise which would stabilise the capitalist economy rather than replace it, and 
would deliver both better standards of living for workers and profits for capital (Jesson 
1989: 14-21). It was a compromise which was maintained largely intact for at least three 
decades after the War in an era dominated by National governments, in what Roper 
calls a period of ‘Keynesian consensus’ (2005: 121-138).  
The compromise was built on a strong role for the state in the management of the 
economy and distribution of the social product. The labour movement largely 
surrendered its goal of socialism and accepted the constraints of the capital–labour 
relation in return for ongoing real wage increases, full employment and expansion of the 
welfare state through health, education, housing and social security provisions. Capital 
reluctantly accepted restrictions on commercial freedoms and the need to share 
productivity gains in return for a compliant workforce, expanding domestic markets and 
economic stability. There were also compromises between different fractions of capital, 
as agrarian interests made concessions to industrial capital by accepting import controls 
and channelling of investment into domestic secondary industries, while in turn 
receiving benefits in the form of guaranteed prices, subsidies and centralised marketing. 
The problems associated with New Zealand’s heavy dependence on agricultural exports 
had been exposed by the Depression and it was clear that the primary sector could not 
provide sufficient employment for a growing population, particularly at a time when 
farming was being rapidly mechanised. While New Zealand’s destiny as an agricultural 
producer was by this time irrevocably sealed, it was clear that industrialisation was 
required in order to expand domestic production and employment and to reduce 
dependence on the export earnings of the primary sector. This was achieved through a 
mix of import controls and demand management policies. Import licensing provided the 
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necessary protection for secondary industries, with the granting of licenses manipulated 
to keep out finished consumer goods while allowing the importation of materials or 
capital goods which would provide inputs into domestic manufacturing. Demand for the 
products of protected industries came almost entirely from within the domestic 
economy and was sustained by real wage increases, monetary policy which expanded 
the availability of credit, and fiscal policy which expanded spending on welfare, health, 
education and housing (Hawke 1985; 1992; Easton 1997b; Roper 2005).  
This mode of development conformed in its essential elements to the brand of 
Fordism which prevailed in North America, North-western Europe, the United 
Kingdom and Australia (Jessop 2002: 55-58), albeit with distinctive features owing to a 
continued dependence on agricultural exports, the relatively embryonic state of the 
manufacturing sector and a small domestic market, which together constrained the 
development of large-scale mass-production industries. Nonetheless, its technological 
paradigm was based on advances in machine technology which delivered productivity 
gains in agriculture and – in combination with Taylorist technical divisions of labour – 
in the manufacture of both consumer and producer goods.1 Its accumulation regime was 
based on the production of agricultural goods for export and of standardised processed 
goods, consumer durables and services for domestic consumption; with export demand 
fuelled by Fordist growth in foreign markets (particularly Britain) and domestic demand 
fuelled by productivity-linked wage growth and expanding welfare provisions at home. 
O’Brien and Wilkes (1993: 16-18) use the term ‘dependent agricultural Fordism’ to 
characterise Fordist accumulation in New Zealand, on the grounds that mass production 
largely involved the production and processing of primary products rather than 
manufactured goods, and that these products were largely consumed not in the domestic 
market but in the British market. While this does highlight the distinctiveness of the 
New Zealand situation, it neglects the critical role import substitution industries played 
in sustaining accumulation during this era. Those industries were dependent on 
agricultural exports to fund the importation of manufacturing inputs, but primary 
production accounted for a relatively small and declining share of GDP and 
employment, while within the secondary sector the processing of local primary products 
                                                 
1
 It has become customary to decry New Zealand’s manufacturing sector in this period as inefficient and 
sclerotic, but empirical analysis by McAloon (2006) reveals a more varied picture with several industries 
exhibiting considerable technological and organisational innovation which yielded significant 
improvements in productivity and competitiveness.  
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was less significant than the processing of imported manufacturing inputs for the 
domestic market (Hawke 1985: 258). 
The accumulation regime was supported by a mode of regulation that conformed 
closely to the institutional forms typical of Fordism. Firstly, the capital–labour relation 
was regulated by the compromise which delivered real wage growth through collective 
bargaining. Second, competition was restricted by a range of import barriers, subsidies, 
price controls and investment restrictions which favoured the development of 
monopolies and oligopolies in many sectors (often state-owned). Third, the monetary 
and financial regime involved tight regulation of the financial sector, while the Reserve 
Bank managed the money supply to promote dual objectives of full employment and 
price stability. Fourth, the state had a strongly interventionist role focussed on 
sustaining economic growth and full employment through demand management and 
regulatory controls and through its own role as an employer. And finally, the 
relationship with the international economy was characterised by a greater degree of 
insulation than in the past thanks to the development of import substitution industries – 
although New Zealand was perhaps less insulated than the larger Fordist economies due 
to its continued reliance on agricultural exports and imported manufacturing inputs.1  
The Fordist mode of development delivered sustained growth, full employment and 
rising incomes for most of the period from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Growth rates 
were steady rather than spectacular, averaging over four percent per annum, which was 
healthy by historical standards but not sufficient to maintain New Zealand’s relative 
international standing, as GDP per capita gradually slipped below the OECD average by 
the mid-1960s (Easton 1997b: 15-27). Demand for labour generally exceeded supply 
despite a growing working-age population, increasing labour force participation by 
women and Maori, and relatively high levels of immigration, with unemployment 
hovering at around one percent until the mid-1970s.2 Employment grew rapidly in both 
secondary and tertiary industries, with the former employing 35 percent of the 
workforce and the latter 53 percent by 1971. The primary sector’s declining share of 
employment was matched by a falling share of GDP – just 12 percent by the late 1960s 
                                                 
1
 Paradoxically, import controls increased the penetration of foreign capital as foreign manufacturers who 
wanted access to the New Zealand market were required to establish finishing operations here, with the 
prime example being the vehicle assembly industry (Hawke 1985: 273-274). 
2
 Based on Census data. Registered unemployment was considerably lower, averaging around 0.1 percent 
of the labour force between 1950 and 1974 (Roper 2005: 4), but this measure understates the actual level 
of unemployment as many job-seekers would not have formally registered with the Department of Labour 
when jobs were plentiful and the duration of unemployment was likely to be relatively short. The Census 
measure includes people looking for work but not formally registered.   
Economic Transformation in New Zealand     54 
(Easton 1997b: 140). But while agriculture no longer dominated the domestic economy, 
it still dominated the country’s exports as the protected manufacturing sector was 
focussed on import substitution and generally too inefficient to compete in overseas 
markets. New Zealand therefore remained vulnerable to fluctuations in international 
commodity markets, suffering from a major collapse in wool prices in the late 1960s, 
benefiting from a subsequent commodity price boom in the early 1970s, and then being 
plunged into recession when struck by the multiple blows of the global crisis in 
Fordism, the first oil shock and Britain’s entry into the EEC, which all occurred around 
1973–74. This spelt the beginning of the end for the Fordist mode of development, 
although it would be a decade before it finally succumbed to the gathering forces of 
neoliberalism. 
 
 
Fordism in crisis 
 
The period from the crisis of the early 1970s to that of the late 2000s can be divided into 
three phases which are typical of the restructuring of capitalist economies. The first 
consists of failed attempts to resolve the crisis within the framework of the existing 
mode of development, in this case through Keynesian-Fordist fixes. The failure of these 
strategies leads to the second phase which involves radical restructuring of the economy 
based on a wholly new strategy, in this case the neoliberal project. The third phase 
involves consolidation and embedding of the new mode of development, which may 
involve some compromise and a limited ‘rolling back’ of some earlier reforms in order 
to achieve a political consensus – in this case what is sometimes described as a ‘third 
way’ strategy. The duration of the third phase depends on the stability and success of 
the new mode of development and in this case it was rather short-lived, delivering a 
relatively brief period of unstable growth before being dealt what may prove to be a 
terminal blow by the global financial crisis.  
The course of this process of crisis, restructuring and consolidation tends to be 
shaped in large part by struggle and compromise between competing class interests in 
which political actors play pivotal roles. In most developed countries, the neoliberal 
solution was advanced by parties which represented the interests of capital, notably 
Thatcher’s Conservatives in the UK and Reagan’s Republicans in the US. But in New 
Zealand we had the curious situation of the traditional party of business interests 
(National) pursuing Keynesian solutions between 1975 and 1984, before the traditional 
party of the working class (Labour) implemented a neoliberal restructuring agenda 
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between 1984 and 1990. Normal business was resumed when the National Government 
of the 1990s finished off some aspects of the process which had been politically 
unpalatable to Labour – notably welfare and labour market reform – before the Labour 
Government of 1999–2008 adopted a third-way strategy which tempered some of the 
more extreme aspects of earlier reforms while leaving most of the neoliberal programme 
firmly in place (Roper 2005). We will return to the restructuring process in the next 
section after outlining the course of the crisis in Fordism.  
As Roper observes, most accounts of New Zealand’s crisis of the 1970s and early 
1980s blame a combination of external shocks which severely affected the country’s 
terms of trade – particularly the oil crisis and Britain’s entry into the EEC – and poor 
economic management by government (Roper 2005: 6-14). Such explanations fail to 
account for the causes of the global crisis which afflicted other industrialised countries 
and consequently damaged New Zealand’s export markets, a crisis which was 
exacerbated rather than caused by the first oil shock. Roper argues that the primary 
cause of the crisis both in New Zealand and internationally was declining profitability, 
which he explains in Marxist terms as a result of the law of the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall (Roper 2005: 14-20). This argument, in simplified terms, is that 
competition impels capitalists to replace variable capital (living labour) with constant 
capital (plant and machinery etc), and as the former is the source of surplus value the 
rate of profit tends to fall and the process of accumulation suffers. The theory of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall is contentious even within Marxism, where 
competing explanations of crisis focus on under-consumption (or over-production) 
resulting from workers being paid less than the value of their labour and thus creating a 
demand gap between what they produce and what they can afford to consume, while 
others focus on the wage squeeze which occurs when pressure for increases in real 
wages impacts adversely on the rate of profit (Clarke 1994). The regulation approach 
tends to eschew monocausal explanations of crisis as the circumstances of different 
episodes may vary, but it concurs with the general Marxist perspective that capitalism 
has inherent tendencies towards crises – amply demonstrated by the frequency of their 
recurrence throughout history – and that these are manifested in declining profitability 
and explicable in terms of capitalism’s own internal logic rather than the exogenous 
factors blamed by neoclassical and Keynesian economists. 
Whatever the explanation for capitalism’s long-term crisis tendencies, the question 
remains as to how crises are forestalled over long periods of sustained growth and why 
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such growth models eventually break down. To answer that, we have to move from the 
abstract laws of capitalism to the specifics of particular modes of development. In the 
case of Fordism, profitability was able to be sustained for a prolonged period through 
the operation of a virtuous circle of mass production and mass consumption. Mass 
production techniques generated productivity gains, which in turn funded real wage 
growth and allowed the expansion of consumption, which thus generated rising profits 
to be invested in further productivity improvements (Jessop 2002: 56). The breakdown 
of this mode of development, as noted in the previous chapter, can be attributed to a 
number of factors: the exhaustion of possibilities for further productivity gains in mass 
production, the inability of mass production techniques to satisfy changing patterns of 
consumer demand, the inflationary tendencies inherent in a regime based on wage 
growth and public spending, and the increasing internationalisation of economic activity 
which undermined the management of national economies (Boyer 1988: 200-203).  
This was an international crisis which impacted severely on New Zealand through 
the contraction of export markets and investment flows, but it was also a domestic crisis 
in which New Zealand itself experienced a marked slowdown in labour productivity 
growth (Marks 1983) at a time when real wage growth was accelerating as a result of 
the breakdown of centralised wage fixing and a climate of increasing industrial unrest 
(Easton 1997b: 93-94). Profitability inevitably suffered, in turn constraining investment 
and creating pressures to reduce labour costs through redundancies or wage restraint. 
This spelt the end of both full employment and real wage growth which had 
underpinned Fordist development, with unemployment rising exponentially and the real 
wage rate falling for much of the decade after 1975. Consequently, consumers had less 
disposable income to spend on the products of Fordist industry, the state was placed 
under increasing fiscal pressure from falling tax takes and rising welfare costs, public 
debt soared and economic growth plummeted – falling from a peak of over seven 
percent in 1973/74 to a negative growth rate of almost three percent in 1977/78 (Dalziel 
and Lattimore 2004).  
The strategy of the Muldoon administration of 1975–1984 was to attempt to 
resuscitate Fordism through Keynesian policies of demand management, regulatory 
intervention and fostering of large-scale industry, which far from resolving the crisis 
may ultimately have served to prolong it. It should also be noted, however, that in this 
period the economy was not as sclerotic and over-regulated (at least by international 
standards of the day) as it was subsequently painted by advocates of the neoliberal 
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reform programme (Goldfinch and Malpass 2007). The National Government did 
engage in some market liberalisation and attempted to reduce some forms of 
government spending but in other respects government intervention increased, notably 
in the form of increased agricultural subsidies, a freeze on wages and prices introduced 
in 1982 to control rampant inflation, and the state-funded ‘Think Big’ energy projects of 
the early 1980s – the latter described by O’Brien and Wilkes (1993: 125) as “the last 
gasp of the Fordist regime.” These, and other strategies such as job creation schemes 
and expansion in state sector employment, were unsuccessful in containing 
unemployment, which reached almost 6 percent of the labour force by 1984 – an 
increase of over 75,000 people in a decade. Despite a catalogue of poor economic 
indicators, the economy did grow in the early 1980s, at an average of just over 2 percent 
per annum between 1980 and 1984 (Dalziel and Lattimore 2004: 151), but it was 
growth built on unstable foundations, held together with stopgap solutions and funded 
by unsustainable debt. 
Meanwhile, relations between labour and capital were deteriorating. During the 
Fordist period workers had been in a relatively strong position because of high labour 
demand and the importance of wage growth to the expansion of consumption. But the 
compromise between capital and labour could only be maintained in boom conditions 
when high productivity and profitability continued to deliver real wage increases. When 
declining profitability put pressure on employers to constrain labour costs in the 1970s, 
there was an upsurge in industrial conflict. Whereas in the 1960s there had been an 
average of 104 work stoppages and 82,000 working days lost through industrial action 
per year, in the 1970s there was an average of 409 work stoppages and 293,000 working 
days lost each year (Deeks et al 1994: 374). Roper argues that following the breakdown 
of centralised wage bargaining in 1968 the balance of power shifted in favour of 
workers as increasingly militant unions secured some important victories. But this was 
countered in the late 1970s by the emergence of ‘employer militancy’, abetted by a 
government which sought to curb the power of unions and restrain wage increases 
(culminating in the wage and price freeze of 1982). As the balance of power shifted 
back towards capital, employers moved from support of centralised bargaining and 
compulsory unionism to advocacy of a deregulated system which would allow more 
flexibility in employment contracts and wage fixing (Roper 2005: 96-106).  
This was part of a broader ideological shift amongst employer and business 
organisations, away from the Keynesian-Fordist consensus towards the neoliberal 
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doctrine of unfettered free-market capitalism, which was now ascendant in countries 
such as the UK and the USA. A similar shift in thinking had taken place within the 
government’s key economic agencies – Treasury and the Reserve Bank – where the old 
orthodoxy of Keynesianism gave way to a new orthodoxy based on neoclassical and 
monetarist economic theory, which was very much at odds with the policies of the 
National Government (Roper 2005: 160-168). The lobbying of an increasingly activist 
business community and the advice of increasingly agitated officials had little influence 
on the staunchly Keynesian Muldoon administration, but did find receptive ears among 
key figures in the Labour Party which was to take power in 1984 (Oliver 1989). And it 
was ironically under a Labour government that the struggle over the direction of 
economic development after Fordism would be resolved in favour of capital rather than 
labour. 
 
 
Restructuring and reform 
 
The period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s witnessed an overhaul of the economy 
which was perhaps more radical and extensive than any in New Zealand’s history. And 
in contrast to major reforms of earlier periods the programme was not democratically 
mandated, with Labour giving little warning of the impending economic revolution 
during the 1984 election campaign and subverting the customary processes of 
consultation to implement their reforms once in office – as did the succeeding National 
government during the 1990s (Kelsey 1995: 28-45). Critical accounts of the imposition 
of the neoliberal solution generally focus on senior members of the Labour 
administration being captured by ideologically-driven officials and avaricious business 
interests, and emboldened by a foreign exchange crisis at the time of their election to 
embark on a ruthless and unpopular programme of reform (eg Jesson 1989; Kelsey 
1995; Goldfinch 2000). A different reading of the process is provided by Larner (1996; 
1997), who argues that it was not so much a matter of the Labour administration being 
ideologically seduced and manipulated to act in the interests of capital, but rather that 
Labour saw certain neoliberal strategies as a means to achieve economic efficiencies 
which would provide them with the resources to pursue social-democratic goals. 
Whatever the motivation of the actors and the political machinations involved, these can 
only provide a partial understanding of the transformation of the New Zealand 
economy. They might help to explain why the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism 
took the particular form it did in New Zealand, but it must be remembered that this was 
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just one instance – albeit a particularly dramatic one – of a shift that was taking place 
throughout the advanced capitalist nations in response to the failure of Keynesian-
Fordist strategies to resolve the global crisis of capitalism. This is not to say that the 
policies adopted in New Zealand were either inevitable or judicious, but rather that they 
have to be seen in the context of a particular moment in capitalist development.  
To encapsulate the restructuring programme in a brief summary is difficult due to 
the scope and severity of the reforms, but we can broadly outline the major changes in 
terms of what Kelsey (1995: 85-239) describes as the five ‘fundamentals’ of the 
programme: market and trade liberalisation, state sector reform, disinflationary 
monetary policy, fiscal restraint and labour market deregulation.  
Market and trade liberalisation involved the removal or reduction of the many 
regulations, incentives, subsidies, barriers and controls that had built up over the 
preceding decades of Keynesian economic management (Kelsey 1995: 85-114; Bollard 
and Buckle 1987). According to the new orthodoxy, these interventions distorted 
markets and prices, resulting in inefficient allocation of resources and discouraging 
innovation, flexibility and competition. The finance sector was the first to be 
comprehensively deregulated, stimulating a frenzy of activity on financial markets and 
the diversion of investment from productive to speculative activities – with the 
consequence that New Zealand suffered severely from the global sharemarket collapse 
in 1987 (Jesson 1999). While liberalisation stimulated the financial sector, it had quite 
the opposite effect on the productive sectors of agriculture and manufacturing. Small 
farmers were hit hard by the removal of government assistance at a time of rising 
interest rates, with many forced off the land and their holdings consolidated into larger-
scale operations. The manufacturing sector was decimated by dismantling of the import 
licensing system, reduction of tariffs and removal of tax incentives for exporters. Many 
local manufacturing industries found themselves unable to compete with cheaper 
imported products in a contracting domestic market, resulting in widespread plant 
closures and redundancies (to which we will return in chapters three and four) (Britton 
et al 1992). Restrictions on foreign investment in New Zealand were also relaxed, 
prompting an inflow of foreign capital, increasing foreign control over New Zealand 
companies – including formerly state-owned enterprises sold off under the 
government’s privatisation programme – and the repatriation of locally-generated 
profits to overseas owners (Kelsey 1999: 121-160).  
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Reform of the state sector saw a rash of corporatisation, privatisation and 
restructuring, driven by the neoliberal orthodoxy that public sector organisations are 
inefficient and ineffective (Kelsey 1993: 29-75; 1995: 115-149; Easton 1997a; Boston 
et al 1991). Corporatisation began with the state’s trading organisations in areas such as 
energy, communications and resource management which, under the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act of 1986, were required to be run as businesses in ways that were as 
profitable and efficient as comparable private enterprises. Subsequently, commercial 
imperatives and business models were also imposed upon organisations in areas 
formerly regarded as non-commercial such as health, education and state housing. Gains 
in profitability and efficiency were achieved at the cost of thousands of jobs in state-
sector organisations which had been amongst the country’s largest employers, along 
with the loss of community services and increasing user charges for consumers. 
Corporatisation served as a prelude to the privatisation of many state-owned enterprises 
by turning them into saleable entities and paving the way for greater public acceptance 
of their eventual sale. Privatisation was ostensibly a means of reducing public debt, but 
it was clearly also driven by an ideological conviction that commercial enterprises 
belonged in the hands of private capital and not the state. Once in private ownership, the 
remaining constraints of public responsibility and accountability were largely 
subordinated to the profit motive, which meant further job losses and further costs to 
consumers. Meanwhile, core public sector agencies which were spared corporatisation 
and privatisation were subject to significant budget cuts and the imposition of 
commercial practices in respect of accounting, management and employment relations. 
The results were repeated rounds of organisational restructuring, significant reductions 
in staff levels, deteriorating pay and conditions for remaining staff, increasing 
flexibilisation of the workforce through the use of casual workers and consultants, and 
commodification of the agencies’ services which became ‘outputs’ to be purchased by 
ministers, other government agencies and private users.  
Disinflationary monetary policy was in many ways at the core of the neoliberal 
programme (Kelsey 1995: 150-172; Whitwell 1990; Dalziel and Lattimore 2004: 50-
62). The monetarist diagnosis of New Zealand’s economic malaise held that high 
inflation was distorting price signals and preventing efficient resource allocation as well 
as reducing returns on financial assets, discouraging investment, and hampering 
international competitiveness. If inflation could be brought under control and price 
stability maintained, it would allow market forces to operate more effectively and 
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thereby provide conditions for sustainable economic growth. Several aspects of the 
wider reform programme contributed to the disinflationary strategy, including a tight 
fiscal policy and industrial relations reforms which constrained wages. But the central 
mechanism was a tight monetary policy implemented by the Reserve Bank, initially by 
controlling the funds available to banks and later through the indirect setting of interest 
rates. Prior to 1984 the Reserve Bank had been obliged to consider objectives such as 
economic growth and full employment along with price stability in implementing 
monetary policy. After 1984 price stability became the overriding goal, and this was 
duly enshrined in statute with the Reserve Bank Act of 1989, which dropped references 
to other objectives. Inflation was successfully reined in – falling from over 18 percent to 
less than one percent between 1987 and 1992 – but at significant cost to producers and 
workers. Producers already facing the removal of protection and subsidies were hit with 
high interest rates, high exchange rates (in the case of exporters) and declining domestic 
demand, exacerbating the effects of market liberalisation on profitability and 
employment. The growing pool of unemployed acted as a constraint on wage 
settlements, so that those who remained in work faced reductions in real incomes and 
living standards. These costs were not unintended consequences, but were integral to 
the disinflationary strategy, legitimated by the argument that short-term pain was 
necessary for long-term gain.   
Monetary policy was supported by fiscal restraint, which involved a reversal of the 
Keynesian strategy of high levels of government spending funded by high and 
progressive taxation and borrowing. The neoliberal prescription was for reductions in 
government spending, particularly in social welfare, and a lower and flatter taxation 
regime, which together would not only allow a balancing of the books but would also 
encourage productive investment, increase incentives to work and reduce welfare 
dependency (Kelsey 1995: 207-239; Dalziel and Lattimore 2004: 63-84). The Labour 
Government initially focussed on taxation reform, broadening the tax base by 
introducing the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and reducing personal and company tax 
rates, thus undermining the progressive nature of the taxation regime and encouraging a 
redistribution of income from lower to higher earners. This was followed by attempts to 
reduce spending through the reorganisation of the state sector described above. Political 
considerations constrained Labour’s reform of the welfare state, but the succeeding 
National Government had no such qualms, launching a radical assault on welfare 
spending spearheaded by significant reductions in benefit levels and tightening of 
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eligibility criteria, resulting in considerable economic hardship for beneficiaries and 
low-income earners (Boston et al 1999). When budget surpluses were eventually 
achieved in the mid-1990s they were used to retire public debt and fund further tax cuts 
rather than to alleviate the hardship of those who had borne the brunt of the austerity 
programme or to repair the battered health and education systems. The inviolability of 
fiscal restraint was enshrined in statute by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1994, which 
required the government to maintain a prudent level of debt, an operating surplus on 
average over time, a positive level of net worth, prudent management of fiscal risks and 
stability in tax rates. Henceforth, it would be extremely difficult for any government to 
return to an expansionary fiscal policy of the type seen during the Fordist period.   
Neoliberal philosophy regarded the labour market as akin to any other commodity 
market and held that it should therefore be governed by demand and supply rather than 
regulatory control, which essentially meant that employers should have greater 
flexibility in how they hired, fired, utilised and remunerated workers. This would 
necessitate dismantling the long-standing system of centralised bargaining and 
weakening the collective organisation of workers. The Labour Government made some 
tentative steps in this direction, most notably with the Labour Relations Act of 1987, 
which sought to encourage movement away from national awards towards enterprise 
agreements, and the State Sector Act of 1988 which brought public service pay fixing 
under the same system as the private sector and encouraged departmental rather than 
service-wide agreements (Walsh 1989; Deeks et al 1994: 66-80). However, the Labour 
Government was constrained by the party’s close relationship with the union movement 
and it was only after the election of National in 1990 that radical reforms could be 
enacted, in the form of the Employment Contracts Act of 1991 (the ECA) (Deeks et al 
1994: 81-101; Dannin 1997; Walsh and Brosnan 1999). The stated intent of the ECA 
was to ‘promote an efficient labour market’ and to this end it effectively individualised 
the employment relationship, making it a matter between individual workers and 
employers rather than the union and the employers’ organisation. Unions could still 
negotiate collective contracts, but they lost the automatic and exclusive right to 
represent workers in negotiations and to secure blanket coverage of any agreement 
across industries or occupations. In the name of ‘freedom of association’, union 
membership became voluntary and individual employees were able to choose who 
should represent them in negotiations and whether to negotiate an individual contract 
with their employer or to be part of a collective a
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compelled to negotiate collective contracts – this was a matter for negotiation between 
the parties – and where they did enter into collective agreements it tended to be at site or 
enterprise levels rather than at a multi-employer level. This was encouraged by 
restrictions on strike action, which was only allowed in support of negotiations for a 
collective contract with a single employer and not in support of multi-employer 
negotiations. The effects of the ECA were to weaken the capacity of workers to pursue 
their interests collectively and – in a labour market where the supply of workers greatly 
exceeded demand – to strengthen the powers of employers to enforce agreements 
unfavourable to workers’ interests. This not only allowed employers to restrain wages 
and conditions, but also facilitated increasing use of flexible or non-standard working 
arrangements, as we will see in Chapter Three. The effect of the ECA on trade unions 
was dramatic, with union membership falling from 42 percent of wage and salary 
earners in 1991 to 22 percent by 1995. The proportion of the workforce covered by 
collective agreements is estimated to have fallen from 49 percent to 29 percent between 
1990 and 1993, with almost all collective contracts being enterprise rather than multi-
employer agreements (Walsh 1997: 196-197).  
By the end of the fourth National Government’s second term in office in 1996, 
advocates of the reform programme could point to a number of successes in terms of 
economic indicators. The economy was in recovery mode: growth averaged over five 
percent per annum between 1994 and 1996, and the 1996 figure of 6.4 percent was the 
highest since the crisis hit 20 years earlier. Inflation was under control, the budget was 
back in black, public debt was at its lowest since 1984, private sector investment was 
accelerating, employment growth was at its highest in 20 years, and unemployment was 
on the way down. (Dalziel and Lattimore 2004). However, it is questionable whether 
New Zealand was in a better position than it would have been had it pursued a less 
radical and destructive programme of reform (Dalziel 2002). Impressive economic 
growth figures have to be seen in the context of the years of policy-induced recession 
which had gone before – New Zealand was not so much booming as dragging itself out 
of a deep hole into which it had dug itself. Even the sudden surge in growth in the mid-
90s only took per capita GDP back to a level slightly above that of 1985 in real terms. 
And a fall in unemployment from 10.6 percent to 6.3 percent between 1992 and 1996 
sounds less impressive when compared with the figure of 4.2 percent in 1986 – when 
there were 47,000 fewer people unemployed.1  
                                                 
1
 Statistics New Zealand, Household Labour Force Survey, December year averages. 
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The road to recovery was littered with victims of the neoliberal juggernaut – not just 
the unemployed whose jobs had been wiped out by market liberalisation and 
monetarism, but other beneficiaries whose incomes had been cut or who had lost their 
entitlement, and low-paid workers whose real wages had fallen as a result of labour 
market deregulation. But not everyone had suffered – there had been a redistribution of 
income and wealth from labour to capital and from low-income to high-income earners. 
In the decade before Labour took office, employee compensation (wages and salaries) 
on average accounted for 53 percent of GDP while gross operating surpluses (profits) 
accounted for 39 percent; by 1996 the employee share had fallen to 42 percent while 
operating surpluses had risen to 45 percent.1 The redistribution of income from labour 
to capital was accompanied by a redistribution among workers as the earnings gap 
between high and low income earners widened (Dixon 1998). Combined with the 
regressive changes to taxation regimes and cuts to welfare benefits, this resulted in 
increasing levels of household inequality: between 1984 and 1998 the wealthiest 10 
percent of households enjoyed a rise of 43 percent in real disposable income, while the 
bottom 50 percent of households saw their disposable income fall by 14 percent – with 
an estimated one-fifth of households living below the relative poverty threshold 
between 1993 and 1998 (Waldegrave and Stephens 2000).2 New Zealand had moved 
from a mode of development in which generalised prosperity and a more equitable 
distribution of income were integral to the growth regime, to one in which a high degree 
of inequality was an accepted and perhaps essential feature of the growth model.  
 
 
Consolidation and a new crisis 
 
By the end of the fourth National Government’s second term in office in 1996, the 
restructuring project was more or less complete and the fundamentals of the new regime 
firmly in place. Any desire to push the project further was constrained by electoral 
reform which saw Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMP) introduced for 
the 1996 election. The adoption of MMP by public referenda occurred in the context of 
widespread disaffection with the anti-democratic nature of much of what had occurred 
over the preceding years, when the two-party system had effectively presented voters 
with a choice between the neoliberals in the blue corner and the other neoliberals in the 
                                                 
1
 Statistics New Zealand, National Accounts (year ended March 2009), Consolidated Accounts full series.   
2
 Using a poverty threshold of 60 percent of the median, equivalent, disposable household income. 
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red corner, both of whom used the strong powers of the Executive to push through 
unpopular programmes with little resistance from Parliament and little regard for the 
will of the electorate. The first MMP election in 1996 forced National into coalition 
with the economically centrist New Zealand First party, putting the brakes on an 
already-slowing neoliberal project rather than reversing it in any significant way. 
Between 1999 and 2008, the Labour Party held power through a variety of 
arrangements with other parties from the left and centre of the political spectrum, 
including formal coalitions and confidence and supply agreements.  
The latter period embraces Labour’s conversion to a ‘Third Way’ approach, 
emulating similar shifts in other countries which had been through neoliberal 
revolutions, most notably the UK under the Blair government and the USA during the 
Clinton administration. Essentially, the Third Way strategy was to retain the 
fundamentals of a marketised economy while pursuing social-democratic goals of 
greater fairness and equity (Giddens 1998). The extent to which a free market and a fair 
society are compatible goals might be debated, but the reality of Labour’s tenure – as in 
other countries which pursued similar strategies – was that the third way proved to be 
much closer to the second way (neoliberalism) than the first (democratic socialism). 
Both Roper (2005: 221-238) and Kelsey (2002: 49-87) argue that the Labour 
government embedded rather than usurped neoliberalism, retaining all the key features 
of the earlier reforms while mitigating their harsher consequences with some 
adjustments to regulatory and social policy settings. This did little to roll back the 
neoliberal project but did achieve something of a political compromise, defusing much 
of the left-wing opposition to the market economy while for the most part placating 
business interests and neoliberals – although they remained quick to denounce anything 
which might threaten the inviolability of the market. Differences between the major 
political parties were largely confined to arguments around the margins of the market-
oriented model, and even among opposing interest groups there was a general 
acceptance that the rules of engagement in economic activity had been set and the 
players had to adjust their behaviour and expectations accordingly. The success of this 
compromise was due in part to favourable international conditions, which enabled New 
Zealand to achieve solid if unspectacular economic growth and improvements in most 
economic and social indicators from the start of the new millennium until the onset of 
the global financial crisis.   
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To briefly summarise the key shifts during the consolidation period we can return to 
the five key strands of the restructuring project – market and trade liberalisation, state 
sector reform, disinflationary monetary policy, fiscal restraint and labour market 
deregulation. In relation to the first three elements we find the persistence of neoliberal 
economic management, while in regard to fiscal policy and the labour market there is 
greater evidence of the social-democratic leanings of the post-1999 Labour-led 
governments. Markets remained regulated by competition rather than government 
intervention, although there was a return to some light-handed intervention in 
infrastructural sectors where deregulated markets had delivered unsatisfactory results 
for consumers – most notably the electricity and telecommunications sectors – and a 
greater willingness by the state to play an active role in fostering certain industries and 
skills considered critical to New Zealand’s economic development.1 The state sector 
reforms remained largely in place and most of the privatised enterprises stayed in 
private hands, although the government did buy back a controlling share in Air New 
Zealand and the whole of the railways infrastructure as well as re-entering the banking 
market with the establishment of Kiwibank. Monetary policy continued to be 
determined by the requirements of the Reserve Bank Act, which gave precedence to 
considerations of price stability over those of economic growth and employment, 
although there was a limited relaxation of the inflation targets.  
Fiscal policy remained constrained by the principles of the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act (incorporated into the Public Finance Act in 2004), but increases in spending were 
made possible by revenue gains from the economic recovery and an increase in the top 
marginal tax rate. Most of the new spending under the Labour-led governments was in 
social policy areas, with increased funding for health, education, superannuation and 
state housing, and the introduction in 2004 of the Working for Families programme to 
assist low- and middle-income families with income support and tax credits. This 
expansion in spending also lead to renewed growth in state-sector employment. These 
were essentially attempts to mitigate the damage done by the neoliberal reforms and 
leaven the social deficits of the free-market economy, and fell far short of a return to the 
Keynesian welfare state. There were clear policy differences between political parties in 
this area, with those on the right wanting the proceeds of economic growth to be used to 
                                                 
1
 Most notable in this regard was Labour’s Growth and Innovation Framework (later reincarnated as the 
Economic Transformation Agenda), which sought to encourage innovative enterprises, skills 
development and global competitiveness, particularly in the areas of biotechnology, information and 
communications technology and creative industries (Office of the Prime Minister 2002).  
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fund tax cuts rather than social spending, but this was essentially an argument about 
how to distribute surpluses rather than about the requirement for prudent fiscal 
management, which was set in legislation and generally agreed by the major parties 
(Dalziel and Lattimore 2004: 80-84; Roper 2005: 229-234).  
Labour market deregulation was rolled back to a limited degree when the 
Employment Contracts Act was replaced by the Employment Relations Act (ERA) in 
2000. The new Act sought to redress some of the inequities of the ECA and encourage a 
more conciliatory approach to employment relations built on ‘mutual trust and 
confidence’ and ‘good faith behaviour’. Among its stated objectives were to address the 
‘inherent inequality of bargaining power’ between workers and employers, to encourage 
collective bargaining while also protecting individual choice, and to promote mediation 
to solve disputes and reduce the need for judicial intervention. Although the Act 
removed some of the impediments to union representation and collective bargaining 
contained in the ECA, it also retained some of the key aspects of that Act: union 
membership remained voluntary, the right to negotiate individual contracts was 
retained, employers were not compelled to enter into collective agreements, and there 
were still significant restrictions on the right to strike (Walsh and Harbridge 2001; 
Deeks and Rasmussen 2002: 118-138; Rasmussen 2004). Despite its intentions, the 
ERA failed to reverse the decline of collective organisation among workers – the fall in 
the number of union members was arrested, but the proportion of workers belonging to 
unions remained static at about 17 percent and the proportion covered by collective 
agreements continued to decline to a low of 14 percent in 2007 (Department of Labour 
2009a). The divide between collectivised and individualised employment relations had 
been well and truly crossed during the preceding years and there appeared to be no 
going back, leaving employers holding the upper hand at the bargaining table. 
The consolidation phase was framed by two major international crises – the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–98 and the global financial crisis beginning in 2007–08, both of 
which had significant effects on New Zealand’s economic performance.1 The years in 
between, however, were characterised by relatively buoyant conditions, with economic 
growth averaging between three and four percent until 2006 before falling to around one 
percent in the year preceding the latest crisis.2 The growth regime was extensive rather 
than intensive, based on increases in the volume of labour rather than improvements in 
                                                 
1
 Between these crises there was also an international downturn associated with the ‘dotcom crash’ in 
2001, but this did not have a serious impact on New Zealand (Reddell and Sleeman 2008).  
2
 Statistics New Zealand: Gross Domestic Product, December quarter releases 2008 and 2009. 
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productivity: employment grew significantly and unemployment fell from almost eight 
percent to under four percent between 1999 and 2007 to give New Zealand one of the 
lowest unemployment rates in the OECD; but at the same time labour productivity grew 
slowly at around one percent per annum and fell progressively below the OECD 
average.1 With low productivity and a weakened union movement, wage growth was 
slow for most of the period, although it picked up slightly between 2005 and 2007 as 
strong job growth began to generate labour shortages.2 As in other market-oriented 
economies, consumption growth was fuelled less by rising incomes than by rising 
household debt, which had been growing rapidly since the early 1990s and reached 159 
percent of household disposable income by 2007.3 This was sustained by a housing 
boom lasting from 2001 to 2007 that encouraged greater borrowing against property, 
along with relaxed lending criteria by banks and financial institutions. When the global 
crisis hit in 2007–08 credit conditions tightened, the property bubble burst and 
consumption slumped. Producers were faced with a sudden deterioration of markets at 
home and abroad as well as a contraction of loan finance, with the result that production 
fell and the economy was plunged into recession by the start of 2008.  
By contrast with the Fordist-Keynesian period, the neoliberal regime had delivered 
only a short period of fragile growth and achieved this at great social cost in terms of 
inequality and economic hardship. Despite impressive job growth during the 
consolidation period, unemployment remained far higher than it had been before 
restructuring and persisted despite the emergence of labour shortages in some sectors, as 
we will see in Chapter Three. Many unskilled workers seemed to have been left behind 
by the process of change, and a surplus pool of labour had become an integral feature of 
an economy which depended on a flexible labour supply and wage restraint. Similarly, 
despite some reduction of income inequality and poverty levels from 2004 – seemingly 
due largely to the Working for Families programme – levels of inequality and poverty 
remained far greater than they had been before the neoliberal project began (Perry 
2009). Over the two decades from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, New Zealand 
experienced among the most significant increases in income inequality and relative 
poverty in the OECD (OECD 2008). That this trend was eventually arrested largely by a 
                                                 
1
 Unemployment data from Statistics New Zealand, Household Labour Force Survey (December year 
averages); productivity data from Statistics New Zealand, Productivity Statistics 1978–2009 (March 
years); OECD comparisons from OECD Factbook 2009, retrieved on 16/9/2010 from 
http://www.sourceoecd.org.  
2
 Based on average hourly earnings data from Statistics New Zealand, Quarterly Employment Survey. 
3
 Reserve Bank of New Zealand, retrieved on 16/9/2010 from http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics. 
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redistributive mechanism such as Working for Families – which was targeted not at 
beneficiaries but at wage earners – was itself an indictment on an economic regime that 
failed to provide adequate wages for many workers, and it did not address the issue of 
why market incomes were inadequate in the first place (Roper 2005: 233-234).   
In New Zealand, as elsewhere, it remains to be seen whether the latest crisis means 
the neoliberal programme has run its course. The fifth National Government elected in 
2008 is more committed to the principles of neoliberalism than its Labour predecessor, 
and so far disinclined to seek alternative solutions to the crisis. But if the crises of the 
1930s and 1970s are any indication, the story has a long way to run and its eventual 
outcome will depend on processes of struggle and compromise between competing class 
interests both here and in countries such as the UK and the USA, from which New 
Zealand tends to take its lead. 
 
 
Contrasting modes of development 
 
To conclude, we can place the major shifts of the 1984–2007 period more firmly within 
the framework of the regulation approach by looking at the ways in which the new 
mode of development contrasted with that of the Fordist period. In general terms, the 
transition conforms to the pattern described in Chapter One as typical of developed 
capitalist nations: a shift from an accumulation regime based on mass production and 
mass consumption, to one based on flexible production and fragmented consumption; 
and a move from a monopolistic mode of regulation centred on the capital–labour 
compromise, to competitive regulation prioritising the operation of free markets. Within 
this typical pattern, however, there are aspects of the New Zealand case which are 
distinctive due to the fact that it is a small economy whose comparative advantage still 
lies in agricultural production, and due also to the specifics of the post-1984 reforms 
which were the product of a particular political and social context.  
 
Regime of accumulation 
 
In New Zealand as elsewhere, the post-Fordist accumulation regime was enabled by the 
emergence of a new technological paradigm, which saw the main source of economic 
dynamism shift from standardised production based on machine technology to 
diversified production utilising microelectronics and information communications 
technologies. This was a matter not just of changes in the technological infrastructure, 
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but also new labour processes and organisational models designed to enhance 
flexibility, reflexivity and efficiency – something which was necessary in order for New 
Zealand enterprises to survive competition from both local and overseas producers in 
newly deregulated markets (Perry et al 1995; Perry 2004; Le Heron and Pawson 1996). 
These changes significantly affected the nature of production in both manufacturing and 
service industries, although it is important to note that there were large sectors of the 
economy – notably primary production, construction and personal service industries – 
where new technologies and production models offered less scope for change.     
The demise of mass production techniques in manufacturing was accentuated in 
New Zealand by the fact that many such industries were in the business of import 
substitution and went into terminal decline with the removal of import protections – the 
car assembly industry being the most notable example. In other manufacturing or 
processing industries, microelectronic technology enabled the introduction of flexible 
machinery which could produce short runs of diversified product lines – although the 
extent to which this occurred is difficult to gauge empirically. In primary product 
processing industries, the emphasis shifted from simple bulk production to adding value 
through innovations in processing and packaging, and diversifying product ranges to 
cater for segmented markets. A small number of large-scale manufacturers of consumer 
durables, such as household appliances, also successfully adapted to flexible production 
methods and introduced design innovations which enabled them to compete with 
imports and in some cases expand into export markets. But the most successful new 
manufacturing enterprises tended to be smaller-scale operations utilising advanced 
technologies and innovations to target specialised export markets in fields such as 
electronics, software and industrial equipment. 
Most of the growth in production and employment, however, was in service 
industries. Here, information technology revolutionised internal labour processes by 
allowing computerisation of many routine clerical and administrative tasks, and 
enabling more effective integration of internal divisions of labour by enhancing 
communications. In large-scale service enterprises, labour processes were also 
reorganised (often repeatedly) to conform to new organisational models believed to 
offer improvements in efficiency and flexibility. Service enterprises increasingly 
performed roles within production networks in which service functions were outsourced 
from specialised enterprises, adding complexity to the social division of labour and 
stimulating the expansion of producer service industries. Services also became 
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increasingly exportable as real-time communications through ICT networks reduced the 
disadvantages of New Zealand’s remote location, although services remained a 
relatively small share of total exports (with the exception of tourism which is not a 
typical export). The flipside of this was that services were also increasingly importable, 
allowing large New Zealand enterprises to outsource functions such as data processing 
and call-centre operations from low-wage countries.  
Flexible production catered to increasingly fragmented and shifting consumer 
markets. Consumption was more fragmented partly because of cultural trends which 
encouraged greater diversity of lifestyles and tastes – trends which were themselves 
influenced by the changing nature of production – and partly because of widening 
income disparities which meant greater differences in the level and type of consumption 
that could be afforded by people in divergent economic circumstances. Consumption 
among low-income earners became focussed on cheaper mass-produced imports 
distributed through high-volume and low-cost retailers, while those with greater 
disposable incomes provided demand for the innovative designer products of high-end 
manufacturers and specialist retailers and for many of the consumer service industries in 
areas such as entertainment, recreation, cafes and restaurants, and personal services. The 
increasing diversity of goods and services was most evident at the higher end of the 
market where, in a highly competitive environment, producers had to compete 
vigorously for market share through product innovation and diversification and niche 
marketing, creating ever-expanding and ever-changing product lines. It was no longer 
sufficient for producers to make a uniform product appealing to a broad market; they 
required a range of products which would appeal to many different segments of the 
market or specialised products catering to niche markets (Le Heron and Pawson 1996 
318-346).  
But while flexible production was able to cater to diverse and changing markets, it 
was unable to deliver significant growth in productivity and hence, as observed earlier, 
accumulation was predominantly extensive rather than intensive. That is to say, it 
depended on utilising increasing volumes of labour (in terms of both the number of 
workers and the hours worked) to increase the scale of production and the level of 
absolute surplus value, rather than increasing relative surplus value through productivity 
gains. There was a sufficient labour supply to fuel this mode of growth and sustain 
profitability during the consolidation period, although the labour shortages which began 
to emerge towards the end of the period created wage pressures which might have 
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threatened profitability had the financial crisis not intervened. As it was, for most of the 
period wage growth at the lower end of the labour market was constrained by low 
productivity, a surplus of low-skilled labour and a lack of collective organisation among 
workers. At the higher end of the labour market, those with the managerial and 
professional skills which were valued in the new environment were able to command 
high premiums, opening up the disparities in income and consumption that we have 
already noted. Overall, however, consumption growth was sustained more by household 
debt than by rising incomes, making the growth regime very fragile. In this environment 
export markets may have offered greater possibility for expansion, but exports remained 
focussed on primary products – albeit with more value added than in the past – and 
there was no significant increase in the value of exports as a proportion of GDP. 
Consequently, the post-Fordist accumulation regime did not offer the same possibilities 
for sustained growth and generalised prosperity as the Fordist regime.   
 
Mode of regulation 
 
Fordism’s monopolistic mode of regulation dominated by large capital and an 
interventionist state was effectively dismantled by the neoliberal reforms, which 
introduced a competitive market-based mode of regulation. The regulation approach 
holds that in a successful mode of regulation there is a complementarity between the 
institutional forms – the capital–labour relation, the forms of competition, the nature of 
integration into the international economy, the monetary and financial regime, and the 
role of the state. In Fordism, the institutional forms tended to cohere around the capital–
labour compromise which enabled growth in productivity, wages and consumption. In 
market-oriented post-Fordism, as we have seen, the compromise was abandoned and 
there was a shift in the balance of power between capital and labour. Workers were seen 
not as the engine of consumption but as costs of production, and to keep those costs 
down collectivised employment relations gave way to individualised relations which 
helped to constrain wages and allow more flexible utilisation of labour. This 
complemented other aspects of the new mode of regulation in that a deregulated labour 
market was seen to enhance competition in product markets, to assist New Zealand to 
compete in an increasingly internationalised economy, to support a disinflationary 
monetary strategy and to minimise state intervention in capital–labour relations. 
The nature of competition was fundamentally transformed by market liberalisation. 
New Zealand went from being one of the most regulated and protected economies 
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among developed capitalist countries to one of the most deregulated and open. New 
Zealand producers not only had to compete more vigorously against each other, but had 
to compete with an influx of cheap imports and were faced with highly competitive 
export markets. Increased competition among producers of both goods and services 
meant greater emphasis on innovation and flexibility in production processes, product 
design and marketing. This was accompanied by considerable organisational change as 
large organisations were restructured to achieve greater efficiency, flexibility and 
reflexivity, while small and medium-sized enterprises found opportunities to compete 
with large enterprises in market niches or play specialised roles within production 
networks (Perry et al 1995; Perry 2004; Le Heron and Pawson 1996). 
More effective integration with the international economy was one of the main 
objectives of market and trade liberalisation. New Zealand has always depended on 
external linkages due to its role in the international division of labour as an agricultural 
exporter. But dismantling of the structure of regulations and protections which had 
restricted international flows of goods and capital during the Fordist period greatly 
increased its exposure to global forces. The objective may have been to enable New 
Zealand to compete more effectively in a globalising world, but the result was greater 
penetration of imports and foreign direct investment in New Zealand rather than any 
notable improvement in New Zealand’s export performance or foreign direct investment 
overseas. Nonetheless, the strategic change was significant in that whereas the Fordist 
model sought to encourage growth by insulating the domestic economy from 
international competition, the post-Fordist model pursued growth through 
internationalisation of the New Zealand economy. 
The monetary and financial regime was also opened up by deregulation of the 
financial sector, which lifted restrictions on capital movements and drew New Zealand 
into global financial markets, while the floating of the dollar placed the value of New 
Zealand currency in the hands of foreign exchange markets. Financial speculation 
became a defining feature of the new regime and affected not just the financial sector 
but also productive sectors where profiting from financial management and improving 
‘shareholder value’ became priorities. This resulted in the financialisation of the 
economy as the financial sector and financial activities more broadly assumed 
unprecedented dominance at the expense of the ‘real economy’, in the process 
increasing economic volatility and the risk of crisis. In this environment, the state had a 
diminished role in controlling financial activity and concentrated on maintaining price 
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stability by indirectly setting interest rates to keep inflation within target levels, and in 
the process also influencing the exchange rate.  
The state in general assumed a far more limited role in the economy than during the 
Fordist era. Deregulation of product, financial and labour markets entailed a 
fundamental shift from a state which sought to actively manipulate markets through 
regulatory intervention, to one focused on providing conditions for free markets to 
operate efficiently and competitively while also encouraging international 
competitiveness among New Zealand enterprises – a model sometimes referred to as a 
‘competition state’ (Neilson 2006; Larner 1997). The state’s own participation in 
economic activity was also greatly reduced as a result of privatisation and 
corporatisation of its trading organisations and efforts to scale back the core public 
service. State spending was constrained by requirements of fiscal responsibility and 
reduced taxation on businesses and high-income earners, leading to a reining in of the 
welfare state by minimising levels of assistance and maximising incentives to work. 
Notwithstanding increases in public sector spending and employment towards the end 
of the consolidation period, the post-Fordist state was far leaner and more light-handed 
than its Fordist incarnation. 
   
 
Conclusion 
 
Over the course of its economic history, New Zealand has moved through four distinct 
phases or modes of development: colonialism, neo-colonialism, Fordism and market-
oriented post-Fordism. These have been separated by periods of economic crisis and 
initiated through extensive restructuring of production and reform of institutions. The 
latest such period has been perhaps the most tumultuous and transformative as 
responses to the crisis of the 1970s moved from increasingly desperate attempts to patch 
up the ailing Fordist-Keynesian regime, to a radical conversion to neoliberalism which 
resulted in a complete overhaul of the economy, and eventually to a Third Way 
compromise that was essentially neoliberalism with a friendlier face. The end result 
conformed very closely to the market-oriented post-Fordist model typical of the 
English-speaking capitalist countries, with a regime of accumulation based on a 
virtuous circle of flexible production and fragmented consumption, and a mode of 
regulation based around market competition and minimal state intervention. The process 
of restructuring had devastating effects on New Zealand producers, workers and 
beneficiaries for the better part of a decade and eventually delivered only a brief period 
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of fragile growth before the global financial crisis struck in 2007–08. This, then, is the 
scenario within which the labour market and the division of labour underwent major 
change in the period between the last two great crises in capitalism. Having established 
the nature and causes of the economic transformation New Zealand experienced in this 
period, we can now proceed to look at how this transformation has affected the 
availability of work, the type of work we do and how it is distributed and organised. 
This task begins with an analysis of changes in the labour market since the 1980s. 
 
 3 
 
The Labour Market in Transition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Processes of economic transformation of the kind experienced by New Zealand since 
the 1970s entail profound upheavals in the labour market and the division of labour. The 
onset of crisis inevitably causes a general contraction of labour demand, rising 
unemployment and increasing insecurity for workers. The restructuring which follows 
tends to result in further job destruction in certain sectors of production while creating 
different types of jobs in others. This may also be associated with changes in 
employment relationships as the institutional arrangements governing relations between 
capital and labour are reformed to meet new requirements. All this was certainly true of 
New Zealand’s experience during the troubled transition from Fordism to the new 
market-oriented post-Fordist mode of development. Full employment gave way to rising 
unemployment from the mid-1970s and job losses accelerated dramatically with the 
beginning of the restructuring project in the mid-1980s, being felt most severely in the 
productive sectors which had underpinned the Fordist regime. The subsequent 
revitalisation of job growth was centred on different industries and occupations, and 
saw the emergence of a labour market characterised by greater labour surpluses, more 
flexibility and insecurity, and less standardised forms of employment than had been the 
case under Fordism.  
This chapter explores the transitions in the labour market through an analysis of 
official data sources, focussing on changing levels of employment and unemployment 
and the destandardisation of work. It begins with an analysis of the rise in 
unemployment during the crisis and restructuring periods and the subsequent resurgence 
in employment growth, before considering the apparent paradox of continuing labour 
surpluses at a time of emerging skills shortages. The remainder of the chapter looks at 
non-standard work, beginning with a discussion on the nature and causes of 
destandardisation in employment before assessing the empirical evidence for various 
types of non-standard work in New Zealand.  
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The rise and fall of unemployment 
 
The experience of high unemployment during the crisis in Fordism and the subsequent 
restructuring was common to the advanced capitalist nations, although the timing and 
severity of job losses depended to some extent on the strategies different nation states 
adopted in response to the crisis (Koch 2006). The worst of New Zealand’s 
unemployment was not an immediate effect of the crisis in the 1970s, but rather a 
consequence of the restructuring project in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite the 
deteriorating economic climate in the 1970s, registered unemployment did not exceed 
one percent of the labour force until 1979 as the National Government mopped up 
surplus labour by means of Keynesian demand management, job creation schemes and 
state-sector employment. But these were stopgap solutions which masked the 
underlying problem of falling market demand for labour while adding to the 
government’s increasingly unsustainable fiscal burden. Unemployment pressures 
became increasingly difficult to contain in the early 1980s, and by the time the 
reforming Labour Government came to power in 1984 registered unemployment had 
reached almost six percent – a total of 77,000 people unemployed compared to fewer 
than 2,000 a decade earlier. The days of full employment were well and truly over, but 
the worst was yet to come. 
While the Muldoon administration had intervened in the market to sustain labour 
demand, the approach of the fourth Labour Government and the subsequent fourth 
National Government was to abandon workers to the mercy of the market. The reforms 
which we reviewed in the last chapter – in particular market liberalisation, tight fiscal 
and monetary policy and state sector reform – all contributed to contractions in 
production and labour demand, which were compounded by the sharemarket crash of 
1987 and a further global downturn in 1991–92. As Figure 3.1 shows, the 
unemployment rate – now officially measured by the Household Labour Force Survey 
(HLFS) – rose from 4.2 percent in 1986 to a peak of 10.6 percent in 1991 and 1992 as 
the number of unemployed workers soared from 70,000 to 180,000.1 Despite continued 
growth in the working age population, the number of people in paid employment fell by 
111,000 between 1987 and 1992, and the proportion of adults with paid jobs fell from 
64 percent to 57 percent (Figure 3.2).  
                                                 
1
 These figures (as with other HLFS data in this chapter) are averages over the four quarterly surveys in 
the given year. On a quarterly basis, unemployment peaked at over 190,000 or 11.1 percent of the labour 
force in the March quarter of 1992.  
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Changes in employment at the sectoral level will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four, but in broad terms, while job losses were felt across the economy, they 
were particularly severe in the formerly protected manufacturing industries which 
suffered the double blow of removal of import barriers and recession in the domestic 
market. Primary sector employment also fell as export markets contracted and 
government subsidies were removed. The slowdown in production was duly reflected in 
 
Figure 3.1: Unemployment rate
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Figure 3.2: Employment growth and employment rate 
1986–2009
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major job losses in the construction and transport industries and cessation of job growth 
in the wholesale and retail industries. The only industries to experience significant 
employment growth in this period were some producer and consumer service industries.  
We saw in the previous chapter that by the mid-1990s New Zealand was moving 
from a restructuring to a consolidation phase, with the pillars of the new mode of 
development in place and the conditions established for renewed economic growth. As 
figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, unemployment fell and employment growth returned from 
1993, and the improvement continued except for a downturn associated with the Asian 
crisis in 1997–98. The initial phase of the recovery was marked by a fall in the official 
unemployment rate to 6.3 percent by 1996, followed by a slight increase at the time of 
the Asian crisis and then a further fall to below four percent by 2005, before starting to 
climb again in 2008 as the effects of the latest financial crisis were felt. In the period 
from 1992 to 2007, the number of people officially counted as unemployed fell by 
almost 98,000 or more than half – although as we will see shortly the official figures 
somewhat misrepresent the actual level of surplus labour in the economy. Over the 
same period, the number of people in paid employment grew by over 660,000, with an 
initial surge of growth from the trough of the early 1990s and slower but steady growth 
in the years following the Asian crisis. By 2007, 66 percent of the adult population were 
employed, compared to just 57 percent in the early 1990s. As we will see in the next 
chapter, most of this employment growth occurred in quite different sectors from those 
which had borne the brunt of the earlier job losses – notably producer and consumer 
service industries and retailing – although there was also resurgence in the construction 
industry. And whereas most of the earlier job losses had been among manual production 
workers, most of the new job growth was in white-collar occupations – not just in the 
skilled categories of managers, professionals and technicians, but also in the less-skilled 
categories of service and sales workers.  
Employment regrowth was not just a matter of jobless workers being absorbed back 
into employment, but also of increasing levels of labour force participation by women 
and older people, along with increasing volumes of immigration (see Chapter Seven). 
The growth in labour force participation by women was a long-term trend which had 
been evident throughout the Fordist period, but it received renewed impetus after 1992 
due in large part to increasing employment among mothers of young children. Between 
1992 and 2007, the employment rate for women increased from 49 percent to 59 
percent, while the male rate increased from 65 percent to 73 percent. For both sexes, 
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these rises also reflected increasing employment among people around retirement age or 
older. This was partly due to increases in the age of eligibility for New Zealand 
Superannuation from 60 to 65 – which occurred progressively during the 1990s – but 
also reflected an increasing tendency for people to maintain some form of engagement 
in the labour force beyond retirement age, whether for economic or social reasons. 
Employment rates among 60–64 year olds increased from 24 percent to 64 percent 
between 1992 and 2007, while among those aged 65 and over they increased from five 
percent to 14 percent. During this period the labour force was also boosted by a 
significant expansion in New Zealand’s immigration intakes, following the 
liberalisation of immigration policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Between 1992 
and 2007, around 945,000 working-age migrants arrived in New Zealand on a 
permanent or long-term basis (including New Zealanders returning after long absences). 
While this was balanced by significant emigration, it nonetheless resulted in a net gain 
of 138,000 migrants of working age.1  
Long working hours also became more common. While average working hours did 
not change greatly, this was the outcome of two countervailing trends: increasing 
proportions of people were working part-time, but increasing proportions of full-time 
workers were working longer than the once-standard 40 hour week. Between 1986 and 
2000, the proportion of full-time workers who worked 50 hours or more per week 
increased from 20 percent to 29 percent, although it subsequently fell to 24 percent by 
2006.2 A combination of factors is likely to have contributed to the increase during this 
period: slower wage growth and greater demands on household budgets may have 
compelled some workers to work longer hours to maintain living standards, while low 
productivity and shortages of skilled workers may have caused employers to pressure 
workers to put in extra hours in order to sustain production levels. 
As suggested in Chapter Two, the voracious appetite for labour in the context of 
relatively low productivity growth indicates an accumulation regime which was 
predominantly extensive rather than intensive. That is to say, growth in output was 
achieved by increases in the volume of labour used in production rather than increases 
in the level of output per worker. This contrasts with the Fordist period, in which 
growth was built on improvements in productivity through more intensive use of labour 
                                                 
1
 Statistics New Zealand migration statistics, retrieved from Table Builder at: http://www.stats.govt.nz/ 
methods_and_services/access-data/TableBuilder.aspx.  
2
 Based on HLFS data. Census data shows a higher incidence of long hours, with 29 percent of full-timers 
working 50 hours or more in 2006.  
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in mass production industries – which in New Zealand’s case included agriculture as 
well as manufacturing. Certainly in the Fordist period there was also rapid growth in 
labour demand as production expanded, but that labour was being utilised in a way that 
yielded higher productivity gains and consequently higher rates of economic growth 
than experienced during the growth phase of the post-Fordist regime. Extensive 
accumulation regimes were not untypical in post-Fordist economies, although they 
tended to be more evident in countries adopting market-oriented models in which the 
short-term interests of capital prevailed and profitability was restored primarily by 
making labour cheaper and more flexible, as opposed to those countries where 
negotiated solutions protected the interests of workers and encouraged a return to 
profitability through improvements in productivity (Koch 2006). When labour demand 
peaked in the years before the latest crisis, New Zealand was one of the more 
pronounced cases of an extensive growth model, with labour productivity growth 
among the lowest in the OECD, while its employment rates and working hours were 
among the highest.1  
 
 
Labour surpluses and skills shortages 
 
Prior to the latest crisis, labour demand was at such a level that New Zealand was in 
danger of running out of workers – or at least certain types of workers. Skills shortages 
were becoming an increasing problem in a range of professional and technical 
occupations and some skilled manual trades, although many employers also experienced 
difficulty in recruiting unskilled labour. Over the six years to June 2007, an average of 
40 percent of firms reported difficulty in finding skilled staff and 21 percent had 
difficulty in finding unskilled labour. Over the same period, an average of almost one in 
five firms cited a shortage of labour as the main constraint on expansion of their 
business.2 An indication of the type of skills in short supply is provided by Immigration 
New Zealand’s Long Term Skill Shortage List, which in mid-2007 listed 73 
occupations, of which 45 were professional, with a further 13 being technician and 
associate professional occupations and 12 being skilled manual trades.3 
                                                 
1
 Based on data from OECD Factbook 2009, retrieved on 18/09/2010 from http://www.sourceoecd.org.  
2
 Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion. Reported by the Department of Labour in Skills in the Labour 
Market - August 2007. Retrieved on 18/09/2010 from http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/lmr/archive/.  
3
 Figures as at July 2007. Retrieved on 18/09/2010 from http://www.immigration.govt.nz/opsmanual/ 
7131.htm.  
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This was occurring despite the fact that joblessness and underemployment were still 
relatively high by historical standards. While there was certainly a significant fall in 
unemployment from the early 1990s, at its lowest point of just under four percent from 
2005 to 2007 the unemployment rate was still considerably higher than it had been 
during the Fordist period. For comparison between the eras we have to turn to census 
data, which gives higher unemployment rates than the HLFS and is subject to some 
definitional changes over time, but nonetheless allows an approximate comparison. This 
shows that the unemployment rate in 2006 (5.1 percent) was higher than it had been at 
the last census prior to restructuring in 1981 (4.2 percent), considerably higher again 
than it had been during the 1970s when less than two percent of the labour force were 
unemployed, and still more so by the standards of the 1950s and 1960s when the Fordist 
growth model all but eliminated unemployment. 
Official unemployment figures also conceal significant levels of joblessness and 
underemployment. To be officially counted as unemployed, a person must be without a 
paid job and be available for work and be actively seeking work, using methods other 
than simply looking at job advertisements. The unemployment figures therefore do not 
include those jobless people who want to work but are either not immediately available 
for work and/or not actively seeking work when surveyed, perhaps because they have 
exhausted all options or have simply become discouraged from active job hunting. 
There was an annual average of 73,000 people in these categories even when 
unemployment was at its lowest between 2005 and 2007 – not far below the number of 
officially unemployed (84,000). At the same time similar numbers of people – an annual 
average of 79,000 – were underemployed, that is to say working part-time and wanting 
to work more hours. So the pool of surplus labour was considerably larger than the 
official unemployment figures reveal, with an average of 236,000 people or seven 
percent of the adult population either jobless or underemployed. Moreover, as Figure 
3.3 shows, the decline in official unemployment between 1992 and 2007 was not 
matched by a comparable fall in the ranks of other jobless or underemployed workers. 
Both categories fluctuated over the period, with the number of people jobless but not 
officially unemployed ending up just 14 percent below its 1992 levels, and the number 
of underemployed falling by 19 percent – compared with a fall of well over half in the 
number of officially unemployed.1  
                                                 
1
 It is likely that the jobless figures also exclude a certain number of people who ceased to look for work 
after shifting from the unemployment benefit to sickness or invalid’s benefits as a result of the tightening 
of eligibility criteria for the unemployment benefit. Between 1992 and 2007 there was a fall of 78 percent 
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Comparable figures on joblessness and underemployment are not available for the 
Fordist period, but given the conditions of full employment and low levels of part-time 
employment during those years it is certain that they would have been comparatively 
low. This contrast between the levels of labour surplus in the Fordist and post-Fordist 
economies is typical of countries which followed a similar trajectory of development to 
New Zealand. The sustained period of full employment during the Fordist era was 
rather unusual in the annals of capitalist development, and one which we should not 
necessarily expect to see repeated. Labour surpluses, as Marx explained, are an inherent 
feature of capitalism as it has a tendency to displace variable capital (labour) with 
constant capital (plant and machinery) (Marx 1976 [1867]: 762-870). It is only during 
periods of extraordinary growth in capital accumulation that the additional demand for 
workers engendered by the expansion of production is sufficient to outweigh the effects 
of the declining ratio of labour required in production and thus to absorb the reserves of 
surplus labour (Koch 2006: 28). This was the case in Fordism when rising labour 
demand was sustained by the rapid expansion of mass production, but in the post-
Fordist period production expanded more slowly and much investment was diverted 
into speculative activities, so the new growth model proved less successful in 
overcoming capitalism’s tendency to create reserves of surplus labour. Moreover, while 
full employment had been an explicit objective of Fordist states in countries such as 
                                                                                                                                               
in the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, but an increase of 128 percent in the number 
of people receiving sickness or invalid’s benefits (Ministry of Social Development 2009: 162).  
Figure 3.3: Unemployment, joblessness and underemployment 
1986–2009
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Year
Nu
m
be
r 
(th
o
u
sa
n
ds
)
Officially unemployed
Other jobless
Underemployed
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Household Labour Force Survey (December year averages)
The Labour Market in Transition     84 
New Zealand, in the post-Fordist era this goal was subordinated to the imperatives of 
restraining wages and controlling inflation, achieved by means of tight monetary and 
fiscal policies and labour market deregulation. As we saw in Chapter Two, New 
Zealand’s Reserve Bank Act of 1989 removed full employment as an objective of 
monetary policy, and subsequently rises in interest rates were used to dampen economic 
activity whenever growing labour demand threatened to stimulate inflation – preventing 
any possibility of a return to genuinely full employment. 
Joblessness in the post-Fordist labour market was also exacerbated by higher levels 
of frictional unemployment than in the past. This is mostly short-term joblessness 
caused by labour turnover and people entering or re-entering the labour market. While 
there is a certain amount of frictional unemployment in any labour market, in the 
Fordist era it would have been minimal as the workforce consisted overwhelmingly of 
full-time waged or salaried employees in relatively stable long-term jobs, and 
movement between jobs would be relatively seamless given the situation of full 
employment. Frictional unemployment increased in the post-Fordist period for a 
number of reasons: employers were more inclined to use temporary workers for the 
purposes of flexibility; redundancies and business closures were more common due to 
the competitive nature of the economy; workers were more inclined to change jobs 
voluntarily during the course of their careers; and there were greater numbers of women 
moving in and out of the workforce as they alternated between paid work and family 
responsibilities. While comparable data is not available for earlier periods, we do know 
that the post-Fordist labour market was characterised by a considerable degree of 
‘churning’, with a high number of jobs being created and destroyed and significant job 
mobility among workers. In each quarter from 2000 to 2007, an average of 289,000 
workers joined new employers and 277,000 left employers, resulting in an average 
worker turnover rate of 17 percent – meaning essentially that over each three month 
period around one in six workers started or left a job.1  
Many of these workers would have changed jobs of their own volition and moved 
directly between positions, but for others movement would have been involuntary and 
involved periods of joblessness. In the latter category, people may have either been 
made redundant or may have finished temporary jobs. When the labour market was at 
its worst in the early 1990s, the most common reason unemployed people gave for 
leaving their last job was being laid off, dismissed or made redundant. When the labour 
                                                 
1
 Statistics New Zealand, Linked Employer-Employee Data. Retrieved from Table Builder at 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/methods_and_services/access-data/TableBuilder.aspx.  
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market was resurgent in the 2000s, the most common reason was having finished a 
temporary, seasonal or contract job. Even when employment levels were at their 
healthiest in 2005–07, there were on average 16,000 people who were unemployed 
because they had finished temporary jobs, making up 26 percent of all those who 
specified a reason for leaving their last job. A further 9,000 people or 13 percent on 
average had left their last job because of being laid off, dismissed or made redundant 
and the same number had left because of unsatisfactory work conditions. These figures 
exclude a large number of people who did not specify reasons for leaving their last job 
and the many people who were jobless but not included in the official unemployment 
counts. They indicate that there was considerable insecurity in the labour market even 
when labour demand was at its peak. However, by this time most unemployment was 
relatively short-term, suggesting that people were tending to move between jobs 
reasonably quickly. When the job market was at its lowest point in the early 1990s, the 
majority of unemployed people had been out of work for six months or more; but long-
term unemployment declined progressively until by 2007 less than one in five were in 
that category, while the majority had been unemployed for less than two months. In 
fact, the number of people who had been unemployed for less than one month was 
higher in 2007 than it had been in the early 1990s.  
While all this points to a significant level of frictional unemployment in the post-
Fordist labour market, there was also a degree of structural unemployment. This tends 
to be longer-term and arises from a mismatch between labour supply and demand – 
either because jobless workers are located in different parts of the country from the 
available jobs or because they lack the skills required for those jobs. The skills 
mismatch is a critical factor in explaining the apparent paradox of labour shortages at a 
time when so many people were jobless. We have already noted that job growth and 
labour shortages were most pronounced in skilled occupations. Most of those who were 
out of work, on the other hand, were relatively low-skilled. Of those officially 
unemployed between 2000 and 2007, on average 58 percent had no post-school 
qualifications, 72 percent were looking for jobs in low-skilled occupational categories, 
and 41 percent were aged under 25 and so would tend to have little work experience. 
Those who were jobless but not officially unemployed may have been even more 
disadvantaged, as many would have been deterred from active job seeking due to a lack 
of appropriate skills or difficulty in returning to the workforce after prolonged periods 
of unemployment. 
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This mismatch arises in large part from the transition between modes of 
development. The combined effects of restructuring, internationalisation and 
technological change wiped out vast swathes of low-skilled manual jobs in production 
industries and encouraged job growth in service industries and skilled white-collar 
occupations. Many of the workers who lost their jobs through restructuring lacked the 
skills to take advantage of the new areas of job growth. Some would have acquired new 
skills through retraining while some would have been absorbed into low-skilled service 
work, but others were effectively left behind – consigned to long-term joblessness or 
intermittent periods of short-term and low-standard employment. And despite 
increasing participation in education and training, significant numbers of younger 
people continued to enter the labour force ill-equipped to succeed in a new environment 
where there was a premium on professional and technical skills and fewer low-skilled 
jobs available. These are the victims of disjunctural processes of economic change and 
the failure of education and training policies to manage the transition effectively.  
A final point to note is that the post-Fordist era was characterised not just by higher 
levels of joblessness, but also by a more inequitable distribution of employment 
between households. Callister’s work (2000; 2001) shows that between the mid-1980s 
and the mid-1990s there were increases in the proportions of both ‘work-rich’ couples 
(where both partners are employed) and ‘work-poor’ couples (where neither partner is 
employed), and conversely a decrease in the proportion of households where one 
partner is employed and the other not. Increasing employment rates among women are 
obviously an important factor in the growth of work-rich households, while the growth 
of work-poor households reflects falling employment among low-skilled males during 
the restructuring period. By 1991 around a fifth of prime working-aged households 
could be classified as work-poor – a figure that changed little over the next decade 
despite the recovery in employment growth.1     
 
 
Destandardisation of work 
 
We have already identified one aspect of flexibility in the post-Fordist labour market in 
the relatively high levels of frictional unemployment and labour turnover associated 
with workers moving between jobs or in and out of employment. Associated with this 
are changes in the characteristics of jobs in the peripheral sectors of the labour market – 
                                                 
1
 This analysis does not cover the years from 2001 to 2007 when further increases in employment may 
have reduced the incidence of ‘work-poor’ households.  
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the growth of what is widely referred to as non-standard work or alternatively as 
atypical, flexible, contingent or precarious work. Of these designations, non-standard 
work is the most useful for our purposes as it encompasses a wide range of employment 
types – not all of which are flexible, contingent or precarious – and signals a departure 
from the standardised employment model which predominated under Fordism. Just as 
Fordism entailed standardisation of production and consumption, it also involved 
standardisation of employment – the predominance of full-time and long-term waged or 
salaried employment in a single job based at an employer’s premises and carrying the 
benefits and protections of a formal employment contract. And just as the demise of 
Fordism meant destandardisation of production and consumption, it also involved 
destandardisation of work – the growth of employment arrangements which departed 
from the conventional model in one or more respects including part-time employment, 
casual work, fixed-term contracting, agency temping, self-employment, multiple job 
holding and homeworking.  
We saw in Chapter One that some notable social theorists such as Castells, Beck 
and Bauman have argued that the trend towards destandardisation and insecurity in 
employment is so pronounced that we may be witnessing the end of work as we know 
it, while others have argued that such grandiose claims are at odds with empirical reality 
(Doogan 2009). In New Zealand, the changing nature of employment arrangements has 
inspired a burgeoning literature and it has been tentatively suggested that non-standard 
work may in fact be becoming standard (Spoonley 2004). There is certainly evidence to 
show that non-standard work has become more common in New Zealand (Spoonley et 
al 2004; Carroll 1999; Baines and Newell 2005) as in other developed economies 
(Mangan 2000; Houseman and Osawa 2003).1 However, as suggested in Chapter One, 
there is a need for some caution in interpreting these trends: some categories of non-
standard work still only account for fairly small proportions of the workforce; much 
non-standard work is not insecure or precarious and differs little in most respects from 
standard employment; non-standard working arrangements are often preferred by 
workers rather than being imposed by employers; and trends which emerged during the 
restructuring period of the 1980s and 1990s may have subsequently slowed or reversed. 
The evidence for the growth of non-standard work in New Zealand will be analysed in 
the next section, but first we need to consider what is meant by non-standard work and 
why it became more common during the post-Fordist period.  
                                                 
1
 In New Zealand, a considerable volume of research on working arrangements has emerged from Massey 
University’s Labour Market Dynamics Research Programme (see http://lmd.massey.ac.nz/).  
The Labour Market in Transition     88 
While Ulrich Beck is one who may be guilty of exaggerating changes in the nature 
of employment, he offers a useful conceptualisation of destandardisation (1992: 139-
150). He identifies three dimensions to the standard employment model: the labour 
contract, working hours and the work site. Standard work is regulated by the terms of 
standardised employment contracts (often negotiated collectively), it is full-time and 
long-term, and it is concentrated within centralised business premises. Thus 
destandardisation, for Beck, involves increasing degrees of flexibility in the contractual, 
temporal and spatial organisation of work. Edgell (2006: 126-152) draws on this 
conception to show how different types of non-standard work embody different types of 
destandardisation, as represented in Figure 3.4. This is somewhat simplified, as in 
reality different types of destandardisation often overlap, but it is useful as an 
illustration of the ways in which different types of non-standard work depart from the 
standard model. Contractual destandardisation involves the growth of self-
employment, which may take many different forms – the common factor being that 
there is an exchange of labour but no contract of employment between the seller and the 
purchaser of that labour. This includes working proprietors who sell their services to 
other producers or consumers on the open market, independent contractors or sub-
contractors who provide services to other businesses on a contractual basis, and 
franchisees who are licensed by a company to sell its products or services in return for 
some form of payment. Temporal destandardisation is the most common departure 
Source: Derived from discussion in Edgell (2006: 126-152)
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from standard employment and involves variation to the number of hours worked and/or 
the tenure of employment. This includes part-time workers on standard employment 
contracts, fixed-term employees contracted to work for limited periods, casual workers 
hired as needed without formal employment contracts or any certainty of tenure, and 
temporary workers hired through intermediaries such as temping agencies. Spatial 
destandardisation involves a departure from the norm of working at an employer’s 
premises and encompasses various forms of outworking conducted by either employees 
or contractors. This includes homeworking and teleworking, which are often but not 
always the same thing – not all homeworkers are dependent on telecommunications and 
not all teleworkers are based at home, with some working from remote offices or 
‘telecentres’ or on the move between customers (Felstead et al 2005). If all three 
dimensions of destandardisation coincide, it may even result in what Edgell terms total 
destandardisation, manifested in informal work which is beyond the purview of 
employment and taxation regulations. This might range from ‘under the table’ work 
done by legitimately employed people or beneficiaries, to work performed by highly 
vulnerable and exploited groups such as illegal immigrants, and criminal activities 
involving exchange of goods and services on the black market (Williams and 
Windebank 1998). 
A further distinction needs to be drawn between inferior types of non-standard 
employment often referred to as precarious work, and those non-standard jobs which 
offer greater rewards and protections to workers. We can identify four axes along which 
the quality of non-standard work varies: job security, control over the labour process, 
regulatory protections and income levels (Rodgers 1989). Non-standard work covers a 
spectrum along each axis: from those with little certainty of continuing employment to 
those in secure long-term positions; from those whose work is tightly controlled by 
employers to those who control their own means of production and work processes; 
from those without any employment protections to those fully covered by collectivised 
employment contracts; and from the low paid to the highly paid. Precarious non-
standard workers rank at the lower end of the spectrum on each count. They have little 
job security, often subsisting on casual work and facing considerable uncertainty as to 
tenure and hours of work; their work processes are often highly prescribed and 
controlled by those who employ them; they seldom have formal employment contracts 
or union representation and are therefore vulnerable to exploitation; and they tend to be 
poorly remunerated, often at a level below that required for an acceptable minimum 
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standard of living. Examples of workers in this category might include non-contracted 
casual or part-time workers in service industries such as hospitality and retailing, 
seasonal workers in horticultural industries, and low-skilled homeworkers paid on piece 
rates. Examples of non-standard workers in less precarious situations include part-time 
workers in stable jobs with long-term employment contracts, employed professionals on 
fixed-term contracts with good incomes and reasonable expectations of further work, 
and self-employed people who control their own work processes and have scarce skills 
that are well remunerated. Inevitably, there are grey areas in such distinctions but it is 
important to recognise that at the lower end of the spectrum there is a distinctive group 
of non-standard workers subject to greater levels of exploitation and hardship. 
The destandardisation of work in the latter part of the twentieth century was very 
much associated with – but not entirely reducible to – the restructuring of production 
following the crisis of Fordism. The standard employment model was not an invention 
of the Fordist era, but it did come to predominate to a greater degree during that period 
(Edgell 2006: 73-80). Large scale production based on highly compartmentalised 
technical divisions of labour required large workforces gathered together in factories 
and offices, with low labour turnover in order to minimise training costs and production 
bottlenecks. Moreover, large producers tended to maintain direct control over the 
extended division of labour, from pre-production through the core production process to 
post-production work, by keeping the work in-house rather than outsourcing services 
from smaller firms or contractors. The economies of scale available to large producers 
could also make it difficult for petty commodity producers and small proprietors to 
compete in product markets, drawing many away from self-employment and into waged 
employment. The appeal of waged employment was enhanced by the capital–labour 
compromise which underpinned Fordism, with progressive labour laws and centralised 
bargaining delivering improved conditions of employment, greater job security and real 
wage growth. Together, these factors made what we now call standard employment a 
more advantageous arrangement for bosses and workers alike.  
In the post-Fordist era several factors encouraged shifts away from this standard 
model. Firstly, flexible production models in which the volume and composition of 
output were more subject to changing market conditions often required a labour supply 
which was both numerically flexible (in terms of the amount of labour employed) and 
functionally flexible (in terms of the way it was deployed), something which could be 
achieved through the use of temporary workers and external contractors in preference to 
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permanent employees who might at times be surplus to requirements. Secondly, and 
relatedly, greater pressures to minimise labour costs in the interests of competitiveness 
and profitability meant that non-standard workers often provided a cheaper alternative 
to standard employees, not just because they could be more easily dispensed with when 
no longer required, but also because they offered savings on the non-wage costs 
associated with standard employment contracts – training and development, paid leave, 
superannuation contributions, health and accident insurance, redundancy payments, 
administrative costs and in some cases provision of equipment.1 Thirdly, information 
communications technology enabled some types of work to be performed off-site by 
employees or independent contractors working from home or other remote locations 
while remaining connected via electronic networks. ICT also encouraged some forms of 
self-employment by enabling small businesses to operate out of virtual offices 
consisting of little more than a PC and an Internet connection, with minimal start-up 
costs and online access to potentially vast markets. Fourthly, structural shifts in 
production and employment from goods-producing to service industries meant more 
workers were employed in industries where non-standard employment was common – 
particularly in sectors such as retailing, hospitality and tourism where labour 
requirements are highly variable and much work is low-skilled, meaning staff are more 
disposable and recruitable. Finally, increasing numbers of workers were prepared to 
take up non-standard jobs, some because of a dearth of opportunities for standard 
employment but others out of preference – particularly mothers of dependent children 
needing to combine paid work and family responsibilities, older people wishing to 
maintain some engagement with the workforce while easing into retirement, tertiary 
students funding their studies through part-time or casual work, and some immigrant 
groups with a preference for self-employment over waged employment.  
Both demand and supply factors therefore contributed to the growth of non-standard 
employment in developed capitalist economies. This is not to say, however, that the 
phenomenon was simply a mutually advantageous outcome of market forces. The trend 
really gathered strength in the 1980s and early 1990s when restructuring of production 
and intensification of competition were forcing employers to find new ways of utilising 
                                                 
1
 Additionally, if there is an ample supply of casual labour which can be employed on wages and 
conditions inferior to those of permanent employees, this may undermine the latter’s bargaining strength 
and lead to a deterioration of their wages and conditions. Non-standard workers can thus act as a modern-
day reserve army of labour, not only providing capital with a buffer against fluctuating labour 
requirements but also simultaneously acting as a restraint on the demands of the core workforce (Magdoff 
and Magdoff 2004).  
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labour flexibly and cheaply. In the context of soaring unemployment, many workers 
who were unable to find suitable long-term jobs had to turn to alternative forms of 
employment, although for others it may have been a preferred option. The literature 
suggests, not surprisingly, that supply-side factors are significant in encouraging the 
more desirable forms of non-standard work such as professional self-employment and 
stable part-time work, but demand-side factors drive the growth of precarious non-
standard work (Tucker 2002). A crucial factor in enabling the shift to more flexible 
working arrangements was the deregulation of labour markets that occurred in market-
oriented post-Fordist economies in the 1980s and 1990s. This was done not in the 
interests of workers, but rather to enable capital to use labour more flexibly and more 
cheaply by individualising employment relations, easing legislative restrictions on the 
way employers utilised labour, and weakening the power of unions to protect vulnerable 
workers against unfavourable conditions of employment – New Zealand’s Employment 
Contracts Act being a good example. It is worth comparing the haste with which labour 
markets were deregulated in the 1980s and 1990s with the reluctance to accommodate 
workers’ demands for flexibility from employers. In New Zealand, it was more than 16 
years after the passage of the ECA that legislation was finally passed giving employees 
with caring responsibilities a statutory right to request flexible working arrangements 
from employers, and this only occurred in the face of considerable opposition from 
business groups.1 Flexibility was not quite a one-way street, but traffic certainly moved 
faster and more freely in one direction than the other.  
 
 
Non-standard work in New Zealand  
 
The growing body of literature on non-standard work in New Zealand suggests a 
significant trend of destandardisation which was most pronounced during the 
restructuring of the 1980s and early 1990s, slowing as the post-Fordist economy entered 
its consolidation phase and employment growth returned. On the supply side of the 
equation, the increasing participation of women in paid employment has clearly been an 
important factor in the growth of non-standard work, but other demographic groups 
have also been over-represented, including recent migrants and those at either end of the 
working-age spectrum – young people in the early stages of their working lives and 
older people around retirement age (Baines and Newell 2005; McPherson 2006). 
                                                 
1
 The Employment Relations (Flexible Working Arrangements) Amendment Act 2007.  
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Qualitative research suggests that life-cycle and lifestyle factors make non-standard 
employment a preferred option for some, but for others it is more a matter of taking 
whatever work is available on whatever terms employers are prepared to offer it – 
particularly in the case of work at the precarious end of the spectrum. While there is 
little quantitative evidence on this kind of work in New Zealand, qualitative studies 
suggest that it is not uncommon for non-standard workers to be in low quality jobs with 
poor wages, inferior conditions, inadequate legal protections, low levels of unionisation, 
and a high degree of insecurity and uncertainty over job tenure and hours of work 
(McLaren et al 2004; WEB Research 2004).  
On the demand side of the equation, research on how and why New Zealand 
employers utilise non-standard labour is limited and a little dated. Evidence from the 
early 1990s suggested that in the prevailing recessionary conditions, casualisation and 
outsourcing tended to be pursued as short-term measures to contain costs rather than as 
deliberate long-term strategies of flexibilisation (Anderson et al 1994; Ryan 1992). A 
desire for greater flexibility in contractual arrangements and labour costs was behind the 
push for labour market deregulation which culminated in the Employment Contracts 
Act of 1991, but while the ECA may have accelerated the existing trend of 
destandardisation it did not result in a quantum shift towards non-standard work 
(Brosnan and Walsh 1996; Deeks et al 1994: 511-534). It is useful here to distinguish 
between public and private sectors: until the early 1990s the public sector with its new 
imperatives of efficiency and fiscal responsibility appears to have made greater use of 
non-standard labour than the private sector (Anderson et al 1996), but once the state 
sector reforms were bedded in and the ECA was enacted, the use of non-standard labour 
grew more rapidly in the private sector (Brosnan and Walsh 1996).1 The slowdown in 
destandardisation during the consolidation phase might support earlier suggestions that 
the use of casual and outsourced labour was largely a recessionary phenomenon and that 
economic recovery could see a shift back towards the standardisation of work 
(Anderson et al 1994; Brosnan and Walsh 1998). By the same token, the return of 
recessionary conditions after 2007 might see a resurgence in the use of non-standard 
workers, although it is too early as yet to draw firm conclusions about this.  
                                                 
1
 The ECA was superseded by the Employment Relations Act but, as noted in the last chapter, the latter 
did little to alter the fundamentals of the earlier Act. While it introduced greater regulation of non-
standard working arrangements and offered some protection to vulnerable groups such as homeworkers, 
there was little in the legislation to discourage employers from using non-standard workers (Rossiter and 
McMorran 2003). 
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An indication of the decline of the standard model of full-time wage and salary 
earning which characterised Fordism is shown in Figure 3.5. In 1966, at the height of 
the Fordist era, over 80 percent of workers were full-time employees (ie working more 
than 30 hours a week for wages or salaries). By 1996 this had fallen to less than 60 
percent, thanks to increases in both part-time work and self employment. A significant 
factor in this trend was increasing labour force participation by women combining part-
time paid employment with unpaid domestic labour. This appears to have been the 
driving factor behind the decline in standard work up until the 1981 Census, during 
which time the proportion of full-time employees in the female workforce fell 
significantly while there was little change in the male workforce. However, with the 
onset of restructuring in the 1980s the picture for men also changed. The proportion of 
male workers in standard employment fell from 80 percent to 64 percent between 1981 
and 1996 as secure full-time jobs became more scarce and increasing numbers turned to 
casual or part-time work or self-employment. For both sexes, the decline levelled off 
between 1996 and 2001 and reversed slightly at the last census in 2006, reflecting the 
end of the restructuring process and a return to economic growth which created more 
full-time waged and salaried jobs. This levelling off of destandardisation is common to 
other advanced economies which followed a restructuring path similar to New 
Zealand’s (OECD 2009) and is contrary to the predictions of those such as Beck and 
Figure 3.5: Full-time wage and salary earners
as a proportion of all employed people, by sex
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Castells who foresaw a continuing downward spiral into chronic insecurity where 
standard jobs would be a thing of the past.  
It is important to note that while Figure 3.5 gives an indication of the long-term 
trend of destandardisation, it overstates the proportion of workers in standard 
employment as the figures include full-time wage and salary earners who are temporary 
workers, homeworkers or multiple job holders. It is very difficult to estimate the total 
proportion of workers in non-standard jobs as different forms of non-standard work tend 
to overlap and there are some deficiencies in the data. Estimates in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s ranged from 39 percent (Baines and Newell 2005) to 57 percent (Carroll 
1999), but these studies used different data sources and methodologies. Calculations 
from 2006 Census data indicate that 49 percent of workers were either part-timers, self-
employed (including employers), multiple job holders or working from home – but this 
excludes temporary workers who are not identified by the Census. However we measure 
it, non-standard employment clearly accounted for a large proportion of the workforce 
by the late 1990s and early 2000s – perhaps even the majority. This should be qualified 
with the observation that many non-standard jobs do not differ greatly from standard 
employment – particularly permanent part-time jobs and some fixed-term contract 
positions – and the growth of non-standard work should therefore not be read as a shift 
towards precarious work. The latter may well have grown, but the trend is impossible to 
quantify as official statistics do not allow us to distinguish jobs of this kind. 
Official data sources also do not enable us to the identify the extent of informal 
employment, which by its very nature is not susceptible to measurement. While 
informal employment is more common in developing nations, where it often accounts 
for the majority of work, it has been estimated that even in advanced industrial 
economies informal work may equate to as much as a fifth of the level of formal 
employment (ILO 2002). There are no estimates for New Zealand, but it is likely to be 
at the lower end of the scale given that it has fewer illegal immigrants – a group who 
tend to have high rates of informal employment. It is also difficult to gauge whether 
informal work increased during the post-Fordist period, although this is likely given the 
general trend towards destandardisation, and particularly the increased use of causal 
labour which is more conducive to hiring on an informal basis (Edgell 2006: 142-148).     
Given the limitations of the data, any statistical analysis of non-standard 
employment in New Zealand will give only a partial picture, but with this qualification 
in mind it is worth looking at the trends during the post-Fordist era in more detail. Table 
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3.1 shows the trends since 1986 in different types of non-standard work for both sexes. 
Generally, the figures confirm the overall trend of increases during the restructuring 
period and then a levelling off, followed by a slight decline during the consolidation 
period. Part-time employment is the most significant category, not only in terms of size 
but also because many workers in other types of non-standard employment such as 
casual work, multiple job holding and homeworking tend to work part-time and are 
therefore enumerated within this category. The biggest increases in part-time work were 
between 1986 and 1996, when it grew from 15 percent to 23 percent of the workforce 
and the level of male part-time employment more than doubled. This period 
encompassed the years of restructuring and recession when unemployment growth was 
at its most rapid and large numbers of full-time workers were losing their jobs or being 
forced involuntarily into part-time or casual work. Between the 1986 and 1991 censuses 
full-time employment fell by 127,000 while part-time employment rose by 28,000. 
Between 1991 and 1996 growth in full-time employment returned, but at 102,000 it was 
still lower than the 129,000 increase in part-time workers. After 1996 the economic 
recovery produced considerably more growth in full-time than part-time employment, 
but this did not result in a significant reduction in the proportion of workers in part-time 
jobs, with the figures settling at around 12 percent for men and 35 percent for women.  
Table 3.1: Proportions of employed people in non-standard work, by sex 
1986–2006 
      
  1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
      Part-time 1      
Male 5.5 7.6 12.5 12.1 12.4 
Female 28.3 31.1 36.0 35.8 34.7 
Total 14.8 17.8 23.2 23.1 22.9 
Self-employed 2      
Male 12.4 14.8 14.8 15.9 14.9 
Female 6.3 7.2 8.1 9.0 9.1 
Total 9.9 11.5 11.8 12.7 12.2 
Multiple job holders 3      
Male 4.7 6.3 8.4 9.6 9.2 
Female 5.7 8.5 11.0 10.8 10.3 
Total 5.1 7.2 9.6 10.2 9.7 
Working from home 4      
Male 7.7 7.2 9.3 9.4 7.9 
Female 9.2 8.4 10.9 10.7 9.6 
Total 8.3 7.7 10.0 10.0 8.7 
            
      1  Usually work fewer than 30 hours per week in all jobs. 
2  Employed on own account but not employing others. 
3  Usually work some hours in jobs other than main job. 
4  Worked from home on census day. 
 Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings 
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Although growth in part-time employment is often taken as evidence of employers’ 
preferences for flexibility in their workforces, supply-side factors may have played a 
more important role. Over the two decades in question, three groups in particular 
contributed to the growing supply of workers wanting part-time rather than full-time 
employment. The first was tertiary students, whose numbers increased greatly due to 
rising educational participation rates. The second was older people around retirement 
age, whose numbers increased due to population ageing and who were more likely to 
work than in the past due to the raising of the retirement age, changing social attitudes 
towards ageing, and for reasons of financial necessity. And the third was mothers of 
dependent children, whose labour force participation also increased as a result of both 
changing social attitudes and financial necessity (see Chapter Seven). These groups 
together accounted for seven in every ten part-time workers in 2006, and were 
responsible for around 90 percent of the growth in part-time employment between the 
1996 and 2006 censuses. The HLFS also shows that over this period only around five 
percent of part-time workers on average wanted to work full-time – although a 
considerably higher proportion would have preferred to work more hours.   
By comparison with part-time work, growth in self-employment was more modest. 
It was most pronounced between 1986 and 1991, fluctuating at around 12 percent over 
subsequent censuses, with stronger growth among women than men – although in 
contrast to other forms of non-standard work, women remained considerably less likely 
than men to be self-employed. There was much anecdotal discussion of involuntary 
self-employment during the late 1980s and early 1990s as firms laid off workers and 
rehired them as self-employed contractors, while other workers used redundancy 
payments to set up small businesses, but this does not seem to have significantly 
increased overall rates of self-employment.  
There was stronger growth in multiple job holding up until 2001 as it became an 
increasingly common option for people unable to find full-time work, unable to make 
ends meet with a full-time job or simply wishing to pursue portfolio-type employment 
(Taylor et al 2004). Multiple job holding increased most markedly between 1986 and 
1996, when the proportion of both men and women with more than one job almost 
doubled, but it subsequently levelled off at a figure of around one in ten workers.1  
                                                 
1
 The Census gives much higher figures for multiple job holding than the HLFS, possibly due to sampling 
bias in the HLFS. Because of its wider coverage, the Census probably provides the more accurate data 
(Baines et al 2005). 
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The proportion of people working from home also increased between 1986 and 
1996, although it is difficult to know whether teleworking was a significant factor in 
this. Many people in this category are primary sector workers and so the trend 
represents the outcome of the countervailing influences of declining primary sector 
employment and increasing homeworking in other sectors. Overall, growth in this 
category was relatively modest and levelled off after 1996 before reversing slightly 
between 2001 and 2006.  
Data on temporary employment is not available from the census and was not 
collected in any official surveys until the Survey of Working Life was introduced as a 
supplement to the HLFS in 2008. As yet there has only been one such survey, but it 
does provide a snapshot of temporary employment in 2008, showing that 7.7 percent of 
the workforce at that time were temporary employees, including 4 percent who were 
casual employees, 1.9 percent who were fixed-term employees and 0.6 percent who 
were temp agency workers. Temporary work – like most other types of non-standard 
work – was more common for women than men, with 9.2 percent of females and 6.3 
percent of males working in temporary jobs.1 This survey shows a lower incidence of 
temporary employment than surveys in the 1990s which put the figure at around 11 
percent (Brosnan and Walsh 1998; Allan et al 2001; Department of Labour 1992; 
1997). While this might indicate that rates of temporary employment, like other forms 
of non-standard work, fell as economic conditions improved, we should be wary of 
drawing any firm conclusions given the different methodologies of the earlier surveys. 
But whatever the trend, the fact that the recent figures show only about one in thirteen 
workers employed on a temporary basis lends little support to prophecies of a descent 
into endemic insecurity in employment. On this point, it is also worth noting that the 
same survey found the majority of workers (55 percent) had been in their current jobs 
for more than three years, with almost a quarter (23 percent) having been in their jobs 
for more than 10 years. Around a fifth of workers (21 percent) had been in their present 
employment for less than one year. 
Finally, it is worth looking at the prevalence of non-standard work in different types 
of industry. It was noted earlier that non-standard work is more common in service 
industries, and so any shift in employment from goods-producing to service industries 
will inevitably result in an increase in non-standard work. Table 3.2 shows that the vast 
                                                 
1
 Statistics New Zealand, Survey of Working Life, March 2008 Quarter. Data retrieved on 18/09/2010 
from http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/work_income_and_spending/employment_and_ 
unemployment/surveyofworkinglife_hotpmar08qtr.aspx.  
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majority of New Zealand’s part-time jobs are in tertiary industries (84 percent in 2006), 
and almost all the growth in part-time work between 1986 and 2006 was in these 
industries. However, there was also some growth in the number of part-time jobs in the 
primary and secondary sectors over that period, at a time when full-time employment in 
those sectors was declining. The proportion of the workforce employed part-time 
increased for all sectors between 1986 and 1996 but fell slightly over the subsequent 
decade. In 2006, around one in four workers in the tertiary sector were employed part-
time, along with one in five workers in the primary sector and just one in ten workers in 
secondary industries. Clearly service industries provided the major impetus for the 
growth in part-time employment – and probably for many of the other types of non-
standard work which are predominantly part-time. But this is not to say that the growth 
of part-time work was simply the result of a shift in employment between sectors, given 
that part-timers also increased their share of the workforce within each sector over the 
full period.  
 
Table 3.2: Part-time employment by industrial sector 
1986–2006  
 
Industrial sector 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
      
 Number of part-time workers employed (thousands) 
      Primary 23.4 24.7 35.3 29.9 28.4 
Secondary 36.7 30.7 36.7 36.1 39.2 
Tertiary 158.5 186.6 269.9 302.1 345.1 
      
 Percent of workforce part-time 
      Primary 13.9 16.9 22.9 20.5 20.4 
Secondary 8.5 9.4 10.9 10.8 10.4 
Tertiary 17.9 20.8 26.0 26.1 25.4 
            
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Self-employment by industrial sector 
1986–2006  
      
Industrial sector 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
      
 Number of self-employed workers (thousands) 
      
Primary 52.9 50.1 39.1 37.8 32.9 
Secondary 36.0 36.8 38.4 42.4 46.4 
Tertiary 56.2 67.5 89.3 113.2 137.6 
      
 Percent of workforce self-employed 
      
Primary 31.8 34.4 25.8 26.2 23.8 
Secondary 8.3 11.3 11.6 12.8 12.4 
Tertiary 6.4 7.5 8.7 9.9 10.2 
            
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings 
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Table 3.3 shows that tertiary industries also account for the majority of self-
employment (63 percent in 2006), but in contrast to part-time work, self-employment 
makes up a smaller share of the workforce in service industries than in goods-producing 
industries. It is most common in primary industries, but there was a marked fall in self-
employment in this sector between 1986 and 2006, probably reflecting the decline of 
the family-owned farm as rationalisation of agriculture saw many smaller holdings 
amalgamated into larger ones run on a corporate or partnership basis. Even so, almost a 
quarter of the primary sector workforce were self-employed in 2006 compared with just 
12 percent in the secondary sector and 10 percent in the tertiary sector. Most self-
employed people in the secondary sector are tradespeople in the construction industry, 
which had a self-employment rate of 21 percent in 2006 (compared with just 6 percent 
in manufacturing). As in the case of part-time work, the tertiary sector accounts for most 
of the growth in self-employment, but the fact that self-employed workers make up an 
increasing proportion of the workforce within both secondary and tertiary sectors 
suggests that the trend is not simply a product of changes in the distribution of 
employment between sectors.  
Data on temporary employment from the Survey of Working Life shows that in 
2008 over two-thirds (69 percent) of temporary workers were employed in tertiary 
industries, but the primary sector had the highest proportion of temporary employees in 
its workforce – 12.4 percent compared with 7.5 percent in tertiary industries and 6.6 
percent in secondary industries. The relatively high proportion in the primary sector no 
doubt reflects the widespread use of temporary labour for seasonal work.  
Overall, the secondary sector – and manufacturing in particular – seems to be the 
least likely to employ non-standard workers. This is supported by figures on worker 
turnover which show there is less ‘churning’ in manufacturing employment than in most 
other industries. In the five years to June 2007, manufacturing had an average worker 
turnover rate of 13 percent per quarter, compared with 32 percent in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing, 31 percent in administrative and support services (which includes clerical 
temping), 28 percent in accommodation, cafes and restaurants, 22 percent in arts and 
recreation services, 20 percent in rental, hiring and real estate services, and 18 percent 
in retailing.1 The fact that the manufacturing workforce appears to be more stable and 
standardised than those in other sectors is at odds with the focus on flexible production 
and labour practices in manufacturing industries which characterises much of the 
                                                 
1
 Statistics New Zealand, Linked Employer-Employee Data. Retrieved from Table Builder at 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/methods_and_services/access-data/TableBuilder.aspx. 
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international literature on post-Fordism. That approach perhaps reflects a preoccupation 
with highlighting the effects of restructuring on Fordist mass production industries, with 
a consequent neglect of other sectors. It is difficult to know the degree to which 
employment practices in New Zealand’s manufacturing sector differ from those in other 
advanced economies, but the fact that manufacturing accounts for a declining share of 
employment and that relatively small proportions of its workers are in non-standard jobs 
suggests the manufacturing sector does not hold the key to understanding the 
destandardisation of work in this country. The shift in the distribution of employment 
from secondary to tertiary industries and the growth of non-standard work in the tertiary 
sector, accentuated by changing patterns of labour force participation among particular 
sections of the population, would appear to be far more significant factors.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
The two decades or so from the beginning of the restructuring project in the mid-1980s 
to the onset of the current crisis saw considerable upheaval in the New Zealand labour 
market. Restructuring destroyed huge numbers of jobs in goods-producing industries 
which had driven growth during the Fordist era, and sent unemployment soaring to 
levels not seen since the 1930s. The subsequent consolidation of the new mode of 
development saw a return to moderate economic growth based on extensive use of 
labour rather than high productivity, generating a demand for workers that caused 
unemployment to plummet and employment to reach new highs. It even resulted in 
labour shortages in some sectors of the economy despite the fact that there were still 
significant levels of joblessness and underemployment – at least by comparison with the 
Fordist era. These apparent labour surpluses were in part a product of a more flexible 
labour market characterised by considerable movement between jobs and short spells of 
joblessness, but they also reflected a mismatch between skills in supply and those in 
demand as some lower-skilled workers were left behind by the transition to a higher-
skilled economy. The flexibilisation of production and labour practices was also evident 
in the destandardisation of work as increasing numbers of workers departed from the 
standard model of full-time and long-term waged or salaried employment. This, 
however, is a trend which appears to have been associated with the era of restructuring 
and which slowed and reversed slightly as economic growth returned and labour 
demand recovered, contrary to the expectations of some social theorists. It is also a 
trend which was driven not just by the changing requirements of production and the 
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demands of employers, but also by an increasing supply of workers with a preference 
for non-standard employment, particularly part-time work. Clearly the restructuring of 
the economy has altered the dynamics of the labour market, but it has also had 
significant effects on the division of labour within production, which we will explore in 
the next chapter. 
  
 4 
 
The Changing Division of Labour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The development of capitalism has involved a progressive expansion of and 
specialisation within the division of labour as capitalist relations of production have 
spread across the globe and into more and more spheres of activity, as new technologies 
have been harnessed to revolutionise production processes, and as relations between 
producers have been reorganised to maximise efficiency and profitability. But as we 
observed in Chapter One, within this long-term evolution there have been periods when 
the division of labour has undergone more concentrated and pronounced change as a 
result of transformations in the nature of economic activity. These are the periods of 
crisis and restructuring in which existing modes of development break down and new 
ones emerge in their place. The transition between modes of development involves a 
process of creative destruction which affects employment at two levels, the aggregate 
and the sectoral. At the aggregate level, as we saw in the last chapter, the restructuring 
of production results in rising unemployment as old jobs are destroyed, followed 
eventually by a resurgence in employment levels as economic growth returns and new 
jobs are created. At the sectoral level, this entails a redistribution of labour as job losses 
are concentrated disproportionately in industries which flourished under the old regime, 
while subsequent job growth is concentrated disproportionately in those industries 
favoured by the new growth model.  
This chapter shifts the focus from the aggregate to the sectoral level to examine how 
restructuring in New Zealand redistributed employment from goods-producing 
industries that bore the brunt of job losses, to producer and consumer service industries 
which enjoyed most of the job growth under the new regime. It also looks within 
industrial sectors to examine occupational changes which saw a redistribution of work 
from manual to non-manual and from lower-skilled to higher-skilled jobs. In the 
process, we observe an accentuation of the long-term shift in the division of labour from 
the work of directly producing goods, towards work which indirectly supports the 
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production, circulation and consumption of goods or which produces commodities in 
the form of labour services rather than material goods.  
 
 
Sectoral change 
 
The long-term evolution of production and employment in advanced capitalist 
economies is conventionally characterised in terms of a progressive shift from 
agriculture to industrial manufacturing and then to service industries – leading to what 
Bell and others call the post-industrial economy. However, service industries are not so 
much a successor to industrial manufacturing but expand as a consequence of growth in 
the production, circulation and consumption of material goods. From its very 
beginnings, industrialisation created work for merchants, financiers, transporters, 
retailers and governments, and in most of the major capitalist nations the early phases of 
industrial development produced faster growth in services than in manufacturing, with 
the consequence that dominance in terms of employment tended to pass directly from 
agriculture to services (Kumar 1978: 200-204). As industrial capitalism develops, the 
dominance of service industries continues to become more pronounced for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, there is the expansion of the division of labour: as material production 
expands, the surrounding division of labour becomes more extensive and complex as 
more and more workers and specialised businesses are required to handle the tasks of 
developing products, managing production, circulating commodities and money, and 
performing intermediary roles between producers and consumers. Second, there is the 
increasing wealth which comes with economic growth: industrialisation produces rising 
incomes which provide consumers with more discretionary income to spend on 
household and personal services and provide governments with more tax revenue to 
invest in health, education and other social services. Third, there is technological 
innovation: technology provides more scope for productivity improvements in 
manufacturing industries than in service industries, and displaces more manual 
production workers than non-manual service workers. Fourth, there is rationalisation: 
the application of calculative rationality and technical knowledge to the organisation of 
production and the administration of economy and society encourages the proliferation 
of managers, experts, planners and bureaucrats in both private and public sectors. Fifth, 
there is commodification: as capital pursues its relentless quest for new sources of 
profit, it extends its reach into parts of the division of labour which were once the 
domain of private households or public organisations, in the process expanding 
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employment across a range of activities from personal and household services to health, 
education and public safety. Finally, there is internationalisation: capitalism has always 
scoured the globe for new commodities, new markets and new sources of labour, and in 
the process has found that some types of material production can be conducted more 
profitably elsewhere – agriculture in the colonies during the nineteenth century, and 
manufacturing in developing countries in the latter part of the twentieth century – 
resulting in displacement of employment from goods production in the core countries. 
None of these factors are new – most were identified by Marx and other classical 
theorists long before anyone conceived of post-industrialism, and they have driven the 
development of service employment in capitalism for over two centuries. The result, as 
Sayer and Walker argue, is not an epochal transition from industrial to post-industrial 
society or from a goods-producing to a service economy in the late twentieth century, 
but rather a long-term decline in the direct labour required for material production and a 
corresponding increase in the indirect labour which makes up the extended division of 
labour surrounding commodity production (Sayer and Walker 1992: 56-107). 
All this would occur even if the path of capitalist development was smooth and 
untroubled, but of course this is not the case. Capitalism, as we have observed, is prone 
to episodes of crisis and restructuring which result in disjunctural shifts in the nature of 
production and employment. The nature of these shifts depends on the historical and 
national circumstances, but the restructuring of the advanced capitalist economies 
following the crisis of the 1970s typically reshaped the division of labour at a number of 
different levels. At the international level, the dismantling of barriers to the movement 
of goods and capital, the industrialisation of developing countries and the growth of 
transnational production together meant greater relocation of manufacturing production 
from developed to developing economies, leaving the former to concentrate 
increasingly on the ‘immaterial’ aspects of production. At the regional level, those 
regions and cities which had been bases for Fordist mass production experienced 
declining employment and often sought revitalisation by attracting new industries, while 
metropolitan cities benefited from the expansion of corporate and financial activities. At 
the institutional level, there was a redistribution of work between the institutions of the 
state, the market, the community and the household: work shifted from the state to the 
market as public sector enterprises were sold off and services were contracted out to 
private enterprise; it moved from households and communities to the market as an ever 
greater range of activities was commodified in the search for profit; and it was 
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transferred from the state to communities as governments devolved or abandoned 
responsibilities for welfare and governance activities. At the industrial level, there were 
major sectoral shifts in employment as the focus of economic activity in the advanced 
economies moved from material production to the circulation of goods and capital and 
the provision of services, and as the growth of networked production saw different parts 
of production processes redistributed between industries. At the occupational level, the 
requirements for different types of workers changed along with the commodities 
produced and the techniques for producing them, resulting in a marked decline in 
manual production work and growth in managerial, professional, technical and low-
skilled service work. And finally, at the level of individual labour processes, the 
introduction of new technologies and flexible or lean production models resulted in 
considerable reorganisation of the way processes were divided and organised among 
workers. All this accentuated the long-term movement of labour away from material 
production, but it was rather more complex than the simple idea of a shift from goods to 
services suggests. To grasp the complexity, we need to dissect the amorphous concept 
of services and examine its constituent parts, but before doing so we can illustrate the 
broad sectoral shifts in the New Zealand context.  
From Figure 4.1, we can see both the long-term shift towards service or tertiary 
sector employment and the effects of the two major episodes of restructuring in the 
1930s–1940s and the 1980s–1990s, which saw first the rise and then the demise of 
manufacturing. The shift from primary to tertiary sector employment in fact began well 
before this series starts, with the primary sector’s share of employment declining from 
the 1870s onwards (Thompson 1985). The number of workers in the sector continued to 
grow until the 1930s as more land was opened up for farming, but the ratio of labour to 
capital on the farm was falling as investment in mechanisation and rationalisation 
reduced labour requirements. In Britain and other European countries, service-sector 
employment had grown on the back of the Industrial Revolution, but in New Zealand it 
was initially built less on industrialisation than on the growth of agrarian production and 
the business of state and nation building, which generated work in fields such as 
finance, commerce, transportation, communications and government. Consequently, the 
tertiary sector accounted for almost half of all employment as early as the 1930s.1 Up 
until this time, the growth of the secondary sector was relatively slow and based more 
on construction and primary product processing than manufacturing. But in the Fordist 
                                                 
1
 The 1945 figure for the tertiary sector is inflated by large numbers of people in the armed services. 
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period, the stimulus of import protections and expanding domestic consumption brought 
significant acceleration in secondary sector employment, taking its share of the 
workforce from 25 percent to 37 percent between 1936 and 1966. At the same time, the 
decline of primary sector employment also accelerated, not just in relative terms but 
also in absolute terms as the number of workers in the sector began to fall for the first 
time. The tertiary sector’s share of the workforce increased more gradually over this 
period, although there were actually more jobs created in tertiary industries than in 
secondary industries as producer and consumer services expanded and a growing public 
sector was required to deliver enhanced social services and administer the highly 
regulated economy. By 1971 over half the country’s workers were employed in tertiary 
industries – the point at which some would say we had arrived at a service economy. 
The secondary sector’s share of the workforce began to fall from the mid-1960s as 
the Fordist growth model reached its limits, but it was only after the onset of global 
crisis in the early 1970s that the number of people employed in secondary industries 
began to fall. Continued high levels of protection and government efforts to stimulate 
demand were not enough to halt the decline of secondary-sector employment, and when 
these policies were abandoned by the fourth Labour Government in the mid-1980s the 
decline was greatly hastened, with severe job losses in the latter part of that decade and 
a continuing slide in the sector’s share of employment which was only halted by the 
construction boom of the early 2000s. With primary sector employment also continuing 
to decline and the focus of activity shifting away from material production, the tertiary 
Figure 4.1: Employment by industrial sector
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sector became increasingly dominant. It accounted for the vast majority of job growth as 
the economy recovered from restructuring, and by 2006 employed 72 percent of 
workers compared with just 20 percent in secondary production and 8 percent in 
primary production. The post-Fordist period from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s had 
therefore seen significant acceleration in the long-term shift from goods production to 
services. But these broad sectoral trends only tell us a very small part of the story, and 
to adequately appreciate how the division of labour between industries changed in the 
post-Fordist era we must delve a little deeper.  
 
 
Classifying industries 
 
To properly explore sectoral shifts in employment we clearly need a far more detailed 
classification than the simple primary–secondary–tertiary split. The analysis which 
follows in the next section uses census data originally coded to New Zealand’s official 
classifications, but these classifications have limitations in terms of both the design of 
the categories and the fact that they are periodically revised, making time series analysis 
difficult. It has therefore been necessary to disaggregate the data and reclassify it in a 
form which is both more meaningful for the purposes of the current exercise and more 
consistent over time. The first step in this exercise is the design of a classification which 
aims to capture the key lines of demarcation within the social division of labour.1 
The main consideration in the classification of industries should be the output of the 
industry and where this fits within the chain of production, circulation and consumption 
which makes up the division of labour within capitalism. The output of industries 
generally takes the form of commodities – products of human labour produced for the 
purposes of exchange. Commodities may take the form of either alienable material 
goods or labour services which have no tangible form and involve a unique transaction 
between producer and consumer (Sayer and Walker 1992: 60). Goods-producing 
industries present no great difficulties in terms of classification, as the conventional 
distinction between primary and secondary goods production identifies distinct types of 
material production – the former based on the cultivation or extraction of natural 
                                                 
1
 The classification described here and shown in Table 4.1 is loosely derived from the typology developed 
by Browning and Singelmann (Singelmann 1978) and widely used by others including Castells (2000a). 
However, the Browning-Singelmann model has been significantly modified here in an effort to more 
accurately represent the contours of the social division of labour, drawing on Sayer and Walker’s 
discussion of the division of labour between industries (1992: 56-107). Some modifications have also 
been influenced by the practical requirements of accommodating categories from the official industrial 
classifications used to code New Zealand census data. 
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resources, and the latter based on the transformation of those goods and other inputs 
into manufactured or processed goods (including construction and utility industries). To 
capture distinct stages in the division of labour, it would be useful to be able to 
distinguish between goods-producing enterprises which sell their products directly to 
final consumers and those which sell them to other producers as inputs into further 
production processes. But such distinctions are not always hard and fast and are not 
identifiable from official data sources, so finer disaggregation is conventionally based 
on the type of products industries generate, rather than the uses to which they are put. 
Disaggregating the amorphous category of services is more problematic. To 
simplify matters, we can reduce the classification of services at the highest level to two 
fundamental questions. Firstly, is the service sold as a commodity or is it a non-profit 
activity? And secondly, if it is a commodity, is it sold primarily to producers or to 
consumers, or does it perform an intermediary role between producers and consumers? 
Using these criteria, we can delineate three high-level categories of commodified 
services (circulation, producer services and consumer services) and one of non-
commodified or non-profit services (government and community activities). Circulation 
industries mediate between producers and consumers by facilitating flows of capital in 
the form of both material goods (transport, wholesaling, retailing and property services) 
and money (finance and insurance), as well as the information that flows within the 
sphere of production and between producers and consumers (communications). 
Producer service industries provide intermediate outputs which primarily contribute to 
the production of other commodities, including scientific and technical services, legal 
and accounting services, and management and marketing services. Some of these 
services may also be sold directly to individual consumers, but for the most part their 
role is to facilitate the production and circulation of other commodities in one form or 
another. Consumer service industries provide labour services directly to final 
consumers, including the social services of health, welfare and education, as well as 
accommodation and food services, cultural and recreational services, and personal and 
household services.1 The final category of government and community activities covers 
non-commodified activities conducted by the state in the spheres of public 
                                                 
1
 As health, welfare and education services are often provided on a non-profit basis by government or 
other organisations, they could arguably be classed as non-commodified services or more conventionally 
as ‘social services’. However, because of difficulties in identifying whether workers are employed in non-
profit or profit-making organisations, and given increasing commodification of such services – both by 
private enterprises selling their services for profit and by state agencies imposing user charges – the 
justification for treating these services differently from other consumer services is being eroded. 
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administration and safety (the latter including armed services, police, fire services etc), 
and those of community organisations such as religious and special interest groups. This 
category does not include all non-commodified services, as public sector and non-profit 
organisations operating in fields such as health, welfare and education are classified 
within those particular industries in the official data sources.  
 
 
Restructuring and the industrial division of labour 
 
Using the six high-level industry groupings we have identified above, Figure 4.2 shows 
that circulation activities account for the greatest share of employment in New Zealand, 
but proportionately the fastest growing industries during the post-Fordist period were in 
the categories of producer and consumer services. These three types of industries have 
all experienced long-term growth dating back well beyond the period shown here, but 
there was a significant acceleration in employment in producer and consumer service 
industries during these two decades, while circulation industries also grew strongly in 
terms of numbers employed but without greatly increasing their overall share of 
employment. Between 1986 and 2006, employment grew by 162 percent in producer 
services, 68 percent in consumer services and 31 percent in circulation industries. The 
contrasting fortunes of the goods-producing industries represent not just a decline in 
their share of the workforce, but significant falls in the number of workers employed. 
Employment numbers in government and community activities were fairly stagnant for 
Figure 4.2: Employment by industry
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most of the period, meaning their share of the workforce also declined. To better 
understand the forces behind these broad trends we need to look in more detail at the 
industries within each of these categories, using the data show in Table 4.1.1   
 
Primary goods production 
 
The long-term decline in primary-sector employment was actually reversed for a brief 
period in late 1970s and early 1980s, probably due largely to government subsidies for 
farmers in the form of the Supplementary Minimum Price (SMP) scheme and efforts to 
absorb surplus labour through employment in the New Zealand Forestry Service. 
However, when the fourth Labour Government slashed assistance to farmers and first 
corporatised and then privatised its forestry operations, the effect on primary-sector 
employment was dramatic – a loss of almost 14,000 jobs in agriculture and over 5,000 
in forestry between 1986 and 1991.2 There was some recovery in job growth between 
1991 and 1996, but employment in the sector subsequently resumed its inexorable 
downward slide, to the point where it accounted for only one in 13 New Zealand 
workers by 2006. This occurred despite continuing real growth in the output of the 
sector, indicating that continuing improvements in productivity were enabling 
increasing volumes of output to be produced with declining volumes of labour. In the 
ten years to 2006, the only sector of agricultural production to experience significant 
employment growth was grape growing, thanks to the success of the New Zealand wine 
industry. However, by far the largest job growth in the primary sector in this period was 
in services to agriculture, a category which includes activities such as harvesting, 
picking, irrigation and fertilising. This suggests that agriculture, like other branches of 
industry was developing an increasingly specialised division of labour as activities 
surrounding core production processes were contracted out to specialist enterprises. 
 
                                                 
1
 Table 4.1 shows two series, using census data which was originally coded to different versions of the 
standard industrial classification – the NZSIC classification from 1986 to 1996, and the ANZSIC 
classification from 1996 to 2006. Because the two classifications are significantly different, the two series 
are not strictly comparable, although the data has been disaggregated to the finest level of the 
classifications and then reclassified to make them as comparable as possible. Data from the 1996 Census 
was officially coded to both classifications, and so two sets of data from that year are shown to allow 
comparisons over two ten-year periods and to show the effects of the classification changes. There were 
other minor changes within each of these classifications between censuses, but these should not 
significantly affect the comparability of the data within each of the two series.   
2
 According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the effective rate of assistance to the agricultural 
sector was cut from 52 percent to 3 percent over the decade to 1992/93 (retrieved on 21/09/2010 from 
http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/profitability-and-economics/structural-change/reform-of-nz-
agriculture/reform05.htm).  
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Table 4.1: Employment by industry (thousands employed) 
1986–2006 
        
 NZSIC Classification    ANZSIC Classification Industry 
1986 1991 1996  1996 2001 2006 
        
 Thousands 
Primary goods production        
Agriculture 145.6 132.0 143.3  136.4 129.5 127.0 
Forestry 11.5 6.1 9.9  9.5 9.6 8.0 
Fishing 4.5 3.9 4.3  4.3 3.7 2.9 
Mining 6.0 4.5 4.3  4.1 3.4 4.2 
Total 167.6 146.6 161.9  154.2 146.1 142.0 
        Secondary goods production        
Construction 102.0 84.8 94.4  94.0 103.9 147.5 
Utilities 15.7 11.1 8.2  8.9 6.0 6.1 
Manufacturing 316.2 233.0 236.7  232.5 223.8 226.1 
Food and beverages 74.7 60.1 55.5  51.0 53.0 54.8 
Textiles 44.9 28.8 26.5  26.1 20.6 17.8 
Wood and paper products 31.1 23.3 24.5  24.0 23.6 23.0 
Printed and recorded media 22.1 21.3 22.8  23.2 22.4 22.2 
Chemical products  26.4 18.6 19.2  19.6 18.0 18.0 
Metal products 34.8 25.3 27.5  25.7 25.3 26.7 
Machinery and equipment 57.9 37.0 40.9  41.4 39.5 42.6 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 24.2 18.6 19.8  21.6 21.5 21.0 
Total 434.0 328.9 339.3  335.5 333.7 379.8 
        Circulation        
Transport and storage 70.7 57.8 63.4  62.2 66.5 75.2 
Wholesale trade 85.5 73.2 90.4  94.4 99.5 107.7 
Retail trade 169.0 166.7 189.5  200.0 208.3 238.1 
Property 12.3 20.0 32.0  36.4 38.5 52.3 
Finance and insurance 52.1 55.7 53.7  52.7 51.9 64.1 
Communications 40.3 27.1 24.0  24.4 23.2 24.3 
Total 430.0 400.5 453.0  470.1 487.8 561.8 
        Producer services        
Scientific and technical 17.3 18.2 22.0  22.6 25.1 35.3 
Information technology 6.5 8.0 9.9  10.3 18.4 26.0 
Legal and accounting 24.3 28.1 27.8  27.8 30.0 34.3 
Management and marketing 7.9 12.3 17.4  27.8 38.5 53.4 
Miscellaneous producer services 20.8 33.9 48.4  36.4 44.0 52.4 
Total 76.8 100.5 125.5  124.9 156.1 201.4 
        Consumer services        
Health services 83.8 80.1 76.7  75.9 95.6 106.3 
Care and welfare services 15.3 22.8 32.0  32.1 45.0 54.8 
Education 81.6 93.8 105.4  104.8 126.5 139.1 
Accommodation and food services 59.8 58.5 82.0  69.4 80.4 94.6 
Cultural and recreational services 26.5 27.2 34.7  33.9 41.3 51.7 
Personal and household services 19.0 18.0 24.3  31.8 29.9 34.3 
Total 285.9 300.4 355.2  348.0 418.6 480.9 
        Government & community activities        
Public administration and safety 78.8 84.3 79.5  81.7 76.1 87.2 
Non-profit and interest groups 12.2 11.2 15.4  15.4 18.0 21.7 
Total 91.0 95.5 94.9  97.1 94.1 108.8 
        Grand total 1485.4 1372.5 1529.7  1529.8 1636.4 1874.6 
        
        Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings (reclassified data) 
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Secondary goods production 
 
Secondary-sector employment had also been artificially sustained during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s by means of Keynesian demand management, the retention of relatively 
high levels of import protection, and the ‘Think Big’ energy projects which temporarily 
boosted construction employment. This sector bore the brunt of the fourth Labour 
Government’s liberalisation programme as phasing out of import licensing and 
reduction of tariffs exposed local producers to international competition, while 
consumer demand withered in an environment of soaring unemployment, benefit cuts, 
high interest rates and falling real wages. Between the 1986 and 1991 censuses, 105,000 
jobs were lost in secondary production, with the most severe losses in machinery and 
equipment manufacturing, textile production, food processing and construction. Within 
the category of machinery and equipment manufacturing, the industries of motor vehicle 
assembly and electrical machinery manufacturing best exemplified the rise and demise 
of Fordism. These industries had benefited greatly from import licensing which 
restricted the importation of finished products while allowing the import of component 
parts for assembly in New Zealand, and also prospered from the rising demand for 
consumer durables during the Fordist period. But they were the most severely affected 
by the liberalisation of import restrictions and declining domestic demand after 1984, 
and together shed 15,000 workers between 1986 and 1991 alone. 
If the post-1984 restructuring can be viewed as a process of creative destruction, 
then goods-producing industries suffered the most job destruction but largely missed out 
on the job creation which came with the subsequent recovery. The construction industry 
was a notable exception, taking on an extra 63,000 workers between 1991 and 2006. In 
manufacturing industries, the economic recovery produced only very moderate job 
growth or more typically merely slowed the decline of employment. The biggest losses 
during this period were in textile and clothing industries, which struggled in the face of 
competition from low-wage Asian countries. The manufacturing industries generating 
the most new jobs during the recovery fell into two categories: ‘sunrise’ industries such 
as electronic equipment manufacturing, boatbuilding and wine production; and 
industries producing building materials to fuel the construction boom. Even in these 
industries, growth was fairly modest and none offered the prospect of a significant 
revival in manufacturing employment – demand for construction materials is highly 
dependent on economic conditions, while the other industries mentioned focussed on 
high-quality rather than high-volume output and were not significant employers of low-
The Changing Division of Labour     114 
skilled labour. Over the two decades from 1986 to 2006, manufacturing’s share of the 
workforce fell from 21 percent to 12 percent, and with both manufacturing and 
construction being hit hard by the subsequent recession and New Zealand’s 
commitment to more free-trade agreements with major manufacturing exporters – 
including an agreement with China in 2008 – the prospects for secondary sector 
employment remain bleak.  
 
Circulation 
 
The fortunes of circulation industries are to some extent tied to those of goods-
producing industries, given that much of their work involves the movement and selling 
of goods and the flows of finance and information associated with the production, 
circulation and consumption of goods. However, the decline of goods production in 
New Zealand did not result in a long-term decline in the work of circulation industries. 
New Zealand may have produced fewer goods than before, but it imported more and the 
business of buying and selling goods was undiminished. Flows of finance became more 
important to the economy than in the past, even if they were increasingly detached from 
the business of material production. And communications also became more significant 
with the development of information communications technology, networked 
production and more competitive marketing. Consequently, employment in circulation 
industries grew throughout the post-Fordist era, with the exception of the 1986–1991 
period when restructuring and recession had a major effect on the goods-handling and 
communications industries. However, the pace of growth was generally slower in 
circulation industries than in producer and consumer services, with the result that their 
share of the total workforce changed little between 1986 and 2006. Nonetheless, with 
almost a third of the workforce, circulation clearly retained a dominant role in the 
economy, employing more workers than the goods-producing industries combined and 
more than either consumer or producer services. 
Among circulation industries, the transport and communications industries were the 
worst affected by restructuring. Transport employment suffered not only from the 
decline in manufacturing which affected the volume of goods moving internally, but 
also from the corporatisation and eventual privatisation of New Zealand Railways, 
which was another government agency that had previously helped to absorb labour 
surpluses. As a consequence of this and the deregulation of road transport, over 5,000 
railways jobs were lost between 1986 and 1991 alone, with further losses after railway 
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operations were privatised in 1993. Job growth in the transport industry as a whole 
recovered after 1991, but its share of the national workforce remained largely 
unchanged. Communications industries – a category which includes postal and courier 
services as well as telecommunications – experienced major job losses during the 
restructuring period, with 13,000 jobs going between 1986 and 1991 and a further 3,000 
over the next five years. This was mostly due to the restructuring of the Post Office into 
three state-owned corporations with separate responsibilities for postal services, 
telecommunications and banking, and the subsequent privatisation of the 
telecommunications and banking operations. Major job losses came from the closure of 
many rural, small-town and suburban post offices, along with deregulation of the 
telecommunications market which prompted successive rounds of restructuring and 
redundancies in the privatised Telecom Corporation. Despite the growing economic 
importance of telecommunications and the proliferation of new companies in the 
industry, it is not a major employer and its workforce in fact continued to decrease even 
as the economy recovered through the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Wholesaling and retailing also shed workers in the early years of restructuring as 
consumer demand contracted, but economic recovery brought renewed job growth after 
1991. Growth in retailing employment was most pronounced in the early 2000s, with 
buoyant economic conditions and a debt-fuelled consumption boom stimulating an 
increase of almost 30,000 workers between 2001 and 2006 – the largest growth in any 
category of industry in that period. However, in proportionate terms this was a similar 
rate of growth to that in the workforce as a whole and so it did not increase the 
industry’s share of total employment. In fact, the proportion of workers employed in 
both wholesaling and retailing changed little over the two decades. Retailing is another 
industry to have been badly affected by the latest economic crisis, although by 
comparison with manufacturing it has better prospects of recovery in the event of a 
return to economic growth.  
Property and finance were two sectors which prospered as a consequence of the 
neoliberal reforms, with deregulation of the financial sector and declining profitability 
in goods-producing industries unleashing a spree of speculative investment. However, 
the economic significance of these sectors is not really reflected in employment data, as 
vast profits can be made from relatively small investments of labour and without 
generating a great deal of employment. In the finance and insurance industries there was 
also a displacement of some labour due to technological developments which allowed 
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much routine clerical work to be automated or relocated offshore. Consequently, 
finance and insurance industries did not increase their share of the workforce at all over 
the two decades, although there was strong job growth in the buoyant conditions 
towards the end of the period, with an increase of 12,000 workers between 2001 and 
2006. There was much stronger growth over the two decades in property industries – 
which include real estate, property development, and the hiring and leasing of property 
including machinery and equipment. The commercial property boom associated with 
the speculative binge of the mid-1980s probably fuelled the initial growth, while the 
more recent residential property boom stimulated an increase of 14,000 jobs in property 
industries between 2001 and 2006. Those jobs were mostly in real estate and many are 
likely to have subsequently disappeared with the bursting of the property bubble and the 
onset of recession.  
 
Producer services 
 
Producer services had the fastest rate of job growth of any category of industry in the 
post-Fordist period, even experiencing strong growth at the height of restructuring 
between 1986 and 1991, and more than doubling their share of the workforce from five 
percent to 11 percent over the two decades to 2006. A number of inter-related factors 
account for this growth. Firstly, the restructuring process itself generated considerable 
work for business consultants and experts of various kinds who were contracted to 
oversee and advise on processes of both private and state sector restructuring. Secondly, 
a more competitive business environment put greater onus on producers to seek 
competitive advantages through product innovation, organisational efficiency and 
marketing, all of which created work for specialised enterprises in these fields. Thirdly, 
technological change not only created demand for specialised IT companies, but also 
lead to changes in production processes and business models which generated work for 
other technical and management specialists. Finally, increasing specialisation within the 
social division of labour meant that many functions once conducted in-house were more 
likely to be sourced from specialised companies or contractors able to provide greater 
expertise or more cost-effective services – so labour formerly categorised under the 
industry of the producer was displaced into the category of producer services. Such 
specialisation also tends to generate more jobs as these enterprises seek to increase 
profits by enhancing services, developing new ones and promoting them to stimulate 
demand which otherwise might not have existed.  
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The producer service industries to experience the most growth were management 
and marketing services and information technology services, both of which owed their 
expansion to distinctive features of the new mode of development. Management and 
marketing services expanded largely due to the rise of management consultancy, which 
took off during the restructuring period as businesses reorganised to adapt to the new 
environment, and continued to grow strongly over subsequent years as competitive 
markets encouraged firms to contract in specialised management expertise to help 
maintain competitiveness and efficiency. The growth of IT services obviously reflects 
the shift to a new technological paradigm and again the tendency to buy in outside 
technical expertise – with most of the growth being in computer consultancy services, 
including programming and systems analysis.  
The more established producer service industries in the category of scientific and 
technical services and legal and accounting services experienced more sedate 
employment growth for most of the period, but with an acceleration during the 
prosperous years of the early 2000s. Most of the growth in scientific and technical 
services was in consultant engineering and architectural services and was probably 
largely due to the construction boom, while there was little growth in scientific research 
despite the hype surrounding the ‘knowledge economy’.1 In the residual category of 
miscellaneous producer services, the strongest growth was in various types of staff 
recruitment services, including contract staff services and employment placement 
services – reflecting high rates of labour turnover and increased use of temporary labour 
which we observed in Chapter Three.  
 
Consumer services 
 
While producer services had the fastest rate of employment growth in the post-Fordist 
period, consumer services accounted for the greatest numerical growth. Between 1986 
and 2006, employment in consumer service industries grew by 195,000 workers, 
accounting for half of all employment growth, and by the end of the period these 
industries employed over a quarter of all New Zealand workers. Growth in this sector is 
a long-term trend dating back to the Fordist period and beyond, reflecting rising 
incomes which allowed consumers more discretionary spending on services, rising 
national wealth which allowed greater investment in health, education and welfare, and 
                                                 
1
 This reflects New Zealand’s low level of spending on research and development which, as a proportion 
of GDP, was around half the OECD average for much of this period (OECD Factbook 2009, retrieved on 
21/09/2010 from http://www.sourceoecd.org). 
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the efforts of capital to find new sources of profit by commodifying an ever greater 
range of service activities. Within this long-term trend, there was an acceleration of 
growth in consumer service employment in the post-Fordist period as the declining 
profitability of goods-producing industries encouraged greater investment by capital in 
service activities, ranging from social services such as health and education, to leisure 
activities such as entertainment and tourism. This was accentuated by workers on the 
margins of an insecure labour market turning to various forms of self-employment in 
areas such as hospitality, caregiving, gardening and cleaning. Together, these factors 
resulted in increasing commodification of a range of activities and an institutional shift 
in the social division of labour from the realms of the state, households and 
communities to that of the market.  
The majority of growth in consumer service employment was in the social services 
of health, education and welfare. Health sector employment actually fell during the 
restructuring period due to cutbacks in public health funding and reforms which 
corporatised public hospitals and introduced a competitive funding regime. However, 
these losses were more than recouped over subsequent years, with employment 
increasing by more than 30,000 between 1996 and 2006. The vast majority of this 
growth was in private sector enterprises, as responsibility for health services shifted 
increasingly from the state to the market. In contrast to the health sector, employment in 
care and welfare services received a considerable boost from the restructuring process, 
with the workforce more than doubling between 1986 and 1996 as the hardship caused 
by unemployment, benefit cuts and falling real wages created work for foodbanks, 
refuges, counselling services and other welfare organisations.1 Subsequent years saw 
continued strong growth in the sector, which may partly reflect the fact that levels of 
hardship remained relatively high despite the economic recovery. It was also due to 
increasing commodification of the work of caring and counselling as it shifted from 
households and communities to the market, and thus from the realm of unpaid work to 
that of paid work – the most notable examples being childcare and care of the elderly, 
which were among the strongest growth industries over the decade to 2006. Demand for 
childcare services was stimulated by increasing labour force participation among 
mothers of young children, while population ageing increased demand for aged care 
services.  
                                                 
1
 In fact, much of the growth in this type of work is not captured by the census as the work of central 
government welfare agencies is classified under public administration, while large numbers of people 
working for private welfare agencies are unpaid volunteers and not counted in census employment data.   
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The education sector, like health, was also subject to reforms which cut funding 
levels and introduced a more market-oriented approach. Although this had the potential 
to reduce employment as it had in the health sector, the education workforce continued 
to grow due to the increasing demand for educational services. At tertiary level, 
enrolments grew as the declining availability of low-skilled employment encouraged 
more people to seek tertiary qualifications, and as the commodification of education 
encouraged a proliferation of private training establishments and stronger marketing by 
public tertiary institutes to attract both domestic students and full fee-paying overseas 
students. At school level, students were staying on longer to equip themselves for 
employment or tertiary study, while a ‘baby blip’ cohort of children born to baby-
boomers in the late 1980s and early 1990s also moved into the education system. And at 
early childhood level there was increasing demand for pre-school education, not just 
because of growing awareness of its developmental value, but also because mothers of 
pre-schoolers were increasingly likely to be in paid work. As a consequence of all these 
factors, the education workforce expanded fairly consistently over the period from 1986 
to 2006 and at all levels of the education system – although there was a slowdown in the 
growth rate towards the end of the period which probably reflected fewer children 
entering the education system and a slackening of demand for tertiary education due to a 
buoyant labour market.    
In addition to the strong growth in social service employment, there was also 
considerable expansion across a range of other consumer services. Cultural and 
recreational services grew steadily through the 1990s and 2000s under the impetus of 
the professionalisation and commodification of sport, the growing popularity of outdoor 
recreational pursuits, and the success of the New Zealand film industry. 
Accommodation and food services had a major surge of growth in the 1990s and again 
in the latest intercensal period, when they accounted for more new jobs than either the 
health or education sectors – reflecting the growth of international tourism as well as the 
changing lifestyles and consumption habits of New Zealanders, with their increasing 
taste for dining out and for domestic travel.1 Much of the growth in this sector over the 
latter half of the period was driven by cafes and restaurants, which took on more than 
14,000 extra workers between 1996 and 2006, making it one of New Zealand’s fastest 
                                                 
1
 Tourism-related employment is spread over a number of different sectors, so is not usually identified as 
a distinct category, but it has been estimated that in 2006 there were 92,000 full-time equivalents directly 
employed in tourism, making up 5.9 percent of the workforce, with many more jobs being indirectly 
generated by tourism (Statistics New Zealand 2007b: 19). 
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growing industries. The final category of personal and household services – which 
range from hairdressers to gardeners and from funeral directors to brothels – is a 
relatively small group dominated by the self-employed or small employers. It 
experienced only intermittent growth over the two decades, with its strongest period of 
growth being in the early 1990s, perhaps as a result of people who had lost their jobs 
through restructuring turning to various forms of self-employment. 
 
Government and community activities 
 
Reducing the role of the state was one of the central aims of the neoliberal project and 
with this came a reduction in public sector employment. The category of public 
administration and safety identified in Table 4.1 does not include all public sector 
employment, but only the administrative arms of central and local government along 
with the defence, police, fire and prison services. Employment in this category in fact 
increased in the early years of restructuring, possibly due to the work involved in 
administering the enormous economic and institutional changes and dealing with the 
growing ranks of welfare recipients. The effects of the state sector reforms became more 
evident in the 1990s as employment in public administration and safety fell by several 
thousand between 1991 and 2001, mainly in central government administration and the 
defence forces. However, these losses were subsequently reversed as the fifth Labour 
Government reclaimed a more active role for the state, particularly in social policy.  
A better picture of the effects of restructuring on public sector employment can be 
gained from looking at employment in the public sector across all industries – thus 
capturing the huge numbers of state sector employees in operational areas such as health 
and education. This shows that total public sector employment fell by 118,000 or 31 
percent between 1986 and 1996, then stabilised over the following five years and 
increased by 48,000 or 19 percent between 2001 and 2006. Much of the reduction in the 
earlier period came from privatisation of state-owned trading organisations, while 
employment in organisations remaining within the state sector was also adversely 
affected by corporatisation and the introduction of market competition. Overall, there 
was a considerable shift in the division of labour between public and private sectors, 
with public sector employment falling from 25 percent to 16 percent of the workforce 
over the full two decades. As Figure 4.3 shows, this shift was most pronounced in 
industries in which state-sector organisations were privatised or state monopolies ended, 
including forestry, utilities, transport, finance and communications. In these cases, the 
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shifts all occurred between 1986 and 1996 and some even reversed slightly over the 
subsequent decade. In other industries such as health, education and scientific and 
technical services there was a less abrupt but more sustained shift towards the private 
sector as it progressively captured more of the market. 
The other industry group in the category of government and community activities is 
non-profit and interest groups, which includes religious organisations, business and 
professional associations, trade unions and various types of community and advocacy 
groups. Although the figures for this group show a reasonably strong rate of growth 
over most of the two decades, they vastly understate the number of people working in 
these types of organisations. This is because they exclude employees of non-profit 
organisations in fields such as welfare, health and education (which are classified under 
those industries) and the huge numbers of voluntary workers in the non-profit sector. 
More complete measures are provided by Statistics New Zealand’s (2007a) study of 
non-profit institutions, which estimated that in 2004 these organisations employed more 
than 105,000 paid workers – over five percent of the labour force – making the non-
profit sector almost as large an employer as the health sector and larger than central 
government. To this can be added over a million unpaid volunteers, whose combined 
hours of work were equivalent to that of almost 134,000 full-time workers. The majority 
of paid employees of non-profit institutions worked in social fields, including 31,000 in 
social services, 20,000 in education, and 15,000 in health. Among unpaid volunteers, 
there were 20,000 full-time equivalents working in education and research, and 17,000 
Figure 4.3: Proportion of workers employed in private sector
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in health and social services. This work constitutes a vitally important part of the social 
division of labour by meeting social needs neglected by government and private 
enterprise. In the process it saves the state and capital a significant amount of money: 
the contribution of non-profit institutions to GDP, including the value of unpaid labour, 
was estimated at almost seven billion dollars in 2004 (Statistics New Zealand 2007a).  
The significance of unpaid work to the social division of labour is not confined to 
formal voluntary work for non-profit institutions: it is further supplemented by informal 
voluntary work done among extended families and communities, as well as household 
work which performs the vital social function of reproducing labour power. New 
Zealand’s only major time use survey conducted in 1998/99 found that adults spent an 
average of 28 hours per week on unpaid work – 24 hours in their own households, two 
hours on informal unpaid work for other households and a further two hours for 
voluntary organisations. The estimated combined value of this work was almost 40 
billion dollars – equivalent to 39 percent of GDP (Statistics New Zealand 2001a).1   
The division of labour between the market, the state, communities and households 
is usefully captured by Glucksmann’s concept of the ‘total social organisation of 
labour’, which refers to “the manner by which all the labour in a particular society is 
divided up between and allocated to different structures, institutions and activities” 
(Glucksmann 1995: 67; see also Glucksmann 2005; 2009). This concept extends the 
idea of the social division of labour beyond the sphere of paid employment in which 
labour is bought and sold as a commodity, to the sphere of communities and households 
where people use their unpaid labour to fill the gaps left by the market and the state in 
providing for their own needs and those of others. The concept also recognises the 
interconnections between labour undertaken in different institutional spheres, and how 
the articulation of these spheres varies across time and space. During the period 
analysed here, there were at least three significant shifts in the division of labour 
between institutional spheres: a shift from the state to the market as state organisations 
were privatised and subjected to competition; a shift from the state to communities as 
the government cut back on social services and left voluntary organisations to fill the 
breach; and a shift from households to the market as unpaid household tasks from food 
preparation to childcare to gardening were increasingly commodified in the form of 
goods and services produced by paid labour. Restructuring therefore affected not just 
                                                 
1
 Although this was the only time use data available at the time of writing, a repeat of the survey was 
being conducted in 2009/10, the results of which will enable measurement of changes over the 
intervening period. 
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the distribution of work within the paid labour force but also the broader distribution of 
work across social institutions. 
 
 
The changing occupational division of labour 
 
Structural shifts in the division of labour between industries obviously have a major 
impact on the occupational distribution of the workforce. The decline of goods-
producing industries means a decline in the ranks of manual production workers, while 
growth in producer and consumer service industries swells the ranks of both skilled and 
routine white-collar workers who are more commonly found in those industries. But this 
only provides a partial explanation of changes in the occupational distribution of 
employment. Equally important are changes in the composition of the workforce within 
particular industries: the redistribution of labour from the farm or factory floor to the 
office, and from lower-skilled to higher-skilled jobs. In other words, occupational 
change has to be seen as a product of shifts in the division of labour both between and 
within industries. The effects of these shifts on skill levels within the workforce and 
patterns of social stratification will be considered in more detail in Chapter Six, but at 
this point it is useful to precede that discussion by looking briefly at shifts in the 
occupational profiles of the major industrial sectors. 
Table 4.2 shows that across the workforce as a whole, the two decades from 1986 to 
2006 saw considerable growth in managerial, professional and technical work (from 25 
percent to 37 percent of the workforce) along with a smaller increase in sales and 
service work (from 19 percent to 23 percent).1 This came mainly at the expense of 
primary and secondary production jobs, which together fell from 35 percent to 23 
percent of the workforce, while there were also falls in the proportions of clerical and 
administrative workers and transport and distribution workers. For the most part the 
trends were fairly consistent over the full period, although the most pronounced shift 
came from the decline in secondary production jobs during the 1986–96 period, when 
most of the industrial restructuring occurred. This is clearly what we would expect from 
the analysis of the industry data in the previous section, but the changes in occupational 
distribution were not just the product of changes in the division of labour between 
                                                 
1
 As with the industry data analysed in the previous section, the occupation data has been disaggregated to 
the finest level of the classification and then reclassified to construct a series which is as comparable as 
possible over time. There was a major revision of the standard classification in 1990 which may have 
some effect on the comparability of the 1986 and 1996 data, but the data has been reclassified in such a 
way as to minimise the effects of the classification changes.     
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industries; they were also the result of significant shifts in the occupational division of 
labour within industries. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Occupational distribution by industrial sector 
1986–2006 
    
Industrial sector and occupation 1986 1996 2006 
 Percent 
Primary industries    
Managers 1.3 2.5 5.2 
Professionals and technicians 1.7 2.4 3.5 
Clerical and administrative workers 2.1 3.0 3.8 
Sales workers 0.3 0.7 1.0 
Service workers 2.9 3.1 3.9 
Transport and distribution workers 1.6 2.9 3.8 
Secondary production workers and labourers 3.6 5.1 7.6 
Primary production workers 86.5 80.4 71.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
Secondary industries    
Managers 7.3 11.0 13.1 
Professionals and technicians 5.6 8.5 10.3 
Clerical and administrative workers 9.3 10.1 8.3 
Sales workers 2.9 3.5 3.5 
Service workers 2.3 2.3 3.0 
Transport and distribution workers 5.9 5.1 4.6 
Secondary production workers and labourers 66.1 58.4 55.8 
Primary production workers 0.6 1.3 1.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
Tertiary industries    
Managers 11.8 14.2 16.9 
Professionals and technicians 22.5 24.5 27.8 
Clerical and administrative workers 22.2 17.9 14.4 
Sales workers 11.3 13.6 12.8 
Service workers 17.0 17.4 16.7 
Transport and distribution workers 6.2 4.9 4.4 
Secondary production workers and labourers 8.6 6.7 6.2 
Primary production workers 0.4 0.8 0.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
All industries    
Managers 9.3 12.2 15.1 
Professionals and technicians 15.2 18.6 22.3 
Clerical and administrative workers 16.2 14.5 12.3 
Sales workers 7.6 10.0 10.0 
Service workers 11.1 12.9 13.1 
Transport and distribution workers 5.6 4.7 4.4 
Secondary production workers and labourers 24.8 18.0 16.5 
Primary production workers 10.2 9.2 6.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings (reclassified data) 
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In both primary and secondary industries there was a notable decline in the 
proportion of workers directly involved in the physical work of production, and 
corresponding increases in the proportions of managers and professional and technical 
workers, along with some growth in the routine white- and grey-collar categories of 
clerical, sales and service work. Between 1986 and 2006, the proportion of the primary-
sector workforce directly involved in primary production work fell from 86 percent to 
71 percent, while the proportion of the secondary-sector workforce engaged in 
secondary production work fell from 66 percent to 56 percent. In both sectors, this was 
not just a proportional shift but also reflected an absolute decline in the number of 
production workers as the number of non-production workers grew. Over the two 
decades, the ranks of production workers in the primary sector fell by 43,000 while 
those of non-production workers increased by 12,000; and in the secondary sector there 
was a fall of 74,000 in the number of production workers and an increase of 15,000 
non-production workers. Managers, professionals and technicians accounted for most of 
the growth among non-production workers – increasing their combined share of the 
primary sector workforce from 3 percent to 9 percent and their share of the secondary 
sector workforce from 13 percent to 23 percent. In the primary sector there were also 
significant increases in the numbers of clerical and administrative workers and transport 
and distribution workers, but in the secondary sector the numbers in each of these 
categories fell over the two decades while there were relatively small increases in the 
numbers of sales and service workers.  
In the tertiary sector, white-collar workers have obviously always predominated but 
here too managers, professionals and technicians greatly increased their share of the 
workforce at the expense of those engaged in more routine work – particularly clerical 
and administrative workers. Between 1986 and 2006, management’s share of the 
tertiary sector workforce increased from 12 percent to 17 percent, while professional 
and technical workers grew from 22 percent to 28 percent. Over the same period, the 
proportion of clerical and administrative workers in the sector fell from 22 percent to 14 
percent. This was the only occupational category in the tertiary sector to experience a 
fall in the number of workers over the two decades, although relatively slow growth 
rates among service workers, transport and distribution workers and manual production 
workers meant that their shares of the tertiary sector workforce also fell.   
Changes in the nature of the available census data make it difficult to extend this 
analysis back beyond 1986 and thus to judge the extent to which these shifts represent 
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the continuation of long-term trends in the division of labour or the disjunctural effects 
of restructuring – although clearly both are significant. The trend towards white-collar 
work in general and towards more skilled types of white-collar work in particular, 
undoubtedly predates the latest phase of capitalist development and can probably be 
traced back to the beginnings of industrial capitalism. Just as the development of the 
social division of labour has seen employment progressively shift from industries 
performing the direct work of material production to those concerned with the indirect 
work surrounding production, so there has been an ongoing expansion of technical 
divisions of labour involving a progressive shift from directly productive activities 
towards indirect work which augments, supports and organises those activities. Sayer 
and Walker view this in terms of the expansion of three aspects of the division of 
labour: the extended division of labour, in which there has been an increase in the work 
involved before, after and around core productive activities; the hierarchical division of 
labour, in which the business of co-ordinating and directing labour processes has 
become increasingly complex and elaborate; and the mental division of labour, in which 
specialised knowledge has played an increasingly important role in labour processes 
(Sayer and Walker 1992: 67-75).  
While all these factors have contributed to the long-term shift towards skilled white-
collar work, there are also aspects of the transition between Fordist and post-Fordist 
modes of development which have accentuated the trend over recent decades. Across all 
sectors of the economy, the emergence of new production models and more competitive 
markets placed greater emphasis on rationalisation, financial management, product 
innovation and marketing, with a corresponding increase in the ratio of managerial, 
professional and technical workers to routine production workers. Within goods-
producing industries there were also sector-specific factors. In the secondary sector, the 
removal of import protections and the availability of cheap labour overseas made it 
more profitable for some local manufacturers to relocate production operations offshore 
while retaining management bases in this country. In the primary sector, the removal of 
state assistance for farmers saw many small-scale farms consolidated into larger 
enterprises, with a consequent rationalisation of farm work and greater emphasis on 
management and administration. The new technological paradigm also had a significant 
impact – while machine technology has long tended to displace workers from manual 
jobs by mechanising production processes, the effects of computer technology were felt 
not only on the assembly lines but also in offices where much routine clerical and 
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customer service work was computerised or sent offshore to be done by cheaper foreign 
labour linked to this country through telecommunications networks. At the same time, 
information technology stimulated demand for the experts who implement and operate 
the systems and applications, and for others who utilise the technology for gathering, 
applying and disseminating information of various kinds.  
The evidence of strong growth in skilled white-collar work in New Zealand gives 
some support to the arguments of Castells and others about the rise of informational 
labour in developed capitalist economies, and to the popular idea of the emergence of a 
knowledge economy.1 However, that should be qualified with some cautionary notes. 
As we observed in Chapter One, classing all managerial, professional and technical 
workers within the category of informational labour is somewhat indiscriminate as these 
very broad occupational groups include many lower managerial, lower professional and 
technical occupations which may involve relatively little specialised knowledge and 
require only low-level and job-specific credentials, if any. This is particularly true in the 
case of managerial workers, of whom just 24 percent had university qualifications in 
2006, while a further 27 percent had other tertiary qualifications. This is not necessarily 
surprising as much managerial work is distinguished by the exercise of authority rather 
than the application of expertise, but it does highlight the problems with categorising all 
managers as informational or knowledge workers. Perhaps more revealing, is that only 
49 percent of people categorised as professionals and technicians in 2006 held 
university degrees, with another 30 percent having other types of tertiary qualifications. 
This may partly reflect the broadening of the category of ‘professional’ to encompass 
any job involving a modicum of specialist knowledge – not necessarily advanced 
academic learning and not necessarily even credentialed knowledge.  
Even if we accept that growth in occupations classified as managerial,  professional 
and technical can be used as a gauge of the transition to an informational or knowledge 
economy, it is still the case that these workers constitute only a minority of the New 
Zealand workforce. Lower-skilled white- and grey-collar jobs along with blue-collar 
production jobs still accounted for almost two-thirds (63 percent) of the New Zealand 
workforce in 2006. Much of this work also involves some specialised knowledge or 
                                                 
1
 In New Zealand, official attempts to measure progress towards the knowledge economy have identified 
‘knowledge intensive’ industries as those where at least 30 percent of the workforce are in managerial, 
professional or technical occupations and at least 25 percent have university degrees (Department of 
Labour 2009b). This means that an industry might be classed as knowledge intensive even if two-thirds or 
more of its workers lack degrees and are in occupations which typically require little or no specialised 
knowledge. That the threshold for knowledge intensiveness can be set this low, highlights the need to 
regard the concept of the knowledge economy with some scepticism.  
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skill, but it is generally practical knowledge oriented towards the performance of 
specific tasks, rather than the sort of abstract or theoretical knowledge which is 
generally regarded as the distinguishing feature of ‘knowledge work’ or ‘informational 
labour’. And there is no prospect of this work disappearing in the foreseeable future. 
While low-skilled jobs have obviously been on the decline in both goods-producing 
industries and service industries, there is still – and probably always will be – much 
work of an elementary nature to be done by those who do not aspire to be managers or 
professionals.  
 
 
Conclusion   
 
The distribution of employment between industries and occupations has undergone 
considerable change over the past few decades, partly due to long-term trends within an 
expanding and increasingly specialised division of labour, and partly due to the effects 
of economic restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s which had an extremely adverse 
impact on some industries and occupations while benefiting others. While there has 
been a pronounced redistribution of labour from goods production to other types of 
work, the shifts are more complex than suggested by the dichotomous models of post-
industrial theory which talk of transitions from goods to services, from industrialism to 
informationalism, or from material to immaterial labour. In New Zealand in 2006, fewer 
than three in every ten workers were employed in industries which produced goods, and 
of those just over six in every ten workers were performing manual production jobs. But 
if we add to the goods-producing industries those whose primary business involves the 
circulation or consumption of material goods – wholesaling, retailing, transport, 
property services, and food and accommodation services – we find that a considerable 
majority of the workforce (58 percent) was still employed by industries concerned with 
making, distributing or selling goods. To this we could add (if they were able to be 
counted) the workers in finance who handle the flows of money which accompany the 
exchange of goods, all those in producer service industries who provide services to 
goods-producing industries, and those in consumer service industries in which the 
labour service also involves some exchange of goods. Clearly material goods remain 
central to most economic activity in New Zealand, as in other advanced capitalist 
economies, even if fewer people are directly involved in making those goods.  
It is the progressive shift from direct to indirect labour which, as Sayer and Walker 
argue, has characterised the long-term changes in the division of labour in advanced 
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capitalist economies. The direct labour required for the physical production of goods 
has declined as those activities have been redistributed within the international division 
of labour and as technological change has reduced the ratio of labour to capital within 
production. But the volume of goods flowing through the economy has continued to 
increase, as has the indirect work within the extended division of labour surrounding the 
production, circulation and consumption of those goods – the work of producer service 
industries and circulation industries, and that of the managers, experts, sales and service 
workers who play various roles in the life-cycle of goods from inception to final 
consumption. At the same time, consumer services have also come to play an 
increasingly important role within the division of labor as social services have expanded 
and a range of other services have become increasingly commodified. Rather than a 
decline in the significance of material goods, we have experienced a proliferation of 
commodities in the form of both material goods and labour services as capital pursues 
its restless quest for profit. This received added impetus during the post-Fordist period 
as increasingly competitive markets and declining profitability in mass production 
compelled producers to continually expand and diversify product ranges, to find new 
sources of profit in commodified services and to market their products more 
aggressively. The consequent shifts within the division of labour and the redistribution 
of work between industries and occupations have also had major implications for 
patterns of social stratification, as we will see in subsequent chapters.  
 
 5 
 
Class, Stratification and the Division of 
Labour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shifts in the terrain of economic life inevitably cause ruptures in the social structures 
built upon it. The ascendancy of industrial capitalism undermined the social relations of 
feudalism and thrust forth the class structure of capitalism in which the fundamental 
social division was between capital and labour, between those who owned and 
controlled the means of production and those who did not. As capitalism evolved 
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this structure was progressively overlaid 
with new complexities. The lines between capital and labour blurred as ownership was 
dispersed through joint-stock companies and control was delegated to managerial 
employees. Workforces were increasingly fragmented by divisions of labour based on 
ever more elaborate specialisation of skills and chains of authority, while labour 
migrations and changing gender relations gave greater prominence to divisions of 
ethnicity and sex. And periodically came the crises which resulted in the restructuring of 
economies, the rise and demise of different types of work, and shifts in the nature of 
relations between classes. These changes have been of such magnitude that by the end 
of the twentieth century many were questioning whether conventional understandings of 
class were still relevant and even whether class itself still mattered in any meaningful 
sense.  
The arguments of this chapter are that class does matter, that conventional 
approaches still have a role to play in understanding structures of material inequality 
and the relations associated with them, and that we should not allow the current 
fascination with the cultural aspects of social differentiation to distract our attention 
from the economic dimensions. At the same time, it is acknowledged that conventional 
class analysis has some deficiencies and limitations which should be recognised and 
addressed if it is to withstand the barbs of its critics. The chapter culminates in the 
outline of an approach to the analysis of class structure, the understanding of class 
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formation and the relationship between class, gender and ethnicity, which will serve as a 
framework for the empirical analysis to follow in subsequent chapters.  
 
 
The relevance of class 
 
We observed in Chapter One that the economic and social changes of recent decades 
have caused many to question the relevance of conventional conceptions of class. Post-
industrial theorists such as Bell and Castells have argued that the class structures of 
industrial capitalism have been fundamentally transformed, with knowledge and 
expertise becoming more significant axes of stratification than control of the means of 
production. Many others have gone further and argued that class has lost its relevance as 
a basis of social division and outlived its usefulness as a sociological concept, pointing 
to the fragmentation of the old classes, the waning of class consciousness, the 
individualisation of social lives, and the increasing salience of other forms of social 
differentiation. Even within Marxism, some schools of thought have challenged the 
centrality of class and the relevance of class struggle, arguing that the locus of anti-
capitalist resistance has shifted to new social movements which are not grounded in 
class relations. All this has induced something of a crisis in class analysis. From its 
formerly pre-eminent position in sociology – once seen as the basis of social 
inequalities, the material foundation of lifestyles and cultures, the axis of social conflict 
and a central dynamic in processes of social change – class has become the subject of 
protracted debates about its health and pronouncements of its death (Lee and Turner 
1996; Clark and Lipset 2001; Pakulski and Waters 1996; Kingston 2000), as well as 
attempts to rethink or renew class analysis in ways that overcome the shortcomings of 
traditional approaches (Crompton et al 2000; Devine et al 2005).  
Arguments about the demise of class have a long history. Nisbet announced the 
“decline and fall of social class” as early as 1959, arguing that economic class no longer 
provided a basis for the formation of meaningful and substantive social groupings, and 
anticipating some of the themes which were to emerge in later debates: changing 
employment structures, widening educational opportunities and social mobility, the 
demise of class politics, fragmentation and individualisation of social life, and 
heterogeneous patterns of consumption and lifestyle (Nisbet 1959). At around this time 
we also saw the emergence of the embourgeoisement thesis which suggested increasing 
affluence was undermining working-class cultures and solidarity (Zweig 1961), and the 
decomposition thesis which contended that the classes of capital and labour were both 
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fragmenting – the former due to the increasing separation of ownership and control, and 
the latter due to the increasing differentiation of labour by skill levels which cut across 
class unity (Dahrendorf 1959). By the 1970s, post-industrial theory was further 
highlighting the decline of the traditional industrial working class and postulating the 
demise of old forms of class struggle between capital and labour. For Touraine (1971) 
and Gorz (1982), the demise of the industrial proletariat in the post-industrial era 
signalled an end to the possibilities for radical working-class struggle and a passing of 
the political baton to new social movements such as the student, feminist and 
environmental movements. Subsequently, as we observed in Chapter One, the likes of 
Beck and Bauman argued that class was diminishing in importance not just because of 
the decline of the manual working class, but as a consequence of the more general 
decline of work in the sense of secure long-term employment, and thus of the class 
identities and affiliations grounded in the shared experience of work. The result was 
individualisation and fragmentation of lifestyles and identities, which were increasingly 
based on other forms of social differentiation.  
Perhaps the most resounding rejection of the relevance of class for social theory 
came from postmodernism. Its scepticism towards universal truths and rejection of 
‘grand narratives’ found a particular target in Marxism’s historical materialism and its 
emphasis on class struggle, while its anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist 
perspective rejected the possibility that diverse social phenomena could be explained in 
terms of an underlying structure such as class. The postmodernist emphasis on culture 
and consumption, and on multi-dimensional and fluid patterns of difference and 
identity, was fundamentally opposed to the assumptions of class analysis which 
regarded material inequalities as having a critical influence on people’s affiliations, 
attitudes and actions. Most of the leading figures in postmodernist thought such as 
Lyotard and Baudrillard summarily dismissed the significance of class rather than 
expending any effort on developing a coherent critique of class theory (Milner 1999: 
121-134). That task was taken up by Pakulski and Waters (1996), whose systematic and 
trenchant critique unequivocally pronounced ‘the death of class’. They accepted that 
Western capitalist societies were formerly class societies, but argued that this was no 
longer the case, suggesting a three-stage periodisation of capitalism: the ‘economic-
class society’ of the nineteenth century in which the division between capital and labour 
marked real lines of struggle and domination as well as cultural distinctiveness; the 
‘organized-class society’ prevailing for three-quarters of the twentieth century, in which 
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classes were organised into political blocs within a corporatist state which dominated 
the economy and the development of mass culture; and the current period of ‘status-
conventional society’ in which politically organised classes have decomposed and 
economic stratification has been weakened as new types of stratification have emerged 
from the cultural sphere, based on lifestyles and values and characterised by 
considerable fluidity and fragmentation (Pakulski and Waters 1996: 24-25).  
Much of the criticism of class theory has been associated with a rejection of 
Marxism, including that of many erstwhile Marxists who defected to postmodernism. 
But it also found support among some influential post-Marxist thinkers who sought not 
to bury Marxism but rather to revitalize it by steering it away from its orthodox pre-
occupation with class. Laclau and Mouffe (2001 [1985]) reacted against what they saw 
as the essentialism and economism of classical Marxism by challenging the existence of 
objective class interests and the privileged position accorded to the working class in 
Marxist theory and socialist strategy. They saw class as just one of a number of 
discursively constructed social identities, and class struggle as one of number of 
possible (rather than necessary) antagonisms arising from those identities. Accordingly, 
they argued that the socialist agenda should focus not on establishing the hegemony of 
the working class, but on a pluralistic programme of ‘radical democratic politics’ 
embracing the goals of new social movements concerned with issues of gender, 
ethnicity, ecology and so on. Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004) highlighted the decline of 
the industrial working class and the passing of its role as an agent of emancipatory 
struggle to the ‘multitude’ – a concept which they never adequately define but which 
clearly encompasses a much broader range of interests than the working class as 
conventionally understood. While these positions have been vigorously disputed by 
more orthodox Marxists (eg Wood 1986; Harman 2002), there is little doubt that 
working-class concerns tend to play a less dominant role in Marxist thought and politics 
today than in the past.   
Amongst these disparate arguments there are some valid points about the declining 
importance of class and the shortcomings of conventional approaches to class analysis. 
Most defenders and practitioners of class analysis would probably concede the 
following points: first, that over recent decades there have been major changes in the 
nature of production and consumption which have altered the nature of class structures; 
second, that there has been an associated diminishing of class consciousness, class 
cultures and class-based political action; third, that increasing individualisation and 
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fragmentation have made patterns of social differentiation more complex and multi-
dimensional; and fourth, that some versions of class analysis have been guilty of 
economic reductionism and have neglected the significance of culture and the 
importance of non-class divisions of gender, ethnicity, consumption and lifestyle. 
However, this does not amount to a convincing case that class is dead or that the 
analysis of class no longer serves a useful purpose. 
These concessions should be qualified with a few counter-arguments. Firstly, much 
of the case for the death of class rests on the questionable assumption that advanced 
capitalist nations have entered a post-industrial era. If, as has been argued in earlier 
chapters, we have not undergone an epochal break from industrial capitalism, then the 
case for suggesting that its defining social structure has somehow disappeared or 
diminished to the point of irrelevance is severely weakened. And even if we accept that 
we are now in a post-industrial society, it does not necessarily mean that this is a post-
class society. All it suggests is the decline of the industrial manual working class – not 
the working class per se (for routine manual jobs have basically been replaced by 
routine non-manual jobs which are in most respects little different) and certainly not 
class relations per se. As Savage observes, there has been a tendency to conflate class in 
general with a particular image of the industrial working class and thus to assume the 
decline of that category of workers brings the whole project of class analysis into 
question (Savage 1995: 17). But manual production workers have always been just one 
part of one class within a much wider system of class relations, and while their decline 
may entail change in the composition of the working class, it by no means signals the 
end of class.  
Secondly, defenders of class analysis have pointed to considerable empirical 
evidence showing class does still matter in terms of life chances, distribution of wealth 
and power, patterns of association, political dispositions and even collective struggles 
(Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992; Hout et al 1993; Wright 1996; Marshall 1997; Bradley 
et al 2000: 130-148; Scott 2002). In fairness, critics of class analysis do generally 
acknowledge the persistence of structured inequality, but dispute its relevance as a 
determinant of subjective consciousness and identity (Bottero 2005: 133). However, by 
dismissing class analysis without offering any alternative approaches to the study of 
material inequality, and by devaluing the importance of economic disparities vis-à-vis 
cultural identities, the critics have effectively sought to sideline issues of inequality. 
And they did so at a time when inequality was escalating as a consequence of neoliberal 
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policies, a time when sociology had the opportunity to illuminate those issues from the 
perspective of class analysis. As the ranks of the poor and the marginalised swelled with 
the victims of neoliberalism, sociologists became less concerned with their material 
plight than with their individualised cultural identities and lifestyle choices. Little 
wonder that critics have identified a certain affinity between postmodernism and 
neoliberalism (Crompton and Scott 2005: 199-200). 
Thirdly, it is possible to recognise heterogeneity without dismissing class. Given the 
critics’ insistence that we should recognise multiple forms of social differentiation, it is 
curious that many seem to believe class should not be one of them. This may simply be 
an over-reaction to the way the class paradigm formerly neglected non-class divisions 
such as gender and ethnicity or sought to reduce diverse social phenomena to class. As 
Scott says, “It was a short step from showing that class did not explain everything, to 
asserting that it could explain nothing” (2001: 127). But class reductionism has long 
been discredited within class theory, and today few but the most obdurate of Marxists 
would attempt to argue that all social divisions can be explained in terms of class. And 
while it is true that class may not provide a universal explanation for all forms of 
inequality, it is equally true that other phenomena such as gender and ethnicity can not 
explain class divisions (Ray and Sayer 1999: 14). Rather than eliminating class from the 
study of social difference and inequality, the challenge should be to find ways of 
integrating it with those other dimensions in a way that captures the multi-
dimensionality and complexity of social stratification.  
Finally, even if class analysis is guilty of economic reductionism this does not 
justify replacing it with cultural reductionism. Pakulski and Waters, for instance, devote 
great effort to deriding the class paradigm for its economism, but unabashedly state that 
an essential proposition of their theory of status-conventionalism is its culturalism: 
“Material and power phenomena are reducible to … symbolically manifested lifestyle 
and value phenomena” (1996: 155 [emphasis added]). It is not clear why cultural 
reductionism should be any more acceptable than economic reductionism, but such a 
view is symptomatic of the broader cultural turn within sociology. In seeking to correct 
the perceived economism of certain areas of sociological inquiry, the cultural turn 
involved less of a judicious correction than a violent lurch, resulting in a tendency to 
emphasise all things cultural at the expense of all things economic (Ray and Sayer 
1999). Rather than substitute a naïve culturalism for a stubborn economism and in the 
process effectively abandon any attempt to locate social stratification in its material 
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context, it would seem preferable to seek a rapprochement between the economic and 
the cultural in a way that can revitalize the class paradigm rather than destroy it. 
 
 
Approaches to class analysis  
 
While the debates between proponents and opponents of class analysis have been 
particularly vigorous, there have been equally spirited arguments among the former over 
how the study of class should be approached. One reason for this is that there are 
differing ideas on what the concept of class actually means, which gives rise to what 
Crompton (2008) appropriately describes as ‘pseudo-debates’ in which people with 
different understandings of class and expectations of class analysis tend to talk past each 
other. Crompton advocates moving beyond these debates by adopting a pluralist 
perspective which acknowledges that different types of approach are valid and 
appropriate for investigating different types of research topics within what is the very 
broad domain of the sociology of class (see also Wright 2005b). That is the perspective 
adopted in this chapter, where the intention is to develop an approach focussed on the 
structural inequalities associated with relations of production and hierarchical divisions 
of labour, which can be seen as complementing rather than competing with alternative 
approaches.  
In very broad terms it is possible to identify three main types of approach to class, 
concerned with different issues and to some extent operating with different conceptions 
of class.1 The first originates with Marx, and is concerned with classes as dynamic 
social forces, as expressed in the axiom that “the history of all hitherto existing society 
is the history of class struggles.” In this conception, capitalism is characterised by a 
fundamental divide between the classes of capital and labour – a relationship in which 
the former exploit the latter by paying them less than the value of what they produce. 
The concern is with how the opposing interests of these classes shape the political 
economy and provide the dynamic for the development of capitalism – and perhaps its 
eventual overthrow. This is the perspective which informs the regulation approach and 
its concern with how capitalism evolves in a succession of different modes of 
development shaped by struggles and compromises between the competing interests of 
capital and labour.  
                                                 
1
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt to review the many disparate approaches to class and 
stratification, so the following discussion is necessarily selective and highly summarised. For recent 
overviews of the field see Crompton (2008), Bottero (2005) and Wright (2005a).  
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The second approach also views classes in economic terms but at a more concrete 
and disaggregated level, being concerned with identifying complex class structures 
consisting of a number of groups in unequal economic positions. This is typified by 
what Crompton (2008) calls the employment aggregate approach, which identifies 
classes by aggregating categories of similar types of jobs in accordance with 
theoretically derived criteria, and then uses survey data to test associations between 
those categories and various outcomes, attitudes and behaviours in order to show the 
extent to which class acts as a causal variable. This approach has figured strongly in 
both Marxist and Weberian class analysis, best exemplified by the work of Erik Olin 
Wright and John Goldthorpe respectively (Wright 1985; 1997; Goldthorpe 1987; 
Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). While their concerns tend to be different – Wright is 
primarily interested in the relationship between class location and class consciousness 
while Goldthorpe is mainly concerned with life chances and social mobility – the 
methodological approach is similar and even their models of class structure bear some 
resemblance. 
The third approach views class in cultural rather than economic terms, concerning 
itself less with material inequalities than with shared lifestyles, tastes, values and 
identities. Within both Marxist and Weberian traditions there has long been an interest 
in class culture, but conventionally it has been treated as secondary to economic 
relations, with investigation proceeding from the identification of economic classes to 
examine the extent to which people in objectively similar economic positions share 
similar subjective orientations. The recent revival of interest in the cultural dimensions 
of class has been inspired more by Pierre Bourdieu (1984) and views the economic and 
the cultural as mutually constituted and indivisible, so classes cannot be identified a 
priori from economic criteria, but only from empirical investigation of the cultural 
dimensions of social differentiation. In this perspective consumption, lifestyles and 
identities are not epiphenomenal, but play active roles in the formation of classes 
through processes of symbolic classification, by which people establish their affinity 
with some and distance from others. Although these classes stand in unequal economic 
relations with each other, the concern in culturalist class analysis is not so much with 
the investigation of economic inequalities, but with the ways in which unequal relations 
are constituted and reproduced through cultural practices of inclusion and exclusion (eg 
Bennett et al 2009; Skeggs 2004; Charlesworth 2000; Devine et al 2005). 
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These three approaches tend to be viewed as competing rather than complementary 
perspectives, and exponents of each can be dismissive of the others. In particular, the 
recent cultural turn in class analysis has involved a reaction against the perceived 
economism of earlier approaches, while itself being criticised for steering class analysis 
away from issues of material inequality (Devine and Savage 2005; Crompton and Scott 
2005). However, rather than privileging one of these approaches as having greater 
legitimacy than the others, it is possible to see each as appropriate to the study of 
different aspects of a multifaceted subject. This involves moving beyond restrictive 
understandings of class as consisting of either the capital–labour relation, employment 
aggregates or cultures of difference. These are all important aspects of the complex 
relationships of inequality characterising capitalist societies, but none of them on their 
own capture the totality of class. The capital–labour divide is the distinguishing social 
relation of the capitalist mode of production and therefore remains critical to 
understandings of capitalist societies, but the categories of capital and labour are too 
abstract and amorphous to serve for the investigation of concrete social inequalities, 
particularly as the development of capitalism has seen capital ownership become so 
dispersed and labour become so differentiated and fractured. Occupational classes or 
employment aggregates are better suited to this task as they allow modelling of complex 
structures of inequality, based not just on divisions of ownership but also on divisions of 
labour between workers involving hierarchies of skill and authority. However, the 
categories which this approach yields are nominal rather than real social classes; that is 
to say they are objectively defined economic categories rather than subjectively aware 
social collectivities. They are considered to have the potential to form into real social 
classes, but this depends on what critics have called the S–C–A chain, by which people 
in given positions within a class structure develop a consciousness of that position 
which may then result in collective action to advance their interests (Pahl 1989). The 
problem with the S–C–A model is that class formation is ultimately seen to be 
structurally determined rather than a product of human agency, and is narrowly 
conceived in terms of the awareness and advancement of material interests. Cultural 
approaches provide a richer and less economistic perspective on the subjective 
dimension of class by bringing in issues of lifestyle and consumption and illuminating 
the symbolic processes involved in social differentiation. However, this approach also 
provides only a partial understanding as it tends to abstract class from its material 
context, neglecting the ways in which relations of production and divisions of labour 
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produce structured inequality. It therefore provides a complement to economic class 
analysis rather than a substitute for it. 
To say that these approaches all help to illuminate different aspects of class is not to 
say that they can be combined into a single integrated approach. Rather it is a matter of 
accepting, as Crompton (2008) and Wright (2005b) suggest, that there is room for a 
plurality of different approaches suited to different ends. This ecumenical perspective 
might allow us to put aside some of the doctrinal disputes which have beset the 
sociology of class, including those between advocates of cultural and economic 
approaches. Crompton presents a strong case for ‘analytical dualism’ which recognises 
the intermeshing of culture and economy while also recognising that they are not one 
and the same, and allowing their separation for the purposes of empirical research 
(Crompton 2008: 24-26; Crompton and Scott 2005: 191-195). She and Scott argue that 
it is possible to draw an analytical distinction between “on the one hand, the ‘objective’ 
outcomes of class processes, such as material differences in income and wealth and the 
social relations associated with these, and, on the other hand, the ‘subjective’ and 
culturally mediated experiences of class relations.” They suggest that we need “a 
combination of cultural and economic analyses in order to grasp the totality of ‘social 
class’” (Crompton and Scott 2005: 192). 
Such a distinction would allow us to retain a place for the study of material 
inequality which is not shrouded in the obfuscating mists of culture and identity, and to 
correct some of the over-steer in the cultural turn which has threatened to manoeuvre 
the sociology of class well away from its origins in political economy. In terms of this 
thesis, it enables us to address the issue of how economic restructuring and the changing 
division of labour have reshaped the contours of class structure and affected patterns of 
material inequality, and to do so independently of an investigation of the subjective 
experience of class culture and identity, while recognising that in making such a 
separation we will be considering only one dimension of the totality of social class. 
Before proceeding with that task, it is necessary to develop an approach conducive to 
the purpose.  
 
 
The Wright approach 
 
The dominant strands of economic class analysis originate in the works of Marx and 
Weber, although their writings were fragmentary and incomplete and have spawned 
diverse interpretations and vigorous debate not only regarding what was originally 
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meant, but also how it applies to a world that has since changed enormously. There are 
many similarities in the way Marx and Weber understood class, but the key difference is 
their respective emphases on exploitation and life chances. Marx was primarily 
concerned with the exploitative relationship between owners and non-owners of the 
means of production, while Weber was concerned with variations in life chances 
associated with economic resources such as property and skills (Wright 2002a). It is this 
distinction between exploitation and life chances which remains the crucial point of 
difference between contemporary neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian class analysts such as 
Wright and Goldthorpe. But there are also some very significant differences among neo-
Marxist approaches which have in various ways sought to build upon and update 
Marx’s conception of class to take into account subsequent developments – such as the 
increasing separation of ownership and control of the means of production, the 
increasingly complex divisions of labour among workers, the decline of the traditional 
manual working class, the growth of the so-called new middle classes of managers and 
professionals, and the apparent waning of class consciousness and class conflict. It is 
not particularly fruitful to compare these different approaches as such exercises soon 
become mired in technical detail (see Wright 1980). But it is useful to consider the work 
of the foremost figure in neo-Marxist class analysis, Erik Olin Wright, who provides 
perhaps the most systematic and influential account of class structure in this tradition.   
The driving concern of Wright’s work has been “the problem of the middle 
classes”, or how to refine the classical Marxist polarity of bourgeoisie and proletariat to 
accommodate the growing numbers of people who appear to belong to neither one 
category nor the other. His ultimate interest is in the possibilities for class formation or 
collective organisation among people who share objective class interests, which first 
necessitates identifying what those interests are and mapping them onto a model of class 
structure. In his early work (1978; 1979), Wright utilised the concept of ‘contradictory 
class locations’ to identify a number of distinct groups which he located in various 
positions between the major classes within production relations. The details of this 
model need not concern us here as he subsequently saw fit to completely revise it. In his 
next major work (1985) he admitted to several flaws in the earlier formulation, the most 
fundamental of which was to identify contradictory class locations in terms of relations 
of domination rather than exploitation. Exploitation, Wright now argued, is critical to 
the Marxist conceptualisation of class because it provides the link between class 
position and class interests: it demonstrates that the material wellbeing of one class is 
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causally dependent on the material deprivations of the other and that they therefore have 
conflicting interests. The basic exploitative relationship within capitalism hinges on 
private ownership of the means of production, which allows capitalists to appropriate 
the labour effort of workers.1 However, Wright argued in addition that exploitation 
could be based on possession of two other types of productive resources, namely 
organisation assets (control over the way the production process is organised) and skill 
or credential assets. Building on the game-theory model of Roemer (1982), he 
conceptualised the organisation of production as a game to which actors bring different 
kinds of productive assets which are used to generate income. Broadly speaking, 
exploitation can be said to occur if a group of actors would be better off – and would 
leave their opponents worse off – if they withdrew from the game under certain rules 
and entered an alternative game. People who are exploited in terms of one productive 
asset may be exploiters in terms of another; for instance, all non-owners of the means of 
production are exploited by owners, but non-owners who control organisation assets 
(managers) and skill assets (experts) in turn exploit other workers.  
Always one of his own sternest critics, Wright (1989a; 1989b) later admitted to a 
number of problems with his revised model, and in a subsequent work which reports the 
results of his cross-national research project (1997) he modifies the idea of organisation 
and skills exploitation somewhat. This firstly involves reasserting that exploitation in 
capitalism is fundamentally based on the extraction of the surplus labour of workers by 
capitalists. In conceptualising the position of managers and experts, he revives the idea 
of contradictory class locations and maintains that rather than being exploiters 
themselves they occupy “privileged appropriation locations within exploitation 
relations” because they are able to make a greater claim on the surplus by extracting 
economic rents. These rents are earnings over and above the costs people incur in 
producing and reproducing their labour power, and are paid by employers in order to 
recruit and retain people with scarce skills (a skill rent) or ensure loyalty and 
commitment from people in positions of authority and strategic importance (a loyalty 
rent) (1997: 14-25). So version two of Wright’s revised class map, shown in Figure 5.1, 
first makes the division between owners and non-owners of the means of production, 
                                                 
1
 Wright rejects versions of the labour theory of value which contend that the value of a product is 
exclusively determined by labour effort, but nonetheless argues that labour effort produces a surplus 
(surplus being the proportion of the total social product which exceeds the costs of reproducing the inputs 
of production) and that the appropriation of this surplus by other groups is exploitative (Wright 1997: 10, 
14-17).  
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then divides the former according to the amount of labour they control, and divides the 
latter according to their level of authority and skill, to yield a 12-class typology.1  
The groups thus identified are described as ‘class locations’, which together 
constitute a ‘class structure’, rather than actual classes in the sense of real social 
collectivities. In Wright’s most systematic discussion of the relationship between 
structure and agency (1997: 373-406), he contends that there is no necessary and direct 
link between a person’s class location and their class consciousness and practices, or 
between class structure and class formation and struggle. Class location is said to limit 
rather than determine class consciousness and class practices, while class structure is 
said to limit rather than determine class formation and class struggle. By ‘limit’, he 
means that structures impose certain constraints and opportunities that make some 
forms of belief, organisation and action more likely and sustainable than others. For 
instance, at the micro-level, people in a working-class location are more likely than 
capitalists to believe in the virtues of trade unions and less likely to advocate unfettered 
capitalism, though this may not be universally true. At the macro-level, Wright contends 
that class formation is limited by class structures in the sense that collective 
organisation is more likely to occur among groups of people in proximate class 
locations who share similar material interests and identities than among groups in 
disparate class locations, although cross-class alliances are possible. 
Wright has clearly moved a considerable distance from Marx, and many have 
observed a convergence between his work and Weberian approaches to class. Several 
                                                 
1
 The typology shown in Figure 5.1 is Wright’s ‘elaborated class typology’. For some purposes, this can 
be condensed into a ‘basic class typology’ consisting of six locations: capitalists, petty bourgeoisie, expert 
managers, non-skilled managers, experts and workers (Wright 1997: 24).  
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elements in his more recent work – the recognition of skills as a marker of class 
boundaries, the pluralistic model of class locations, the contingent nature of the 
relationship between class structure and class formation, a concern with the 
permeability of class boundaries to social mobility and cross-class relationships – all 
add a Weberian flavour to Wright’s approach. Wright himself does not blanch at such 
suggestions and seems open to the possibility of a rapprochement between Marxist and 
Weberian approaches (1997: 36-37; 2005c: 26-27; 2009). However, he is resolute in 
maintaining that what is distinctively Marxist about his model is its focus on 
exploitation.  
The concept of exploitation has in fact caused Wright much consternation over the 
years. After neglecting it in his early works (1978; 1979), he subsequently restored it to 
prominence via the abstruse workings of game theory (1985), then later expressed 
serious reservations about that formulation (1989b), and in his culminating empirical 
work appeared to retreat from aspects of his earlier approach while leaving his class 
typology largely intact (1997). The tri-axial model of exploitation presented in Classes 
(1985) engendered considerable debate (Wright et al 1989), much of it centred on the 
issue of whether there were multiple forms of exploitation within capitalist class 
relations – that is, exploitation based not just on control of the means of production but 
also on control of organisation assets and skill assets. In arguing this, Wright had to 
contend not just that those with organisation assets (managers) and skill assets (experts) 
were appropriating more of the surplus than other workers, but that they were 
appropriating surplus which was produced by those other workers, or in other words 
appropriating their labour effort. This was rather problematic for, as critics argued and 
Wright duly conceded, the fact is that highly remunerated workers themselves 
contribute to the creation of surplus and may only be appropriating what they have been 
responsible for producing, or in other words their remuneration may be commensurate 
with their productivity – although it is virtually impossible to establish empirically 
whether or not this is the case, given that the creation of value is so complex and 
indeterminate (Wright 1989a). He therefore made a partial retreat from the idea of 
multiple exploitations in his 1997 work, Class Counts, in which managers and experts 
are no longer seen to practice distinctive forms of exploitation but simply benefit from 
capitalist exploitation, occupying “privileged positions within exploitation relations” 
because they are able to appropriate a greater share of the surplus through skill and 
loyalty rents (1997: 20-23). Wright might have had less trouble with the issue of 
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exploitation had he recognised from the outset that he was dealing with two separate but 
linked dimensions of inequality – relations of production and divisions of labour.  
 
 
Bringing in the division of labour 
 
Wright is not alone among class analysts in neglecting the division of labour. It seldom 
receives more than a passing mention in the employment aggregate tradition, even 
though this approach is based on differentiating workers according to their positions 
within production. While there is therefore an implicit recognition of the role of the 
division of labour in social structuring, it is seldom explicitly conceptualised as such. 
Sayer and Walker criticise Wright and other class analysts for conflating class and the 
division of labour, and argue that the distinctions of skill and authority used to construct 
elaborate class typologies should be understood in terms of the division of labour rather 
than class (Sayer and Walker 1992: 15-34; Sayer 1995: 48-53). They adopt a classical 
Marxist perspective on class which conceives it in terms of ownership and control of the 
means of production. While not opposed to more complex taxonomies of inequality and 
stratification, they argue that conceptualising these in terms of class only causes 
confusion and over-burdens the concept of class. They do not diminish the importance 
of hierarchical differences of skill and authority in structuring inequality, but maintain 
that these differences relate primarily to the division of labour rather than class 
divisions. Large scale and complex labour processes necessitate hierarchies of control 
and direction, along with the compartmentalisation of productive tasks which involve a 
vast range of specialised skills. These divisions are not just associated with material 
inequalities, but also have significant implications in terms of consciousness, group 
formation and collective action: “specialization divides people experientially, 
organizationally, and ideologically”, with the result that “conflict and rupture are 
endemic to divisions of labor.” Struggles between groups occupying different positions 
in the division of labour are often “more immediate and strident” than anything which 
can genuinely be regarded as class conflict (Sayer and Walker 1992: 17).  
There are echoes of this in the work of Grusky and colleagues, who combine a 
Durkheimian emphasis on the occupational division of labour with elements of a 
Weberian approach to the social processes of class formation (Grusky and Sorensen 
1998; Grusky and Weeden 2001; Grusky 2005; Weeden and Grusky 2005b). They 
argue that processes of social differentiation, group formation and collective action are 
less evident among the large-scale aggregations of conventional class analysis than at 
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the occupational level where real social groups “form around functional niches in the 
division of labour” (Grusky and Weeden 2001: 203). Whereas Sayer and Walker argue 
that we should conceptualise class at the highly aggregated level of the capital–labour 
division, Grusky et al argue that we should conceptualise it at the highly disaggregated 
level of individual occupations or ‘micro-classes’. They contend that at this level there 
is greater evidence of structuration – the process by which economic categories form 
into real social groupings – in terms of factors such as identification, social closure, 
collective action, lifestyles and dispositions. Thus, “disaggregate classes are closed and 
self-aware sociopolitical groupings that act collectively and imply a specific style of 
life” (Grusky and Sorensen 1998: 1196). The concept of structuration is borrowed from 
Giddens, who also identifies the importance of the division of labour as a factor in what 
he calls ‘proximate structuration’ or the “‘localised’ factors which condition or shape 
class formation” (1980: 107). However, for Giddens, the division of labour is one of a 
number of factors contributing to class structuration and it does not lead him to adopt a 
disaggregated approach to class analysis of the type advocated by Grusky et al. Rather, 
his concern is with class formation within the broad categories of upper, middle and 
working classes.  
The differing perspectives of Sayer and Walker and of Grusky and colleagues both 
have merit in that they bring the division of labour out of the shadows and illuminate its 
importance as a dimension of social stratification. However, neither offers a satisfactory 
solution to the problem of how to incorporate the division of labour into class analysis. 
Sayer and Walker’s distinction between relations of production and divisions of labour 
is an important one, but their contention that the concept of class should be applied 
solely to relations of production is somewhat restrictive and effectively denies the 
validity of class analysis as a means of studying complex structures of inequality – 
because from their perspective much of it is not about class at all but about the division 
of labour. Grusky et al, on the other hand, attempt to represent detailed occupations as 
classes when quite palpably they are not – occupations are simply occupations. As 
several critics have argued, while it may be fruitful to study matters such as 
identification, closure, collective action and structuration at the occupational level, there 
is no need or justification for appropriating the concept of social class in order to do so 
(Goldthorpe 2002; Therborn 2002; Birkelund 2002). This would result in a highly 
attenuated form of class analysis focused on the study of micro-level phenomena across 
a multiplicity of small groupings. When Grusky and colleagues pose the question of 
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whether there are still any ‘big classes’ (Grusky and Sorensen 2001; Weeden and 
Grusky 2005a), they miss the point that social classes are by definition big – they are 
always aggregations which are to some extent heterogeneous, but which nonetheless 
have commonalities in terms of material situations and interests. If there are no big 
classes, then there simply are no classes.  
As an alternative to the macro-classes of Sayer and Walker and the micro-classes of 
Grusky et al, it is possible to retain a focus on the meso-level of conventional class 
analysis while explicitly incorporating the division of labour as a distinct dimension of 
class structure. Rather than separating class from the division of labour as Sayer and 
Walker argue, this would involve treating class as an over-arching concept which 
embraces two distinct but linked dimensions of inequality in the form of relations of 
production and divisions of labour. Thus, class is a complex structure of inequality 
consisting of both the binary division between owners and non-owners of the means of 
production (relations of production) and multiple divisions within these two categories 
based on factors such as skill and authority (divisions of labour). This is not dissimilar 
to Wright’s approach, and the sort of class typology it yields might resemble Wright’s 
quite closely, but making a more explicit conceptual distinction between relations of 
production and divisions of labour would allow refinements which might address some 
of the shortcomings of Wright’s model.  
Most importantly, it would allow a more satisfactory resolution of the issue of 
exploitation. While Wright is correct to argue that relations of production are 
exploitative in that capital appropriates the labour effort of workers, divisions of labour 
are not directly exploitative but do involve an inequitable redistribution of the surplus 
generated through exploitation. This is effectively the conclusion Wright comes to in his 
later work, when he retreats from the idea of multiple forms of exploitation and instead 
simply argues that those with scarce skills and those in positions of authority are able to 
claim a greater share of the surplus in the form of skill rents and loyalty rents. While 
this position is more satisfactory and sustainable than the idea of multiple exploitations, 
there is still a failure on Wright’s part to explicitly recognise that he is dealing with two 
separate dimensions of inequality – exploitation within relations of production and 
inequitable redistribution within the division of labour – and so his new position seems 
less like a theoretical advance than a limp concession to his critics. 
The second problem such a recognition might address is the awkward concept of 
contradictory class locations (or contradictory locations within class relations). Again, 
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this is an idea which was prominent in Wright’s early work (1979) but which still 
features in a diminished capacity in his later work (1997) as a way of conceptualising 
the position of workers whose class locations are neither unambiguously capitalist nor 
unambiguously proletarian. It effectively asserts that the distinguishing feature of the 
vast numbers of workers employed as salaried managers and experts is that they do not 
fit neatly into conventional Marxist class categories. Thus, skill and authority are seen 
as complicating factors which produce anomalous or contradictory positions within 
class relations, rather than as separate dimensions of social structuring. If we separate 
out relations of production and the division of labour, we can see that there is nothing 
anomalous or contradictory about such workers. In terms of relations of production they 
are categorically non-owners, while in terms of the division of labour they occupy 
privileged positions within labour hierarchies, and their structural location reflects the 
combination of these two factors.  
A third benefit from bringing in the division of labour is that it allows a better 
modelling of inequalities between owners of the means of production. In Wright’s 
typology, owners are divided only by number of employees into capitalists, small 
employers and the petty bourgeoisie. While these are important distinctions, we should 
also recognise that owners occupy a range of positions within the division of labour: 
they include executives, professionals, farmers, tradespeople, shopkeepers and so on. 
The categories of small employers and petty bourgeoisie obscure these differences: 
highly skilled professionals earning high incomes from exorbitant fees are lumped 
together with struggling tradespeople or shopkeepers on the basis of number of 
employees, when it is their position within the division of labour as determined by their 
skills which tends to be the more important determinant of their material circumstances. 
Hierarchies of skill involve inequalities not just for workers but also for owners. 
Given all this, it might sound as if there is little left to be salvaged from Wright’s 
model, but in fact there is no dispute here that ownership, authority and skills are the 
critical determinants of class locations and that they should serve as the building blocks 
for modelling class structure. However, there is a need to approach the business of 
construction in a different way.  
 
 
A model of class structure 
 
For the purposes of the current exercise, a model of class structure has been designed 
using Wright’s criteria of  ownership,  authority  and  skills,  but  differing  significantly  
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from his typology due to two considerations: firstly, the need to better accommodate the 
conceptual distinction between relations of production and divisions of labour as 
discussed above; and secondly, the practical consideration of having to operationalise 
the model using New Zealand census data on employment status and occupation.1 The 
construction of this model is illustrated in figures 5.2 and 5.3. Figure 5.2 shows the 
steps by which the workforce is divided firstly in terms of  relations  of  production  and 
 
Figure 5.2: Method for identifying class locations 
 Classificatory criteria 
Divisions of labour Relations of 
production Authority Skill 
Class location 
Executive employers     Executive employers 
Professional Professionals 
Working employers   
Other Working proprietors 
Professional Professionals 
Self-employed   
Other Working proprietors 
Higher managers   Higher managers 
Lower managers   Lower managers 
Professional Professionals 
Skilled Skilled workers 
Semi-skilled Semi-skilled workers 
Employees 
Non-managers 
Routine Routine workers 
 
Figure 5.3: Grouping of class locations 
Detailed class locations Grouped class locations 
Executive employers 
Higher managers 
Capitalist class 
Lower managers 
Professionals 
Working proprietors 
Middle class 
Skilled workers 
Semi-skilled workers 
Routine workers 
Working class 
                                                 
1
 The census classifications do not allow us to distinguish between large and small employers, to identify 
employees in supervisory roles, or to divide managers according to skill levels – all elements of Wright’s 
typology. These distinctions are therefore excluded from the model, although it could be adapted to 
incorporate them if the data was available.  
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then by two dimensions of the division of labour – authority and skill – into the class 
locations in the right-hand column. Figure 5.3 then shows how those detailed class 
locations can be re-ordered and aggregated into a three-class model representing the 
major divides within capitalism.1 The procedure for operationalising the model using 
New Zealand census data is described in the appendix at the end of the thesis. The 
following discussion describes the composition of the grouped and detailed class 
locations. 
 
Capitalist-class locations 
The term capitalist class is used more broadly than in classical Marxism, encompassing 
not just those who own the means of production (executive employers), but also salaried 
employees at the top of the authority hierarchies of capitalist enterprises who control the 
means of production (higher managers).2 Although these groups differ in terms of 
ownership, they have common material interests deriving from their positions in 
relation to the means of production: executive employers are able to exploit workers 
directly, while higher managers do so indirectly by extracting high loyalty rents – or in 
Wright’s terms they occupy the most privileged appropriation locations within 
exploitation relations.3 These two categories are defined as follows: 
 
Executive employers: Owners of the means of production who employ others and 
work in a purely executive capacity, operating a business and controlling the labour 
power of others rather than utilising their own labour in a productive occupation (ie 
chief executives, managing directors and general managers). 
 
Higher managers: Employees at the apex of authority hierarchies within the 
division of labour, materially advantaged through loyalty rents which reflect their 
level of strategic importance within those hierarchies (ie salaried chief executives, 
managing directors and general managers).  
                                                 
1
 Even the detailed class locations conceal some distinctions which might be regarded as important for the 
purposes of empirical analysis, but they can be further disaggregated by occupation and employment 
status if required – as has been done in the analysis in Chapter Six. No method for such disaggregation 
has been prescribed as it will depend to some extent on which groupings are considered the most salient 
for the research at hand.   
2
 The higher managerial category also includes the top executives of public sector organisations. These 
are not, strictly speaking, members of a capitalist class but classificatory issues make it difficult to 
exclude them, and as their numbers are relatively small they should have little effect on any analysis. 
3
 In fact, the line between ownership and non-ownership at the executive level can be rather blurred as 
salaried senior executives of large enterprises often receive stock options as part of their compensation 
package, and so may have significant shareholdings in their companies.  
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Middle-class locations 
There are three groups of middle-class locations: lower managers, professionals and 
working proprietors. These groups are differentiated from those in capitalist-class 
locations because they do not own or run capitalist enterprises, and are differentiated 
from those in working-class locations because they are materially advantaged in various 
ways. They are differentiated from each other in that the principal source of their 
material advantage is located in different dimensions of stratification: ownership 
(working proprietors), authority (lower managers) and skill (professionals).1 As these 
three groups derive advantage from different sources, their material interests may also 
differ, but what they have in common is that their interests do not directly align with 
those of either the capitalist or working class. These groups are defined as follows:   
 
Lower managers: Employees in positions of authority within the division of labour 
but at a subordinate level, usually under the control of higher managers and with 
responsibility for specialised operational areas. Their positions of authority carry 
additional remuneration in the form of loyalty rents, while those who also have 
some form of professional expertise (eg finance managers, IT managers, R&D 
managers) are doubly advantaged by being able to command skill rents. 
 
Professionals: Those occupying advantaged positions within the division of labour 
by virtue of their specialised expertise (usually credentialed through university 
degrees or a comparable level of vocational training). This category includes all 
professionals regardless of their position in relations of production, on the grounds 
that the advantages associated with expertise tend to be more significant than 
distinctions of ownership. While professionals with their own businesses may have 
some advantages over their salaried counterparts, both have significant advantages 
over non-professionals by virtue of being able to sell their scarce skills at a 
premium – in one case directly to consumers in return for fees and in the other to 
employers in return for skill rents.2 
                                                 
1
 This disaggregation of middle-class locations is similar to that employed by Savage et al (1992) in their 
work on middle-class formation in Britain, where they identify three middle-class groups based on control 
of different types of assets: property (the petite bourgeoisie), bureaucracy (managers) and culture 
(professionals). 
2
 There may be a case for arguing that ‘lower professionals’ such as teachers, nurses, social workers, 
journalists and librarians should be categorised not as middle class but as a privileged strata within the 
working class. However, these occupations increasingly tend to carry university qualifications, and while 
by no means all members of such professions hold university qualifications, those who do tend to be able 
to command higher incomes than those in skilled working-class occupations such as the manual trades. 
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Working proprietors: Owners of the means of production working in non-executive 
and non-professional occupations and typically operating small businesses (eg 
shopkeepers, tradespeople and farmers). This category includes both those who 
employ the labour of others and those who utilise only their own labour, as most 
employers in this category have very few employees and so do not profit greatly 
from the labour effort of others. This category of small-business owners and 
independent producers could be seen as a rough approximation to the traditional 
Marxist category of the petty bourgeoisie. 
 
Working-class locations 
Working-class locations consist of occupations which lack the advantages associated 
with ownership of the means of production, managerial authority or professional skills. 
Within this category, three different groups are identified on the basis of the level of 
skill typical of the occupation: skilled, semi-skilled and routine.1 The boundaries 
between these categories are by no means hard and fast, but they recognise the fact that 
the division of labour between workers includes gradations of skill which are associated 
with differences in material advantage, in terms of both immediate remuneration and 
opportunities for advancement.2 These differences may result in fragmentation of 
identities and interests between working-class locations, and may lead some in skilled 
                                                                                                                                               
Lower professional occupations are therefore more appropriately classified as middle class, although the 
distinction between higher and lower professions is an important one which should be recognised in any 
empirical analysis of middle-class composition (see Chapter Six).  
1
 Stratification models often divide the working class into manual/non-manual or blue-collar/white-collar 
categories. Such distinctions are problematic as there is a large grey area between manual and non-
manual work. Moreover, white-collar workers are not necessarily more advantaged than their blue-collar 
counterparts. While they may have better conditions of employment and opportunities for advancement, 
this is not always the case, and it does not necessarily mean they are better remunerated. Analysis of the 
income levels of low-skilled New Zealand workers shows that manual workers have higher median 
incomes than non-manual workers and that the income gap between semi-skilled and routine workers is 
far greater than the income gap between non-manual and manual workers – suggesting that skill level is 
the more important determinant of a worker’s material position. 
2
 There is a degree of subjective assessment or what Wright calls “operational arbitrariness” involved in 
decisions about how to classify occupations to skill levels (Wright 1997: 80-87). While there is a 
gradation of skills within the division of labour, the delineation of discrete categories along this gradient 
is to some extent arbitrary and a matter of heuristic convenience. It should also be noted that as people are 
allocated to these categories on the basis of their occupation, it is occupations rather than people which 
are being ranked. Within particular occupations there may be gradations of seniority, expertise, 
experience and ability which result in differences in remuneration, but due to the limitations of the data 
sources the occupation must be ranked according to the level of skill typically required to perform the job 
to a reasonable level of competence.  
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occupations to identify more with those in middle-class locations than those in other 
working-class locations. The skill levels are distinguished as follows:  
 
Skilled workers: Employees in occupations requiring specialised skills below 
professional level, which tend to be of a more practical and job-specific nature, 
generally acquired through a combination of formal learning and on-the-job training 
(eg skilled tradespeople, technicians, technical representatives, protective service 
workers, administration officers). 
 
Semi-skilled workers: Employees in occupations which are generally non-
credentialed but require task-specific skills or knowledge which can acquired 
through relatively short periods of on-the-job training (eg industrial plant operators, 
heavy-vehicle drivers, secretaries, specialised clerical workers). 
 
Routine workers: Employees in occupations which can typically be performed to an 
adequate level of competence by a person with no prior experience and minimal 
training (eg sales assistants, waiters, cleaners, labourers, routine assembly and 
processing workers,). 
 
A couple of limitations to modelling class structure in this way should be 
acknowledged. The first is that allocating people to class categories on the basis of their 
job means that those not in paid work are excluded from the exercise. This includes 
people who have not yet entered the paid workforce, those who have retired from it, and 
those who are temporarily disengaged from it for various reasons, including the 
unemployed and those engaged full-time in raising families – groups which together 
make up a substantial proportion of the adult population. The second limitation is that 
there are some people whose paid job may not be a good indicator of their material 
position or their subjective orientations in regard to class. This includes people in dual-
earner families where two partners have jobs in very different class locations (eg a 
routine white-collar worker married to a professional or managerial worker), and people 
whose present job is not indicative of their longer-term class trajectory (eg students or 
semi-retired people supplementing their income through low-skilled part-time jobs). 
These limitations would present problems if one was seeking to map the class 
structure of the entire population – as many class analysts who have attempted such 
exercises have found. However, the aims of the current exercise are more limited in that 
it seeks only to depict the employment structure in terms of the relations of production 
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and divisions of labour which constitute the basis of class relations. Thus, the class 
locations described above are intended for the purposes of enumerating similar types of 
jobs rather than similar types of people – the concern is with the characteristics of the 
jobs rather the characteristics of the people who occupy the jobs. If it is revealed, for 
instance that half the workforce occupies working-class locations, this is quite different 
from saying that half the population is working class. It merely means that half of all 
employed people are in jobs which meet the objective criteria by which working-class 
jobs have been defined. This number will include some people who are materially 
advantaged in other ways and who are more likely to regard themselves as middle class 
than working class. On the other hand, it will exclude people who might be considered 
working class in terms of their material circumstances, but who are outside the paid 
workforce and living on benefits, retirement income or spousal income. This might raise 
problems for certain types of investigation, but it is not a major impediment to this 
study where the concern is primarily with issues of structural change.  
Nor does this model presume any necessary link between structure, consciousness 
and action – the S–C–A chain referred to earlier. The categories described above are 
nominal groupings which can be expected to relate to the formation of real social 
collectivities only in contingent and indeterminate ways. It is for this reason that they 
are described, following Wright (1997: 373-406), as class locations – or alternatively 
locations within class relations – rather than as classes per se. Individuals occupy class 
locations by virtue of their position within relations of production and divisions of 
labour, but a collection of individuals in similar class locations will not necessarily 
represent either an actual or latent social collectivity. As noted earlier, Wright suggests 
that class locations limit rather than determine class consciousness and by extension the 
possibilities for class formation or collective organisation. This essentially means that 
there is a greater likelihood of shared consciousness and action among people in 
proximate rather than distant locations within the class structure because of their 
common material circumstances and interests. But there can be no presumption that 
people in particular positions are likely to think or act in particular ways or that social 
cleavages will develop neatly along economic divides.   
Although this type of approach is often counterposed to cultural approaches to class 
analysis, it does have some resonance with the work of Bourdieu (1984). He utilises a 
typology of classes and class fractions based on the occupational division of labour 
which is not dissimilar to something we might find in the employment aggregate 
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tradition. The significant differences are firstly that Bourdieu does not identify his class 
locations a priori from theoretical precepts but develops them from analysis of 
empirical data, and secondly that the criteria for identifying these locations are not 
solely economic but relate to the distribution of economic, cultural and social capital 
(Weininger 2005: 86-90). The important similarity is that Bourdieu’s class categories – 
like those of Wright and those developed here – represent objective positions within the 
social structure which exist independently of the individuals who occupy them, while 
the likelihood of those individuals coalescing into genuine social collectivities is 
conditioned by distance. That is, people in proximate locations are more likely than 
those in distant locations to develop collective identities by which they differentiate 
themselves from others, although there is no inevitability that they will.  
So while subjectively aware social classes do not emerge fully formed out of 
objectively defined economic categories, the structure constituted by those categories 
can be expected to condition the possibilities for the formation of classes. There are a 
number of different dimensions to class formation which are highlighted by different 
schools of thought within class analysis. For Marxists, class formation tends to be about 
the collective organisation of class actors in pursuit of shared class interests, not 
necessarily on a class-wide scale or with revolutionary intent as anticipated by Marx, 
but involving some type of solidaristic pursuit of collective goals, even if these are only 
of a sectional and instrumental nature. In the Weberian tradition, class formation is 
more to do with the formation of social collectivities resulting from the association of 
individuals and families with particular class locations over time – the less permeable 
class boundaries are to inter- and intra-generational mobility, the more likely it is that 
shared identities and solidaristic ties will develop. In the Bourdieuian approach, classes 
form through processes of symbolic classification embodied in cultural practices and 
lifestyle preferences, by which people establish their social similarity with and 
difference from others – although this symbolic demarcation of groups may also 
increase the possibility for class mobilisation in the Marxist sense.  
In these different approaches to class we therefore find three dimensions of class 
formation: the political (mobilisation in pursuit of class interests); the demographic 
(continuity of association with class locations); and the socio-cultural (cultural and 
lifestyle distinctions between classes). Although there is a tendency in each school of 
thought to focus on one or other of these dimensions, in truth they are inextricably 
linked and the process of class formation can best be understood by looking at all three 
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in combination. Class formation in the Marxist sense of mobilisation in pursuit of class 
interests is more likely to occur where class consciousness is fostered through 
solidaristic relations between people in similar class locations and an awareness of the 
socio-cultural distinctions that separate them from those in other class locations. It is 
therefore enhanced by both the demographic continuity emphasised in the Weberian 
perspective and the processes of symbolic differentiation emphasised in the Bourdieuian 
approach. Those two factors also reinforce each other: a high degree of demographic 
continuity (ie a lack of social mobility) tends to heighten the socio-cultural distinctions 
between groups; and social mobility is in turn restricted by the role of social and 
cultural capital in reproducing those distinctions across generations. In all its aspects 
class formation is a matter of degree: there is no point at which we can say that a class 
has formed or has not formed (as in the classical Marxist distinction between a class in 
itself and a class for itself); rather, it is a matter of identifying to what degree class 
formation has taken place, or to what extent a collection of people in similar economic 
positions can be said to constitute a genuine social collectivity. This must always be a 
matter for empirical investigation in specific social and historical contexts. 
The possibilities for class formation also depend on the strength of other cross-
cutting forms of social differentiation, particularly those of gender and ethnicity.1 
Because classes are divided by gender and ethnicity and because the interests and 
identities associated with gender and ethnicity may in some circumstances be more 
immediate and compelling than those associated with class, these divisions may 
diminish the possibilities for class formation. However, it is also important to recognise 
that gender and ethnic groups are similarly divided by class and are therefore fractured 
in terms of their material situations and interests – divisions which may in some 
contexts override or weaken the commonalities of gender and ethnicity. The relative 
strength of class, gender and ethnicity as bases for social differentiation and group 
formation will vary across different times and places, and this also is a matter for 
empirical investigation rather than theoretical speculation. 
                                                 
1
 The terms gender and ethnicity are used here in preference to sex and ‘race’. Whereas sex and ‘race’ are 
biological categories, gender and ethnicity signify socially constructed differences of identity and 
affiliation. As patterns of inequality are largely the result of social rather than biological differences, the 
terms gender and ethnicity are more appropriate in this context. Moreover, ‘race’ is scientifically 
discredited as a means of classifying people into discrete groups based on genetic differences. Although 
‘race’ may be said to be real in the sense that people continue to categorise themselves and others on this 
basis and it therefore influences their beliefs and practices, to employ it as a concept in sociological 
analysis is to give it unwarranted legitimacy. Instead, we can use the term ‘racialisation’ to refer to the 
process by which people are defined as ‘races’ and social significance is attributed to perceived ‘racial’ 
differences (Miles 1982; Miles and Brown 2003). 
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Class, gender and ethnicity  
   
One of the common criticisms of conventional class analysis is that it fails to deal 
adequately with issues of gender and ethnic inequality. Traditionally, class analysis has 
had difficulty in accommodating other types of inequality and has tended to attribute 
class with primacy over other dimensions of stratification by either substantially 
ignoring gender and ethnic inequalities or purposely reducing them to aspects of class 
relations. While the reductionist perspective is now generally discredited, there is still a 
tendency to disregard gender and ethnicity in much economic class analysis. In the 
employment aggregate tradition, class locations are identified on the basis of objective 
economic criteria which are considered to be gender and ethnicity neutral. Gender and 
ethnicity may be addressed as ‘sorting mechanisms’ (to use Wright’s phrase) by which 
people are allocated to class locations, producing inequitable distributions of gender and 
ethnic groups within the class structure. But there tends to be a lack of attention to the 
inter-relation of class, gender and ethnicity as dimensions of social stratification, and 
more particularly to the ways in which gender and ethnicity have acted as dynamic 
social forces which have helped to shape class structure and class relations.1 This 
omission does not invalidate the employment aggregate approach, but it does mean that 
it could be enriched by greater attention to the complexity and multi-dimensionality of 
stratification.  
The approach adopted in the previous section follows the likes of Wright and 
Goldthorpe in identifying class locations independently of considerations of gender and 
ethnicity – an approach which is often criticised for neglecting the ways in which 
gender and ethnicity are involved in the creation of class inequalities and the experience 
of class relations (Acker 2006; Bottero 1998; Crompton 1996). However, this approach 
is in no way intended to diminish the significance of gender and ethnic inequalities or to 
suggest that they should be excluded from the analysis. Rather, it follows an important 
distinction which Wright makes between the abstract and the concrete levels of class 
analysis (Wright 1989b: 290-291). If we conceptualise class structure at the abstract 
level as a set of objectively defined locations within commodity production, then the 
gender or ethnicity of the incumbents and the distinctiveness of their experiences should 
                                                 
1
 Wright has devoted some attention to the relationship between class and gender, suggesting a number of 
interconnections including the idea that gender relations can have a causal impact on class relations by 
enabling the growth of certain types of jobs which are gendered in their construction as either men’s or 
women’s work (Wright 2001). However, this insight remains undeveloped in both his theoretical 
approach and his empirical analysis (Acker 2006: 28-29).  
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make no difference to how we identify those locations. However, when it comes to 
applying that abstract concept to the concrete analysis of class relations in specific 
contexts we can (and indeed should) have regard to the ways in which gender and ethnic 
relations have been involved in the creation of those positions and the material 
inequalities they entail, as well as the ways in which gender and ethnicity affect the 
distribution of people within the class structure, the lived experience of class relations 
and the possibilities for class formation. As Bradley puts it, “Each set of relations can be 
theorised in isolation, though a complete understanding of each will not be gained 
unless their interaction with the others, both at any given time and through their history, 
is also taken into account” (1989: 63). 
The question then becomes one of how we can best capture that inter-relationship 
between class, gender and ethnicity. The most common approach has been to conceive 
them as analytically separable but mutually constituted dimensions of inequality. This 
perspective is to be found in dual-systems theory, which makes an analytical distinction 
between capitalism and patriarchy as systems of inequality which are independent in 
origin, while addressing the ways in which the inter-relationship of these two systems 
has shaped the nature of gender inequalities in capitalist societies (Hartmann 1981; 
Walby 1986; 1990). More recently, we have seen the emergence of a range of 
approaches focused on the ‘intersectionality’ of class, gender and ethnicity (or ‘race’). 
Intersectional approaches adopt a type of multiple-systems perspective in that they 
distinguish between different dimensions of inequality while being concerned with their 
interconnections within what Collins (2000) calls a ‘matrix of domination’. Inequality is 
seen as multi-dimensional and people’s material positions, experiences and identities 
reflect the intersection of their positions on different axes of inequality. Individuals can 
therefore occupy contradictory locations, advantaged in one set of relations and 
disadvantaged in another. For instance, ‘white’ middle-class women may be 
disadvantaged by gender but privileged by class and ethnicity, and so positioned very 
differently to ‘black’ working-class women (McCall 2001; 2005; Weber 2001; Bradley 
and Healy 2008; Berger and Guidroz 2009).  
While these approaches usefully highlight the multi-dimensionality of stratification, 
the idea of independent and intersecting systems of inequality is problematic when in 
reality they appear to be so thoroughly enmeshed as to operate more like a single 
system. Thus, Acker (2006) advocates going beyond a concern with multiple and 
intersecting systems and adopting a more integrated approach which views capitalism 
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and class as themselves being intrinsically gendered and racialised. She supports this 
with analysis which shows the critical roles gender and ethnic inequalities have played 
in the historical development and contemporary reproduction of capitalist class 
relations. This is more satisfactory than the idea of multiple systems of inequality, but 
her argument that class is intrinsically gendered and racialised relies on a 
reconceptualisation of class, which she broadens to include the diverse relations 
involved in all forms of differential access to the means of ‘provisioning’ and ‘survival’, 
including both paid and unpaid work and the distribution of economic resources in 
various institutional contexts (2006: 68). This effectively renders class as an all-
encompassing concept of material inequality and loses sight of the specificity of 
capitalist class relations, which are based in the relations of production and divisions of 
labour involved in commodity production. As suggested earlier, we can retain that 
abstract conception of class while still attending to the ways in which it is enmeshed 
with gender and ethnic inequalities at the concrete level of analysis.   
At that level, the division of labour again comes into focus. Rather than 
reconceptualising class in order to show that it is inherently gendered and racialised, we 
can look at how class has been underpinned by gendered and racialised or ethnicised 
divisions of labour which have been integral to the development and reproduction of 
capitalist class relations.1 The concept of gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour 
refers to the disproportionate concentration of people of a particular gender or ethnicity 
in particular structural locations within production – both paid and unpaid. This is 
usually a matter of inequitable distribution rather than absolute segregation: it is rare for 
all people of the same gender or ethnicity to share similar positions in the division of 
labour, but it is usual for there to be some degree of dissimilarity in the distribution of 
gender and ethnic groups within production. These gendered and ethnicised divisions of 
labour also cut across each other to produce more complex patterns of inequality: for 
instance, in the case of a disadvantaged ethnic group which is concentrated in low-
skilled jobs, men may be concentrated in traditionally male production jobs while 
women may be concentrated in traditionally female service jobs. These divisions of 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘ethnicised’ is used here in preference to ‘racialised’ as it encompasses a broader range of 
meaning. Miles and Brown (2003: 99) define ethnicisation as “a dialectical process by which meaning is 
attributed to socio-cultural signifiers of human beings, as a result of which individuals may be assigned to 
a general category of persons which reproduces itself biologically, culturally and economically. Where 
biological and/or somatic features (real or imagined) are signified, we speak of racialisation as a specific 
modality of ethnicisation.” Ethnicised divisions of labour can thus be said to exist in any situation where 
socio-culturally defined groups are predominantly located in different types of work. This may or may not 
involve racialisation, where there is a perception that a group is suited to a particular type of work 
because of their ‘racial’ (ie biological) characteristics.  
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labour also have important ideological and political dimensions: they simultaneously 
generate and are legitimated by ideological representations about the type of work to 
which different groups are best suited; and they perpetuate broader political relations of 
gender and ethnic domination involving imbalances of power and resources.  
Gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour are not specific to capitalism, but nor 
can they be regarded as entirely separate from capitalist class relations. Divisions of 
labour between the sexes are evident in all known societies throughout history and 
across cultures (Bradley 1989), while divisions of labour between ethnic groups are 
common to most ethnically heterogeneous societies and can be traced back at least to 
the slave relations of classical antiquity. But from the very beginnings of capitalism, 
these ways of dividing and organising labour were incorporated as integral elements in 
the broader division of labour within capitalist economies, and as those economies have 
progressed through successive modes of development they have been refashioned and 
reproduced in new contexts. The rise of industrial capitalism depended on a gendered 
division of labour in which women were largely assigned to unpaid domestic work and 
men to industrial wage labour, while the global expansion of capitalism depended on 
ethnicised divisions of labour in which indigenes, slaves or indentured workers 
provided labour for primary production on imperial frontiers. The development of mass 
production in the twentieth century depended on labour migrations of ethnically distinct 
populations to fill production jobs, and the increasing employment of women to fill the 
administrative and service jobs which expanded along with the extended division of 
labour surrounding production. More recently, skilled migration from newly 
industrialising countries has sustained the growth of professional and entrepreneurial 
occupations, while continued increases in female employment have been vital to the 
expansion of consumer service industries and the flexibilisation of labour. The broad 
contours of these divisions of labour have shown remarkable persistence over time, but 
they are also constantly in flux, evolving in tandem with the changing labour 
requirements of capitalism and being eroded by the political struggles of feminist and 
ethnic social movements.  
Armed with the conceptual tool of the division of labour, we can cut through some 
of the issues concerning the relationship between class, gender and ethnicity. First, 
gender and ethnic subordination are not reducible to a functional role in reproducing 
capitalist class relations, but their historical and contemporary expression can be better 
understood if contextualised in terms of the roles gendered and ethnicised divisions of 
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labour have played in capitalist development. Second, gender and ethnicity do not 
simply act as sorting mechanisms to allocate people to pre-existing class locations; 
rather gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour have operated as dynamic forces in 
the creation of class locations and the shaping of class structure by enabling the 
expansion of certain types of work which are gendered or ethnicised from the outset. 
Third, gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour are implicated in the material 
inequalities between class locations, with pay differentials reflecting the fact that some 
jobs are devalued precisely because they are predominantly filled by women or ethnic 
minorities. Fourth, gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour locate particular groups 
disproportionately, but not exclusively, in particular class locations: not all women or 
members of disadvantaged ethnic groups are confined to typical occupations and not all 
those typical occupations are working-class jobs – some such as lower professional 
positions in the case of women and entrepreneurial positions in the case of some ethnic 
groups are middle-class jobs – so gender and ethnic groups are divided by class just as 
classes are divided by gender and ethnicity.1 Fifth, ethnicised and gendered divisions of 
labour affect the possibilities for class consciousness and class formation as class 
divisions become more deeply enmeshed with and attenuated by cross-cutting gender 
and ethnic divisions – not as a result of any capitalist conspiracy to divide and rule but 
simply as an outcome of historical processes. 
Viewing gender inequality through the lens of the division of labour also allows us 
to address the issue of unpaid domestic labour, which has been the focus of much 
feminist criticism of conventional class analysis on the grounds that definitions of class 
based in paid employment exclude the economic contribution of unpaid work performed 
largely by women.2 This has lead some feminists to abandon class altogether and others 
such as Acker to attempt to reconceptualise it to include the unequal relations involved 
in unpaid domestic labour. However, an alternative solution which allows us to consider 
both paid and unpaid work and the articulation between them without reconceptualising 
class is to regard them as separate but inter-related spheres within the division of labour. 
Within industrial capitalism there is, broadly speaking, a division of labour between the 
                                                 
1
 For this reason, conceptualisations of class which locate all people of a particular gender or ethnicity in 
a particular category such as an underclass, an eth-class, a sex-class or a class fraction are not appropriate. 
In this context there is a place for the idea of intersectionality, which better captures the fact that class, 
gender and ethnic divisions in the workforce are cross-cutting.  
2
 While there is now general agreement that unpaid domestic labour plays a critical role in sustaining 
capitalist economies by reproducing labour power, there is less agreement over the precise nature of its 
contribution to the creation of value and the implications for the position of the ‘housewife’ in class 
relations – issues left unresolved by the’ domestic labour debate’ of the 1970s (Fine 1992: 169-191).  
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industrial sphere with its responsibility for the production of commodities and the 
domestic sphere with its responsibility for the reproduction of labour. This has 
traditionally equated to a division of labour between the sexes, with men’s primary 
responsibility being in the industrial sphere and women’s in the domestic sphere (Sayer 
and Walker 1992: 40-46). They both fulfil vital roles in what Glucksmann (1995; 2005) 
calls the ‘total social organisation of labour’ which sustains capitalist economies, but 
this does not mean that domestic labour is equivalent to wage labour or that the home is 
a site of class relations in the same way that the workplace is. What it does mean is that 
we should be attentive to the articulation between the two sites – not just to the way in 
which domestic labour helps to sustain commodity production, but also to the ways in 
which the gendered division of labour between the two spheres influences the gendered 
division of labour within the sphere of paid work. The fact that women have always 
shouldered the major responsibility for domestic labour has restricted their opportunities 
for full participation in paid work, has created patterns of job segregation in the 
workplace which reflect those in the home, and has helped to legitimise wage disparities 
between jobs traditionally regarded as men’s work or women’s work. The domestic 
division of labour has therefore played a critical role in shaping gendered inequalities 
within the class structure without itself constituting a class relationship.  
In all these respects, the division of labour is the thread which weaves class, gender 
and ethnicity together into complex patterns of inequality and binds them to the fabric 
of the capitalist economy. We do not need to redefine our understandings of class to 
incorporate gender and ethnicity, but when examining issues of changing class 
structure, class composition and class formation we should have regard to the effects of 
gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour. Similarly, when examining issues of 
gender and ethnic inequality we should have regard to the way they are enmeshed with 
class via the division of labour. This is the perspective which informs Chapter Seven, 
where we will look at the development of gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour in 
New Zealand, with a particular focus on the post-Fordist era.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no denying that class structures and the nature of class relations have 
undergone significant change in recent times. The fact that this coincided with the 
cultural turn in the social sciences has had unfortunate consequences for economic class 
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analysis, which has found itself marginalised and assailed by critics. It is regrettable that 
this occurred at a time when neoliberal reforms and restructuring were exacerbating the 
material inequalities associated with class – a time when issues of inequality warranted 
greater scrutiny through the lens of class analysis. Conventional class analysis no doubt 
has its flaws and limitations, but as Crompton and Scott (2005) argue, there is nothing 
to be gained by throwing the baby out with the bathwater – or in other words writing 
issues of material inequality out of the sociological agenda because of an eagerness to 
abandon earlier flawed frameworks. Rather, there is a need to address those deficiencies 
by refining the understanding of economic structures and processes and enhancing the 
economic perspective by incorporating some of the insights offered by cultural 
approaches to class. There are no definitive ways of doing this, and as Crompton (2008) 
and Wright (2005b) suggest, the approach one adopts will to some extent be guided by 
the research questions a particular project seeks to address. The approach which has 
been developed in this chapter is guided by the objective of tracing the changes in New 
Zealand’s class structure and gender and ethnic inequalities during the transition 
between Fordist and post-Fordist modes of development. In adopting this approach, it is 
acknowledged that it will provide only a partial understanding of class which might be 
complemented by other accounts with a more cultural focus. Equally, cultural accounts 
may in turn benefit from the analysis of economic class structures which this exercise 
seeks to provide. 
 
 6 
 
The Changing Class Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In earlier chapters we saw that the restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s had significant 
consequences for the labour market and the division of labour in New Zealand, as in 
other advanced capitalist societies. Businesses and jobs which had thrived under the 
protective umbrella of Fordism were swept away on a tide of deregulation and global 
competition, to be replaced by different types of jobs in industries producing different 
kinds of commodities. In the process, we saw an accentuation of the long-term trend 
away from the direct labour of production to indirect work within the extended division 
of labour surrounding production. The reshaping of the division of labour was 
accompanied by increasing inequality as income was redistributed from labour to 
capital, and from low-skilled workers to the experts and managers favoured by the new 
regime. All this clearly had major implications for class structure and the nature of class 
relations, but in New Zealand as elsewhere the sociology of class went into decline at a 
time when it could have provided valuable insights into some major transformations. 
Among the voluminous literature generated about the restructuring project, one is hard-
pressed to find much mention of class, let alone any rigorous empirical analysis of 
changes in class structures and inequalities during the period.  
This chapter attempts to address that gap through an analysis of census data on 
employment and income for the period 1986–2006. The chapter begins with a brief 
discussion about the demise of class analysis in New Zealand sociology, which is 
followed by an analysis of changes in class structure and income distribution during the 
period, using the model developed in Chapter Five. It then looks in more detail at the 
changing composition of middle-class and working-class employment, and concludes 
with some comments on the implications for class formation. The exercise is 
constrained by the limitations of official data sources and the lack of research on the 
subjective dimensions of class, so it provides only a partial account of the changing 
nature of class. But it is nonetheless an important part of the story of economic and 
social change during the post-Fordist period.     
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Class in New Zealand sociology 
 
Class analysis, or more broadly stratification analysis, has not figured strongly in New 
Zealand sociology. This may owe something to the country’s egalitarian mythology and 
the widespread belief that, if not a classless society, this is at least a society where class 
matters less than it does elsewhere. As a nation we are inclined to believe that class 
inequalities are less marked and class boundaries more permeable than in those 
countries from which our forebears escaped to forge a more decent society. Class 
consciousness is certainly not high – while we may acknowledge the existence of class, 
we seldom explicitly identify ourselves or others in such terms, and the language of 
class is rarely evoked in popular or political discourse. Of course, for sociologists a lack 
of class consciousness does not necessarily mean an absence of class structures and 
inequalities, but the low profile of class in the popular imagination has perhaps led New 
Zealand sociologists to eschew the study of class in favour of those social divisions 
which are more visible and compelling, particularly ethnicity and gender. What little 
work there has been on the subject of class in New Zealand dates mostly from the late 
1970s and 1980s, which produced a number of studies exploring class relations and 
class structures from a variety of Marxist and Weberian standpoints (Pitt 1977; Steven 
1978; Pearson 1979; Bedggood 1980; Pearson and Thorns 1983; Wilkes et al 1985; 
Jones and Davis 1986). Of these, the most empirically detailed and theoretically 
coherent work was the neo-Weberian account of Pearson and Thorns (1983), although 
from a Marxist perspective its focus on market capacities as the crux of class relations 
tended to diminish the significance of unequal relations within the sphere of production. 
Its depiction of class structure was also problematic in that it did not specify a ruling or 
capitalist class and categorised all white-collar workers as middle class – meaning that 
all growth in white-collar work was interpreted as evidence of middle class expansion. 
Given the fact that much routinised white-collar work is low-skilled, low-paid and low 
on prospects, some white-collar workers may have been more appropriately regarded as 
working class, and growth in their numbers interpreted as evidence of the changing 
composition of the working class (Roper 2005: 49-50).  
While Pearson and Thorns provoked some lively debate (Crothers 1985), there was 
a singular failure among Marxist critics to provide a satisfactory alternative account. 
The earlier work by Bedggood (1980) stood as the major Marxist work on the subject, 
but its merits lay more in its analysis of the historical development of class relations 
than in its account of contemporary class structure. Relying on a very simple model of 
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class structure based solely on ownership of the means of production, it categorised 90 
percent of the employed population as working class, thus making strange bedfellows of 
salaried executives and unskilled labourers, and demonstrating the problems inherent in  
conceiving class solely in terms of relations of production while neglecting unequal 
relations within the division of labour. The other Marxist accounts of the period were 
somewhat more sophisticated but empirically limited: Steven (1978) provided an 
analysis which at least acknowledged the existence of a middle class, but was restricted 
in scope to a snapshot of just one year’s census data; while Wilkes et al (1985) 
endeavoured to operationalise Erik Olin Wright’s original class model through survey 
data, but with limited success due to methodological problems which resulted in some 
implausible findings – not the least being that the proletariat was found to be 
outnumbered by managers and supervisors.1   
This flurry of interest in the sociology of class ironically seems to have petered out 
at about at the time New Zealand was undergoing radical upheavals in employment and 
inequality from the mid-1980s onwards – a time when class analysis could well have 
been at its most relevant. As we saw in the last chapter, this was also a time of heated 
debates elsewhere in the world about the significance of class and the validity of class 
analysis. While these debates appear to have generated little discussion in New Zealand, 
it is possible that they influenced the demise of class analysis in this country. It is telling 
that in recent years class has received more attention from historians than sociologists 
(eg Olssen and Hickey 2005; Fairburn and Olssen 2005; Fairburn and Haslett 2005; 
McAloon 2004; Nolan 2009). While historians have much to contribute to our 
understanding of the origins and development of class relations and class structures in 
New Zealand, their work does not address the contemporary issues of class which 
sociology has neglected.  
The only detailed empirical analysis to encompass part of the post-Fordist period is 
that of Hayes (2002; 2005), who operationalises Wright’s original class model (Wright 
1979) using New Zealand census data from 1896–2001. This provides some valuable 
information on long-term historical trends, but is hampered by deficiencies in Wright’s 
original model – which he himself abandoned (see Chapter Five) – and difficulties in 
operationalising it with census data that is not well suited to the purpose and subject to 
major classification changes over the long period under analysis. It also yields a very 
large and undifferentiated working-class category containing between six and eight in 
                                                 
1
 This survey was conducted as part of Wright’s international comparative class analysis project, but was 
omitted from his report of the results due to methodological issues (Wright 1997: 46) 
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every ten workers over the course of the century. While this might have some utility in 
terms of a conventional Marxist understanding of class structure, it does obscure some 
important gradations of inequality within the working class. The analysis shows a 
decline in the size of the working class since the height of the Fordist era in the mid-
1960s and expansion in some of the ‘contradictory class locations’ situated between the 
polar Marxist classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat. This reflects the decline of 
production industries which had provided many manual working-class jobs, along with 
the rise of the managers, entrepreneurs and professionals who occupy intermediate 
positions between labour and capital. However, because Wright’s original model is built 
around relations of exploitation and domination and neglects divisions of labour based 
on skills (unlike his later model), Hayes’s analysis sheds little light on the effect 
changing skill levels have had on structures of inequality. 
Among the major accounts of New Zealand’s neoliberal revolution, that of Roper 
(2005) is unique in giving a prominent role to class, clearly demonstrating the role of 
class interests in shaping the trajectory of the period. He also provides an analysis of 
class structure which draws on Hayes’s data and therefore suffers some of the same 
difficulties. It is, however, usefully supplemented by a synthesis of the numerous 
studies of income and wealth inequality from this period, which show a marked 
widening of material inequality and increased levels of poverty, as we observed in 
Chapter Two. In contrast to the paucity of class analysis, there have been numerous 
studies of income distribution in recent years, much of it emanating from government 
agencies and generally in the tradition of what Mills (1959) might call ‘abstracted 
empiricism’: quantitatively sophisticated but lacking a sociological perspective.1 This 
research also tends to take as its subject the population as a whole rather than the paid 
workforce (often at the household rather than the individual level), and therefore 
incorporates the effects of changes outside the workforce such as the high 
unemployment and welfare cutbacks of the 1980s and 1990s. While this is essential to 
understanding overall trends in inequality, it tends to neglect changes in the relative 
income levels of people in different types of employment, and so does not illuminate the 
relationship between class structure and income distribution.  
Clearly then, there are some significant gaps in the New Zealand literature. The 
remainder of this chapter seeks to address some of these gaps through analysis of census 
data on employment and income, using the model of class structure outlined in Chapter 
                                                 
1
 See for instance Dixon (1998), Statistics New Zealand (1999), Stephens et al (2000), O’Dea (2000), 
Mowbray (2001), Martin (2002), Hyslop and Maré (2005), Perry (2009).  
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Five. The empirical analysis covers the years from 1986 to 2006, encompassing most of 
the restructuring and consolidation phases of the post-Fordist period. Ideally it would be 
useful to begin the analysis earlier to provide a point of comparison with the pre-
restructuring period, but census data is not available in a sufficiently detailed form to 
allow this (see appendix). However, as the major impact of restructuring on 
employment was not really felt until after 1986 this should not unduly hinder the 
analysis.  
 
 
The restructuring of class 
 
Before commencing the analysis it is worth reiterating that the categories we will be 
discussing are not intended to represent classes per se, but rather class locations. That is 
to say, they are nominal categories intended to capture key lines of differentiation 
within an economic structure defined by relations of production and divisions of labour. 
While this structure can be expected to shape material inequalities and interests, and 
thus condition the possibilities for the formation of subjectively aware social classes, 
there is no presumption that social classes will be coterminous with particular structural 
locations. It should also be stressed that in aggregating people within these categories 
we are doing so according to the characteristics typical of their employment status and 
occupation, irrespective of variations in individual circumstances. So while we may talk 
of a certain number of people being in a certain class location, this does not presume 
that all people within that category will share similar material situations or subjective 
orientations. Hence we will refer, for instance, to the number of people in working-class 
or middle-class jobs rather than the number of people in the working class or the middle 
class. The methodological procedure for enumerating the categories is outlined in the 
appendix at the end of the thesis.  
Figures 6.1 to 6.3 show changes in the distribution of the workforce across class 
locations over the two decades from 1986 to 2006. The graphs illustrate three key 
features of the period. Firstly, the most powerful and economically advantaged positions 
within the capitalist economy – those of executive employers and higher managers – 
continued to be occupied by a very small number of people. Although this group 
increased their power and advanced their interests considerably during this period, this 
was not associated with a significant increase in their numbers, which rose from just 
over two percent of the workforce in 1986 to three percent in 2006. There is nothing 
surprising in this, as the fortunes of the capitalist class have never depended on weight 
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of numbers. The second feature is the growing share of the workforce occupying 
middle-class jobs, which increased sharply from 32 percent to 38 percent between 1986 
and 1991, and more gradually thereafter to reach 44 percent in 2006. The initial surge 
was in fact due less to growth in the numbers of middle-class jobs than to the huge loss 
of working-class jobs in the early years of restructuring. Growth in the number of 
people in middle-class jobs was actually greater in later years and accelerated in each 
intercensal period, as Figure 6.3 shows. Professionals accounted for most of this 
 
Figure 6.1: Employment by class location (detailed)
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Figure 6.2: Employment by class location (grouped)
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growth, but there were also considerable increases in lower management, particularly in 
the latter half of the period. Working proprietors also increased in number over the full 
period, but at a more modest rate which mean that their share of employment fell after 
1991. 
The third feature apparent from the graphs has already been alluded to: the decline 
in working-class jobs. This was most pronounced between the censuses of 1986 and 
1991, when removal of import protections and falling domestic demand decimated 
secondary industries which had flourished under Fordism. The sharpest fall was in the 
semi-skilled category, which includes much manufacturing and processing work. The 
number of people in semi-skilled positions fell by around 93,000 during this period, 
cutting their share of the workforce from 24 percent to 19 percent. The same five-year 
period also saw falls of around 39,000 in skilled jobs and 32,000 in routine jobs.1 While 
job growth in each of these categories returned in subsequent years, it was for the most 
part relatively modest, particularly among the semi-skilled whose share of employment 
continued to decline steadily. There was a resurgence in the number of skilled workers 
between 2001 and 2006, mostly among tradespeople and sales representatives thanks to 
the construction and retailing booms respectively. The number of people in routine jobs 
increased after 1991 as the decline in low-skilled manual work was offset by increases 
                                                 
1
 These figures are less than precise, due to changes in the official occupational classification between 
1986 and 1991. However, for this exercise occupations have been reclassified in a way that ensures the 
figures are reasonably comparable between the two censuses (see appendix).   
Figure 6.3: Intercensal changes in employment by class location
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in low-skilled service and sales work, but the growth rate slowed and their share of 
employment fell again after 1996.  
At the broadest level, the net result of these changes was a significant shift in the 
distribution of employment from working-class to middle-class jobs, as illustrated in 
Figure 6.2. This was most marked in the early phase of restructuring, and thereafter the 
trend was gradual rather than dramatic. Over 20 years, the working class share of 
employment fell from 66 percent to 53 percent, while the middle class share increased 
from 32 percent to 44 percent. This meant that whereas in 1986 people in working-class 
jobs outnumbered those in middle-class jobs by more than two to one, by 2006 the ratio 
was just 1.2 to one. The trend was not in itself a new one: the ranks of managers and 
professionals had been swelling since at least the Second World War, and even during 
the industrialisation of the Fordist period their numbers grew at a faster rate than those 
in working-class jobs. Unfortunately, data issues prevent us from extending the series 
back before 1986 in order to compare the extent of the shift in the Fordist and post-
Fordist eras, but occupation data suggests that the trend was much less pronounced in 
the earlier period: between 1956 and 1976 the proportion of managers/administrators 
and professional/technical workers grew from 15 percent to 22 percent, while the 
proportion of clerical, sales and manual workers fell from 85 percent to 78 percent. 
While these categories are not directly comparable with those used in the preceding 
analysis (they do not differentiate by employment status, do not include part-time 
workers and use a different occupational classification), they do suggest that the shift in 
balance between the classes was less pronounced under Fordism than it was in 
subsequent years.  
The changes in class structure during the latest phase of capitalist development 
therefore parallel the changes in the industrial distribution of the workforce which we 
analysed in Chapter Four – not so much a seismic shift or epochal transformation but 
rather an acceleration of pre-existing trends. Long before neoliberalism and the 
information age, technological development had already led to a declining ratio of 
labour to capital within material production, while the long-term expansion of the 
division of labour surrounding production had resulted in increasing specialisation and 
complexity which required greater administration and expertise. The combined result 
was the paradoxical situation of a shift in the division of labour away from the direct 
labour of production towards the indirect labour surrounding production – effectively a 
shift from working-class jobs to middle-class jobs – during a phase of industrialisation 
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based on mass production. When this phase of capitalist development came to an end in 
the 1970s and the economy was restructured in the 1980s, the trend received added 
impetus from the removal of protection for goods-producing industries, redirection of 
investment towards the growing service industries, and the rise of new technologies and 
production models which generated demand for higher-skilled rather than lower-skilled 
workers. The resulting shift in the numerical balance between the classes was not 
something qualitatively new, but it was something quantitatively greater than before. It 
was not of sufficient magnitude to support the contentions of post-industrial theory that 
class structure had been radically transformed and conventional understandings of class 
made redundant. The size and composition of classes may have changed, but the factors 
delineating them from each other – ownership, authority and skills – remain as relevant 
today as they ever have been. In particular, the figures do not support prophecies of the 
imminent demise of the working class. Despite the decline in working-class jobs, 
employment in this category still accounts for the majority of the workforce. That is to 
say, most people are employed in positions which lack ownership of the means of 
production and authority over other workers and do not require professional skills. And 
it is well worth noting that for all the talk of the knowledge economy and the skills 
revolution, 23 percent of New Zealand workers in 2006 were in routine occupations 
which typically require little or no specialist knowledge or skills, with a further 14 
percent in semi-skilled occupations which typically require no credentials and only a 
modicum of on-the-job training.   
While working-class jobs may still predominate, there have undoubtedly been 
changes in the nature of those jobs as a consequence of changes in the nature of 
production and the division of labour. This will be explored shortly when we examine 
the changing composition of the classes and the implications for class formation, but 
first we will look at the relationship between class structure and income inequality and 
how this changed during the post-Fordist period.  
 
 
Class and income 
 
As noted earlier, many studies have shown income inequality increased under the 
neoliberal regime in New Zealand, but there has been no attempt to relate this 
systematically to class, in the sense of looking at trends in income disparities across the 
class structure. That is the task attempted in this section, although it must be stated at 
the outset that there are significant limitations to the exercise given its reliance on the 
The Changing Class Structure     172 
imperfect tool of census income data. There are a number of caveats to be put on this 
data. Firstly, the census collects income data in bands and therefore lacks some 
precision, particularly at the upper end of the scale where the highest income band in 
recent censuses was $100,000 and over – making it impossible to identify trends in the 
highest executive and professional incomes, which have escalated into several hundreds 
of thousands of dollars (and even millions in some cases). Secondly, there is reluctance 
on the part of some respondents to divulge their incomes, resulting in relatively high 
non-response rates and an apparent tendency among employers and the self-employed 
to understate their income, which results in underestimation of mean and median 
incomes for these groups. Thirdly, the figures record gross income and so do not show 
the effect of taxation changes on income distribution – most notably the effects of 
reductions in the top tax rates during this period. Fourthly, the data relates to income 
from all sources over the course of a year and so is not necessarily the income people 
received from their stated job at the time of the census – although this should not have a 
significant impact. And finally, the data used for this exercise counts full-time and part-
time workers together, which means that part-time workers pull down the medians and 
that the income gaps between class locations are affected by differences in the 
proportion of part-time workers in those locations. While this might seem to be a long 
list of caveats, the data nonetheless provides a useful if imperfect indication of trends in 
income disparities between class locations. 
Figure 6.4 shows the real median incomes of workers in each class location between 
1986 and 2006, expressed in 2006 dollars. Throughout the period, higher managers had 
the highest median incomes, followed by executive employers ($70,400 and $60,800 
respectively in 2006). The figures for these groups are likely to be significantly 
understated for the reasons given above and the fact that the categories probably include 
a number of small-business owners and managers alongside the more highly 
remunerated corporate executives and large employers.1 The evidence that higher 
managers have a greater median income than executive employers should also be 
regarded with some caution, given the tendency for employers to understate their 
incomes. Nevertheless, both these groups tend to have considerably higher incomes than 
those in the middle-class categories of lower managers and professionals ($49,100 and 
                                                 
1
 A survey by a recruitment company of over 500 managing directors, chief executives and general 
managers in 2006 found that they had a median income of $170,000 before bonuses and $244,000 with 
bonuses. While the scientific rigour of the survey is unknown, it is likely that it more accurately reflects 
the incomes of corporate executives than the census data (‘Bosses’ pay rise biggest for 15 years’, 
retrieved on 17/03/2006 from http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3606342a11,00.html).  
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$47,200 respectively in 2006). The other middle-class group, working proprietors, had a 
median income which was considerably lower again at $35,000, also possibly reflecting 
the tendency of employers and self-employed people to understate their income, as well 
as the fact that many small-business owners operate on the margins of profitability and 
often report a loss or zero income on their census forms. The median income of working 
proprietors was in fact slightly lower than that of skilled workers ($35,700 in 2006) and 
not much higher than that of semi-skilled workers ($32,200). Among those in working-
class locations, both skilled and semi-skilled workers tended to have considerably 
higher incomes than routine workers, who had a median of just $20,200 in 2006. The 
figure for routine workers is no doubt affected by the relatively high proportions of part-
time workers in the category – hospitality workers, sales assistants, casual labourers and 
so on. However, it seems unlikely that this would account for the full extent of the gap 
between routine and semi-skilled workers. 
 Over the course of the two decades from 1986 to 2006 there was no change in the 
ranking of the class locations in terms of median incomes, but there were changes in the 
extent of the gaps between some groups as the effects of restructuring were felt 
differently across the class structure. This is most apparent in the case of the groups at 
the poles of the class structure: executive employers and routine workers. These two 
groups were the most affected by the initial period of restructuring: between 1986 and 
1991 the real median income of executive employers fell by 10 percent, and that of 
Figure 6.4: Median annual income (2006 dollars) by class location 
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routine workers by 9 percent. The experiences of the two groups were clearly linked: 
declining domestic demand and the removal of protections and subsidies hit employers 
in the form of declining profitability and business closures, and hit the least skilled and 
most vulnerable workers in the form of redundancies, reduced hours and downward 
pressure on wages at a time when inflation was still relatively high. However, the two 
groups experienced contrasting fortunes in subsequent years. The incomes of executive 
employers rebounded with an 11 percent increase between 1991 and 1996 as surviving 
businesses adapted and more opportunities arose to profit within the deregulated 
environment. By contrast, routine workers experienced a further 11 percent fall in real 
incomes over the same period, probably due in no small part to the introduction in 1991 
of the Employment Contracts Act, which weakened the power of workers to organise 
collectively and encouraged casualisation at a time of continued high unemployment. A 
slight increase in real incomes for routine workers between 1996 and 2001 was 
followed by a more significant increase of 12 percent over the subsequent intercensal 
period, as workers benefited from the repeal of the ECA in 2000 along with developing 
labour shortages in some sectors and targeted state assistance for low-income families 
through the Working for Families programme. Despite this, by 2006 the median income 
of routine workers was still 9 percent lower in real terms than 20 years earlier, in 
contrast to the 7 percent increase enjoyed by executive employers over the same period. 
It should be noted, however, that at least part of the fall for routine workers is likely to 
reflect increased rates of part-time work in this category.  
All other class locations experienced falls in real income levels between 1986 and 
1991 and subsequent recovery, although it was not until 2001 that most groups saw their 
incomes recover to 1986 levels. The trend for higher managers followed that of 
executive employers, but with a less pronounced fall in the early years of restructuring 
and a less marked recovery in subsequent years, with the result that by 2006 their 
median income was five percent higher in real terms than it had been 20 years earlier. 
For both lower managers and professionals the initial fall was more modest again, but 
recovery took longer, with income growth not returning until after 1996 – more strongly 
in the case of professionals, which meant that the gap between the two groups narrowed 
over the full period. Elsewhere in the middle class, working proprietors experienced 
relatively strong income growth after 1991 and appeared to benefit most from the 
buoyant economic conditions which returned towards the end of the period, resulting in 
a 14 percent increase in real median income over the full two decades. Much of this 
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increase in fact reflects rising incomes among primary producers receiving favourable 
prices in international markets, although there were also increases for tradespeople who 
benefited from the construction boom. Although this narrowed the gap between the 
incomes of working proprietors and those of lower managers and professionals, they 
remained by far the least well-off of the middle-class groups. In fact, their median 
income remained marginally lower than that of skilled workers even though the latter’s 
did not increase at all over the full period. Among the working-class groups, semi-
skilled workers experienced the greatest increase in median incomes (10 percent 
between 1986 and 2006), despite the fact that they suffered the most job losses from 
restructuring.  
Table 6.1 provides a different perspective, showing income distribution in 2006 by 
bands, allowing us to identify the proportions of high and low income earners in each of 
the class locations. Clearly those in capitalist-class locations were by far the most likely 
to be in the highest income bracket, with a third of higher managers and a quarter of 
executive employers reporting incomes of over $100,000. People in middle-class 
locations were much less likely to be earning this amount, with around one in ten lower 
managers and professionals and one in 14 working proprietors reporting incomes above 
$100,000. As the median figures have already indicated, lower managers and 
professionals tended to be in a much better position than working proprietors. While 
almost half of all lower managers and professionals earned between $50,000 and 
$70,000, working proprietors were clustered at the lower end of the income scale, with a 
Table 6.1: Total annual income by class location 
2006 
Income 
Class location $20,000 
or less 
$20,001 
to 
$30,000 
$30,001 
to 
 $40,000 
$40,001 
 to 
$50,000 
$50,001 
to 
 $70,000 
$70,001 
to 
$100,000 
$100,001 
or more 
 
Percent 
Executive employers 8 8 12 10 23 14 26 
Higher managers 4 6 10 10 19 17 33 
Lower managers 8 11 17 15 21 16 11 
Professionals 13 11 15 16 24 12 10 
Working proprietors 24 17 18 12 15 7 7 
Skilled workers 17 19 26 18 15 4 1 
Semi-skilled workers 22 22 28 16 10 2 1 
Routine workers 50 24 16 6 4 1 0 
Total workforce 24 17 19 13 14 6 5 
        
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings (reclassified data) 
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quarter of them reporting incomes under $20,000. While this indicates the struggles 
faced by many small businesses, there is also evidence that ownership enhances earning 
opportunities as working proprietors were much more likely than those in working-class 
jobs to feature at the upper end of the income scale. Within the working-class locations, 
skill was clearly an important determinant of income, with skilled workers being the 
most likely to feature in all income brackets over $40,000. While the overall pattern of 
distribution was fairly similar for skilled and semi-skilled workers, the latter were more 
likely to be in income brackets under $40,000 and less likely to be in the higher income 
brackets. There was, however, a considerable gap back to routine workers, of whom 
half reported incomes of $20,000 or less, with another quarter earning between $20,000 
and $30,000 and just one in ten having incomes above $40,000 – although it should be 
stressed again that there is a higher proportion of part-time workers in this category. 
Overall, the income data unsurprisingly shows clear patterns of inequality across the 
class structure. The point of the analysis, however, is not simply to illustrate the obvious 
fact of income inequality, but rather to show how this is associated with the three axes 
of inequality on which this class model is based (ownership, authority and skill), as well 
as the extent of the gaps between different groups and the degree to which patterns of 
inequality changed during the post-Fordist era. Clearly ownership, authority and skill 
are all important factors in income inequality, although more unequivocally in the case 
of authority and skill than in the case of ownership. Authority appears to be the most 
significant axis of material advantage, with higher managers earning considerably more 
than any other group and lower managers faring much better than most non-managers – 
earning marginally more than professionals but considerably more than skilled, semi-
skilled or routine workers. The relationship between skill and income is also clear, with 
a definite hierarchy of income levels extending from professionals down through 
skilled, semi-skilled and routine workers. While the incomes of skilled and semi-skilled 
workers are reasonably close, both these groups earn considerably less than 
professionals and considerably more than routine workers, who are at the bottom of the 
income ladder by a very wide margin. The significance of ownership is not quite as 
straightforward, with executive employers tending to earn less than higher managers, 
and working proprietors tending to earn slightly less than skilled workers and not a 
great deal more than semi-skilled workers – despite enjoying greater increases in their 
incomes over the two decades. For the reasons already noted, income data for owners 
should be treated with some caution. However, it does suggest the possibility that the 
The Changing Class Structure     177 
fundamental Marxist class division based on ownership of the means of production may 
not be the most critical divide in terms of income inequality. At the very least, it points 
to the necessity for any class model which seeks to depict relationships of material 
advantage and disadvantage to incorporate those elements of the division of labour 
associated with differential remuneration (ie authority and skill) as well as divisions 
based on relations of production.  
These observations should be qualified with an acknowledgement that there is much 
more to the inequities of capitalist relations of production than can be illustrated in this 
type of analysis. When we look at capitalist-class locations here, we are only looking at 
the concrete collections of employers and managers within those categories, not at the 
abstract entity of capital which also includes corporations, shareholders and financial 
markets – the faceless ‘collective capitalist’ of which Castells speaks. The surplus 
appropriated by capitalist enterprises from the labour effort of workers does not all 
show up in the personal incomes of employers and managers, but may be reinvested or 
redistributed in dividends, adding to the wealth of the collective capitalist rather than 
just the income of the individual capitalist – although the two tend to go hand in hand. 
Personal income figures therefore provide only a partial picture of the distributional 
inequities between capital and labour, which are also evident in measures such as the 
relative shares of wages and profits, the value of companies and the wealth of 
shareholders. As we observed in Chapter Two, the post-Fordist period was marked by a 
redistribution of national income from wages to profits. This is reflected in the census 
income data which shows that by far the greatest proportional increases in real median 
incomes between 1991 and 2006 were among executive employers and working 
proprietors, who enjoyed increases of 18 percent and 20 percent respectively (although 
the relative income levels of working proprietors were not high). Higher managers, who 
are the employees most likely to benefit from increased profits through salary increases, 
bonuses and shareholdings, enjoyed the greatest numerical increase in real median 
income during this period of $9,400 or nine percent. By contrast, the incomes of the 
most disadvantaged group of workers – those in routine occupations – were just $100 
higher in real terms in 2006 than they had been in 1991, and $2,000 lower than they had 
been in 1986. This also reinforces other research on income inequality discussed in 
Chapter Two, which shows a redistribution of income from the lower to the higher 
percentiles of income earners and an increase in the ranks of the ‘working poor’.  
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Despite these trends, it is again too great a leap to say that the post-Fordist period 
saw a radical transformation in the nature of class inequality. There was an accentuation 
of the existing disparity between the top and the bottom of the income scale, some 
groups suffered more than others from the initial effects of restructuring, and some 
benefited more than others from the subsequent recovery. But at the end of the period 
the rankings of the different class locations were unchanged, and while there were some 
changes in the levels of disparity between various groups, these were not really 
transformations on an epochal scale. The most notable feature was the contrasting 
fortunes of those at the poles of the class structure, and in particular the deterioration in 
the relative position of the most disadvantaged group of workers. The reasons for this 
should be sought not in the supposed movement from an industrial to a post-industrial 
class structure, but in the progression from Fordism to the market-oriented post-Fordist 
mode of development. This entailed transitions from a model of capitalism in which 
capital–labour relations were based on compromise, to one in which capital was 
dominant; from one in which wage increases were seen as a means to sustain mass 
consumption, to one in which wage restraint was seen as a means to contain production 
costs; and from one in which secure full-time work predominated, to one which 
encouraged casualised and precarious employment. For the more skilled sections of the 
workforce, the effects of these changes were counterbalanced by increasing demand for 
their expertise, but for those who lacked the skills to succeed in the new environment 
the result was a marked deterioration in their position in both relative and absolute 
terms – notwithstanding improvements towards the end of the period. These gains may 
be short-lived, given that the subsequent crisis is again being most severely felt among 
the most disadvantaged workers.  
 
 
The changing middle class 
 
The class categories used to frame the analysis so far are necessarily broad and conceal 
some important divisions and divergent trends within them, as is inevitable with any 
stratification model that attempts to capture major lines of division without becoming 
mired in too much complexity. It is worth digging a little deeper to reveal the 
composition of these categories and how they have changed during the period in 
question. To this end, the next two sections explore middle-class and working-class 
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locations in more detail.1 As far as the middle class is concerned, we have already seen 
that the very significant growth in this category was concentrated among managerial 
and professional workers rather than among the working proprietors who make up what 
might be regarded as the old petty bourgeoisie. However, within these categories there 
are further significant trends, as illustrated in Table 6.2 which introduces additional 
distinctions of employment status and occupation.  
In the lower managerial category, most of the growth over the two decades was 
among executive managers – those in fields such as finance, human resources, sales and 
marketing, advertising and public relations. Generally speaking, these are the office-
bound managers who perform specialised roles within the managerial hierarchies of 
large organisations, typically well removed from the ‘coalface’ of production, supply 
and distribution. This group more than trebled in size between 1986 and 2006, doubling 
                                                 
1
 Capitalist-class locations are excluded from this exercise as they are relatively small groups and the data 
does not allow sufficient disaggregation to make further analysis worthwhile. The breakdowns used to 
analyse middle-class and working-class locations are not based on any particular theoretical principles but 
simply on those lines of division which appeared from preliminary analysis to be the most salient. 
Occupation and employment status variables could be used to divide the categories any number of 
different ways or to finer levels of disaggregation if desired.  
Table 6.2: Composition of middle-class employment 
1986–2006 
1986 1996 2006 
Class location and occupation 
Number 
Percent 
of work-
force 
Number 
Percent 
of work-
force  
Number 
Percent 
of work-
force 
       
Lower managers       
Executive managers 35,500 2.4 54,300 3.7 110,200 6.0 
Operations managers 29,800 2.0 36,500 2.5 54,700 3.0 
Total lower managers 65,300 4.5 90,800 6.1 164,900 9.0 
       
Professionals       
Self-employed higher professionals 15,200 1.0 19,300 1.3 32,800 1.8 
Employed higher professionals 51,800 3.5 68,400 4.6 108,600 5.9 
Self-employed lower professionals 13,000 0.9 27,800 1.9 42,200 2.3 
Employed lower professionals 111,400 7.6 140,100 9.5 194,200 10.6 
Total professionals 191,400 13.1 255,600 17.2 377,800 20.6 
       
Working proprietors       
Primary producers 73,400 5.0 58,300 3.9 46,000 2.5 
Tradespeople and technicians 46,400 3.2 49,700 3.4 58,100 3.2 
Retailers and hospitality providers 34,900 2.4 39,700 2.7 37,300 2.0 
Other 55,700 3.8 83,400 5.6 116,500 6.4 
Total working proprietors 210,400 14.4 231,100 15.6 257,900 14.1 
       
Total middle-class  467,100 31.9 577,500 39.0 800,600 43.7 
       
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings (reclassified data) 
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their number in the last ten years alone. This growth dwarfs what is nonetheless a 
considerable increase in the number of operations managers – those running production, 
supply and distribution operations such as factories, construction projects, transport 
operations, and wholesale and retail outlets. Their numbers almost doubled over the two 
decades, with much of that growth coming in the second part of the period under the 
impetus of expansion in retailing, hospitality and construction. The scale of growth in 
these two categories reflects two important developments within the division labour 
which are part of the broader shift from direct to indirect labour highlighted by Sayer 
and Walker (1992: 56-107): firstly, the growing importance of the management 
functions of co-ordination, oversight and strategic direction within increasingly 
complex divisions of labour; and within that, a shift from the direct management of 
production, supply and distribution to the more indirect forms of management 
conducted in corporate offices.  
There are also two important distinctions to be made among professionals. The first 
is a straightforward distinction of ownership, between salaried employees and those 
who are self-employed, running their own businesses either with or without employees. 
The second is between higher and lower professionals: the former generally require a 
high level of expertise in a body of academic knowledge, with membership often 
regulated by professional associations (eg doctors, lawyers, scientists, engineers, 
accountants); the latter generally require a lower level of more job-specific expertise 
and face less restrictive criteria in terms of qualifications and professional membership 
(eg schoolteachers, nurses, librarians, journalists, creative artists). The distinction is not 
a hard and fast one, but it is pertinent in terms of stratification given that higher 
professionals tend to be more advantaged due to the level and scarcity of their skills.  
As Table 6.2 shows, lower professionals greatly outnumber higher professionals, 
and the vast majority of people in both categories are salaried employees rather than 
self-employed. Lower professionals and employees therefore accounted for most of the 
growth among professionals between 1986 and 2006, but the fastest rates of increase 
were in fact in the higher professional and self-employed categories. Growth among 
higher professionals was given significant impetus by the rise of ‘new’ professions in 
the fields of information technology and management consultancy, but sectoral changes 
also encouraged significant increases in some of the more established professions: 
growth in health and education services resulted in large increases among medical and 
tertiary teaching professionals, while the expansion of business services encouraged a 
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proliferation of lawyers and accountants. Growth in the lower professions also reflected 
sectoral changes: the expansion of education, health and welfare services saw 
significant increases in the numbers of teachers, nurses and social workers; while the 
ascendancy of the financial sector was reflected in large increases in the ranks of 
financial advisers, dealers and brokers. There was also significant growth in occupations 
which grease the corporate wheels of large organisations, most notably in the fields of 
human resources, training and development, public relations and policy analysis (with 
most of the latter being in the public sector). Finally, the expansion of the cultural sector 
was reflected in significant increases in some creative arts professions. 
The rise in self-employment among professionals was one of the most pronounced 
trends within the middle class, with the number of self-employed higher professionals 
more than doubling between 1986 and 2006, while among lower professionals self-
employment more than trebled. Much of this growth occurred in business services and 
may be largely attributable to the increasing use of consultants and other independent 
contractors, as organisations opted for flexibility by contracting in some forms of 
expertise rather than employing it in-house. Among higher professionals, the ‘new’ 
professions in the fields of information technology and management consultancy were 
particularly suited to this type of arrangement and between them accounted for much of 
the increase, with most of the remainder occurring in professions traditionally 
characterised by relatively high rates of self-employment such as law, accountancy and 
medicine. Among lower professionals, much of the growth in self-employment was also 
in the field of business services including finance, real estate, human resources, training 
and development, and public relations. Creative arts occupations, which have always 
had high rates of self-employment, also accounted for a substantial share of the 
increase.  
Working proprietors, as we have already observed, generally experienced more 
modest rates of growth than managers and professionals over this period, with their 
overall growth rate being slightly below that of the total workforce. Within this, 
however, there were some contrasting fortunes as Table 6.2 indicates, with a shift from 
some of the traditional areas of self-employment – primary production, the manual 
trades, and the retail and hospitality sectors – towards other types of occupations. The 
number of primary producers fell by almost 40 percent between 1986 and 2006 as many 
small farmers went out of business following the removal of state assistance and small 
holdings were increasingly consolidated into larger operations. Tradespeople and 
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technicians experienced modest growth over the two decades, with most of it occurring 
towards the end of the period as a consequence of the construction boom – although 
there were also increasing rates of self-employment among technicians in areas such as 
telecommunications, broadcasting and engineering. In retailing and hospitality, 
increases in self-employment during the first decade were reversed in the subsequent 
decade. Closer scrutiny reveals that all of this decline was in retailing, possibly due to 
independent retailers being forced out of business by increased competition from chain 
stores and discount outlets.  
The greatest growth among working proprietors was outside these traditional areas 
of self-employment – represented by the ‘other’ category in Table 6.2 which more than 
doubled between 1986 and 2006. Unfortunately, it is difficult to discern the causes of 
this from the occupational data as most of the increase occurred in somewhat ill-defined 
managerial or administrative categories which could cover a variety of activities. 
However, most of the rise is accounted for by those self-employed without employees, 
indicating that it may be due to growth in independent contracting associated with the 
flexibilisation of the labour market. Another factor may be growing demand for 
personal and household services such as personal care, childcare, gardening and 
cleaning, which are often provided by people working on their own account.1 The 
figures therefore do not necessarily indicate a flourishing of new entrepreneurial 
activities – this can not be ruled out but nor is it confirmed by the data. And although 
there has evidently been some redistribution of working proprietors from traditional to 
less traditional occupations, it has to be stressed that this has occurred within the context 
of relatively slow growth for the group as a whole, with the result that working 
proprietors have become a less significant component of the middle class.  
The concept of the middle class clearly conceals a great deal of diversity, and also 
considerable difference in terms of the impact of economic change during the post-
Fordist period. If any pattern can be discerned from these complexities, it is that 
changes within the middle class tended to mirror those within the wider class structure: 
just as there was an upward shift from working-class to middle-class locations, there 
was also upward movement within the middle class. Managerial and professional 
                                                 
1
 It might be argued that self-employed people in low-skilled occupations are better classified along with 
low-skilled employees rather than as working proprietors, but there is likely to be a range of 
circumstances among people in this situation. While some may be independent contractors effectively 
being used as casual labour, others may be genuine small-business owners. As the census data does not 
allow us to distinguish on this basis, it is considered more appropriate to maintain consistency by 
classifying them all as working proprietors.   
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groups expanded at much faster rates than working proprietors; among managers, the 
numbers in executive positions grew faster than those in operational roles; among 
professionals, the higher professions grew faster than the lower professions, and self-
employment expanded more rapidly than salaried employment. Given the diversity 
among middle-class jobs, it may be that the concept of the middle class is of limited 
usefulness except as a means of grouping those whose positions are neither 
unequivocally capitalist nor unequivocally working class. We can identify more 
meaningful categories by distinguishing middle-class groups based on different types of 
advantage – lower managers, professionals and working proprietors – but even these 
categories conceal important distinctions. This fragmentation will inevitably affect the 
possibilities for class formation among these groups, an issue to which we will return 
after looking at trends in the composition of working-class employment. 
 
 
The changing working class 
 
Different types of working-class jobs are often distinguished in terms of blue-collar and 
white-collar work; that is, the manual work of production and distribution versus the 
non-manual work conducted in offices and shops. The distinction between the two 
categories is somewhat arbitrary as they overlap at the margins where there is a 
significant and growing category of employment sometimes referred to as grey-collar 
work. These are jobs which combine elements of manual and non-manual work, or for 
other reasons do not fit comfortably into either of the conventional categories – for 
instance the work of some types of technicians, protective service, personal service and 
hospitality workers. The distinction between white-, blue- and grey-collar work has not 
been incorporated in the stratification model as it was found to be much less significant 
than skill level in determining workers’ incomes. However, it does provide another 
useful angle on working-class composition, enabling us to sub-divide the skill 
categories according to different types of positions within the division of labour, as 
illustrated in Table 6.3.  
We have already seen that skilled workers accounted for a declining share of 
employment during the post-Fordist period, but Table 6.3 shows that within this 
category there were differing trends. The ranks of skilled white-collar workers grew 
throughout the two decades, but most strongly in the second half of the period as the 
labour market recovered from the mid-1990s onwards. Sales and technical 
representatives accounted for much of this growth, but there were also significant 
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increases in some administrative and organisational jobs. By contrast, skilled blue-collar 
workers (predominantly manual tradespeople) experienced a significant loss of 
employment during the first half of the period due to the downturns in both 
manufacturing and construction associated with the removal of import protections and 
declining domestic demand. There was some recovery for this group over the next 
decade thanks largely to the construction boom towards the end of the period, but their 
numbers did not recover to 1986 levels and their share of employment continued to fall. 
Skilled grey-collar workers experienced a similar pattern of declining employment in 
the early restructuring period followed by recovery in subsequent years, but in their case 
the renewed job growth was strong enough to lift their numbers above 1986 levels. The 
growth in this category was divided between social, personal and protective services.  
We observed earlier that the loss of semi-skilled employment accounted for most of 
the decline in working-class jobs during the post-Fordist period. Most of this decline 
occurred in blue-collar jobs, but there was also a significant loss of white-collar 
employment. Restructuring and recession wiped out almost 70,000 semi-skilled blue-
collar jobs between 1986 and 1996, mostly plant and machine operating work in 
manufacturing, construction and forestry industries. Although there was a slight 
Table 6.3: Composition of working-class employment 
1986–2006 
1986 1996 2006 
Class location and 
occupation Number 
Percent 
of 
workforce 
Number 
Percent 
of 
workforce 
Number 
Percent 
of 
workforce 
       
Skilled workers       
White collar 47,300 3.2 56,800 3.8 78,800 4.3 
Blue collar 154,300 10.6 119,300 8.1 136,100 7.4 
Grey collar 64,700 4.4 49,800 3.4 70,200 3.8 
Total skilled workers 266,200 18.2 225,900 15.2 285,100 15.6 
       
Semi-skilled workers       
White collar 159,600 10.9 134,700 9.1 127,700 7.0 
Blue collar 161,000 11.0 91,600 6.2 100,600 5.5 
Grey collar 24,500 1.7 30,800 2.1 36,200 2.0 
Total semi-skilled workers 345,000 23.6 257,100 17.3 264,500 14.4 
       
Routine workers       
White collar 120,000 8.2 128,600 8.7 141,900 7.7 
Blue collar 138,800 9.5 126,100 8.5 134,100 7.3 
Grey collar 94,400 6.5 121,800 8.2 150,800 8.2 
Total routine workers 353,200 24.2 376,500 25.4 426,800 23.3 
       
Total working class 964,500 65.9 859,500 58.0 976,400 53.3 
       
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings (reclassified data) 
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increase in this category over the next ten years, this did little to reverse the job losses 
of the earlier period. The contraction in semi-skilled white-collar work was less 
dramatic but more sustained, with a total fall of 32,000 workers over the two decades – 
mostly secretaries, typists and bank officers who were probably the victims of 
technological change.1 Among semi-skilled workers, only those in grey-collar 
occupations increased in number over the full period, although this is a small category 
and the growth was spread thinly across a range of different occupations.   
By contrast with the trends in skilled and semi-skilled work, employment in routine 
occupations grew at a rate not too far below that of total employment, meaning their 
share of the workforce did not fall greatly over the two decades. This was due to 
increases in white- and grey-collar work rather than blue-collar work. The most 
significant increases were in grey-collar occupations which grew by more than 56,000 
over the two decades, with the largest increases in caregiving, checkout operating and 
food service occupations (waiters, kitchenhands and counter assistants). This is work 
which tends to be of low quality in terms of job security, remuneration and other 
conditions of employment – work which often falls into the category of precarious non-
standard employment discussed in Chapter Three. Growth in routine white-collar work 
was more modest and represented the net outcome of two countervailing trends – a 
decline in clerical work but a more significant rise in sales assistant jobs. In routine 
blue-collar occupations, there was a fall in employment between 1986 and 1996 and a 
more modest increase over the subsequent decade. Most of the increase was among 
labourers rather than assembly or processing workers, and may be related more to the 
growth in construction than to any recovery in manufacturing employment.  
In summary, there were three significant aspects to the changes in working-class 
employment over the post-Fordist period. The first is that it was in decline – not in 
terms of absolute numbers (except during the initial restructuring period) but as a 
proportion of the total workforce – although it still accounted for over half of all 
employment in 2006. The second is that it became less-skilled, largely due to the shift 
from semi-skilled to routine work: as a proportion of working-class employment, semi-
skilled work fell from 36 percent to 27 percent between 1986 and 2006, while routine 
work rose from 37 percent to 44 percent, with little change in the proportion of skilled 
jobs. The third feature is a shift away from blue-collar work towards grey-collar work: 
Figure 6.5 shows that over the two decades the proportion of all working-class 
                                                 
1
 Some of the reduction in the number of semi-skilled clerical workers may also be the result of 
classification changes between 1986 and 1996. 
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employment in blue-collar occupations fell from 47 percent to 38 percent, while the 
proportion in grey-collar occupations rose from 19 percent to 26 percent, accompanied 
by a much smaller increase in white-collar occupations. The movements from blue- to 
grey-collar work and from semi-skilled to routine work are obviously closely linked and 
tied to processes of restructuring and sectoral change: many of the production jobs 
which disappeared when secondary industries were hit by restructuring were at least 
semi-skilled, while the subsequent expansion of service industries generated work in 
grey-collar occupations which tended to be less skilled – and likely to be more insecure 
and poorly paid. This undoubtedly contributed to the growth in income inequalities 
during the post-Fordist period.  
 
 
Class formation  
 
It was argued in the previous chapter that there are three inter-related dimensions to 
class formation: the political (mobilisation in pursuit of class interests); the 
demographic (continuity of association with class locations); and the socio-cultural 
(cultural and lifestyle distinctions between classes). It was also argued that while social 
classes tend to form around the main economic divides created by relations of 
production and divisions of labour, there are no necessary or deterministic links 
between economic structure and social class formation. People in proximate structural 
locations are more likely than those in distant locations to develop awareness of 
Figure 6.5: Working-class locations by occupational category
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common identities and material interests and therefore the capacity to act collectively, 
but the extent to which this occurs depends on historical and social circumstances and 
can only be discerned from empirical investigation. Unfortunately, as this thesis is 
dependent on secondary sources and there is a dearth of research on class formation in 
New Zealand, we are confined here to making some speculative comments on the level 
of class formation and how it is likely to have been affected by structural change.  
As suggested at the start of this chapter, the absence of research on class in New 
Zealand may itself be indicative of the fact that class consciousness is relatively low and 
class formation relatively inchoate in this country, making it a less compelling topic for 
study. A 2005 survey indicates that most New Zealanders acknowledge the existence of 
class but do not have a strong understanding of the concept or how it relates to them. 
Seventy percent of respondents believed that New Zealand had a ‘class system’, but 
responses suggested some confusion about what this meant. Three-quarters believed 
class was based on income, while less than a third believed it was based on occupation – 
smaller than the proportions who opted for factors such as education, ‘where you live’ 
and ethnicity. Moreover, 90 percent of respondents considered themselves to be ‘middle 
class’, with just two percent prepared to categorise themselves as ‘upper class’ and five 
percent as ‘lower class’ (Black 2005).1 The apparent lack of class awareness and class 
consciousness in New Zealand undoubtedly owes something to our egalitarian ideals, 
which hold this to be a meritocratic and open society where there is opportunity for all 
to succeed (or fail) regardless of class background. The reality of course is somewhat 
different, but even the perception of equal opportunity is enough to inhibit the 
development of class consciousness and limit the possibilities for class solidarism and 
mobilisation. If there is indeed a relatively high degree of social mobility in New 
Zealand, then this would also limit the demographic continuity conducive to the 
formation of classes as social collectivities. Unfortunately, the evidence on social 
mobility in New Zealand is sparse, dated and somewhat inconclusive, suggesting that 
while class boundaries are far from impermeable, our class origins nonetheless play a 
significant role in determining our class destinations (Jones and Davis 1986; Pearson 
and Thorns 1983: 106-133). Whether social mobility is greater or lesser than in other 
developed capitalist societies remains a matter of conjecture.2 But greater social 
                                                 
1
 This is market research rather than social scientific research and so should be regarded with some 
caution. A summary of the survey results is available at http://www.listener.co.nz/issue/3394/features/ 
4077/class_facts.html (retrieved on 26/09/2010).  
2
 Except in the case of Australia, which Jones and Davis (1986) found to have similar levels of mobility. 
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mobility might help to account for the apparent weakness of class formation by 
comparison with some other countries – particularly Britain, which is the country we 
are most inclined to compare ourselves with when boasting of our supposed 
classlessness.  
While restructuring and neoliberalism may have accentuated class inequalities in 
New Zealand, it is likely that there was at the same time a paradoxical diminishing of 
the level of class formation. Again, the lack of empirical evidence means we can only 
speculate here, but a number of structural and institutional trends point to this 
possibility. For a start, the general structural shift from working-class to middle-class 
employment will have increased rates of absolute social mobility, meaning that more 
people are moving from working-class to middle-class jobs simply because the former 
are decreasing in number while the latter are increasing. This not only weakens the 
demographic continuity in both working-class and middle-class locations, but also 
weakens the strength of the working class as a collective social force. Accentuating this 
is the fact that the decline in working-class jobs has been concentrated in blue-collar 
occupations, which have traditionally provided the focus for solidaristic relations within 
the working class and where rates of unionisation and collective action have 
traditionally been highest. Conversely, the new growth in working-class jobs has been 
concentrated in grey-collar and some white-collar jobs (notably sales) where rates of 
unionisation and collective action tend to be relatively low, workplaces are often small 
and workforces more casualised and less stable due to ‘churning’ as people move 
between jobs.1 Compounding the structural changes have been institutional changes to 
employment relations (discussed in Chapter Two) which have had a negative effect on 
the ability of workers to organise and act collectively.2 
Moreover, by comparison with blue-collar work, white- and grey-collar jobs attract 
more people whose class trajectory might be quite different from their temporal class 
location – in other words people for whom routine work is not a lifetime prospect but a 
                                                 
1
 It is worth noting however, that New Zealand’s fastest growing union in recent years has been Unite, 
which represents low-paid workers in enterprises such as restaurants, hotels, call centres, casinos, cinemas 
and security firms – although its growth rate should be seen in the context of a concerted recruitment 
drive in workplaces formerly characterised by low rates of unionisation (see http://unite.org.nz).  
2
 The decline in levels of union membership and industrial action over the two decades is particularly 
marked. In 1985 there were 683,000 union members making up 44 percent of all employees; by 2006 this 
had fallen to 382,500 members or 22 percent of workers (Bramble and Heal 1997: 128; Feinberg-Danieli 
and Lafferty 2007: 32). In 1986 there were 215 work stoppages involving 100,600 workers and a loss of 
1.33 million working days; by 2006 there were 42 work stoppages involving 10,100 workers and a loss of 
28,000 working days (Statistics New Zealand, Work Stoppages, retrieved on 25/09/2010 from Infoshare 
at http://www.stats.govt.nz/infoshare/).  
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transitory episode, such as young people entering the workforce for the first time, 
students financing their studies, semi-retired people supplementing their retirement 
income, or recent immigrants establishing themselves in a new country. Similarly, in the 
skilled fraction of the working class we see a shift from manual trades to commercial, 
administrative and service work, in which people may aspire to management or 
professional careers or may simply be more likely to identify with middle-class than 
working-class lifestyles and dispositions. In sum, all these factors mean that within a 
general pattern of working class decline there is also a structural shift within the 
working class to jobs which provide a weaker foundation for class formation.  
In the middle class there has been growth, but also change and fragmentation which 
affect the possibilities for class formation. The growth has been among lower managers 
and professionals rather than the working proprietors who made up the old petty 
bourgeoisie. The ‘service class’ thesis suggests that managers and professionals can be 
regarded as a single class because of the distinctive nature of their employment 
relationships, which involve high levels of trust and autonomy (Goldthorpe 1995). But 
their cohesiveness as a social class is questionable in light of their differing material 
interests and socio-cultural identities. Managers draw their material advantage primarily 
from their organisational position and so their interests are more closely tied to those of 
capital, while professionals are advantaged primarily by the scarcity of their expertise. 
This is not always a hard and fast distinction, as managers often possess scarce expertise 
and professionals may hold positions of authority, but it is enough to ensure their 
interests do not always coincide. Indeed, during the neoliberal period the two groups 
have often come into conflict in situations where managers have been responsible for 
programmes of cost-cutting and rationalisation which have negatively affected the 
remuneration, autonomy and working conditions of professionals. From a Bourdieuian 
perspective, managers and professionals are also distinguished by differing levels of 
cultural capital which are reflected in differences in cultural consumption and lifestyle. 
Both managers and professionals differ again from working proprietors, whose position 
is based not on the extraction of loyalty or skill rents but on the utilisation of their own 
means of production for profit. As owners of small enterprises, they too may have 
interests which conflict with those of managers in large enterprises which can 
disadvantage small businesses by virtue of their market position, either as competitors 
or as dominant players within production networks. Many working proprietors may in 
fact be closer to the working class in both material and socio-cultural terms: materially, 
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because they often operate on the margins of profitability and so tend not to have high 
incomes; socio-culturally, because they are often drawn from working-class occupations 
and may remain situated within that social milieu. For instance, tradespeople who set up 
their own businesses may technically move from a working-class to a middle-class 
position, but are unlikely to suddenly adopt middle-class lifestyles and dispositions. 
These differences suggest that the degree of class formation across middle-class 
locations is likely to be lower than within each of the three groups. However, even 
within each group we find considerable fragmentation: among managers there are 
differences between those in corporate offices and those in operational roles; among 
professionals there are distinctions between those in higher and lower professions and 
between employers and employees; and among working proprietors there is 
fragmentation across sectors such as farming, construction and retailing. If anything, 
this fragmentation would seem to have increased during the period under analysis, given 
the proliferation of new spheres of management, the emergence of new professions, 
increasing rates of self-employment among professionals, and the growing numbers of 
working proprietors outside the traditional petty-bourgeois occupations. The effect of 
this fragmentation on class formation within each of the three middle-class groups is 
impossible to gauge in the absence of relevant empirical research.  
However, it is worth noting British research which suggests class formation is 
stronger among professionals than among managers or working proprietors (Savage et 
al 1992). Essentially, this is because they are the group that in Bourdieuian terms is 
most endowed with cultural capital, which is the most effective asset for maintaining 
class location both intra- and inter-generationally via the acquisition of advantageous 
forms of skill and knowledge. It is also manifested in cultural tastes and dispositions 
which are distinguished more clearly from the mass culture than are those of other 
middle-class groups. Moreover, professional associations provide a means of promoting 
and defending interests that is not open to managers who are more beholden to capital, 
and working proprietors who tend to be too diverse and dispersed to mobilise 
effectively. In the professional category we therefore have the three elements conducive 
to class formation: demographic continuity, socio-cultural distinction and collective 
organisation. So it may be that the group which has accounted for the most growth in 
employment during the neoliberal era also has the greatest potential for class formation. 
This should not, however, be confused with a rise to dominance by professionals as 
predicted in the post-industrial theory of Bell and others, for ultimately it is still 
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capitalists and not professionals who own and control the means of production; it is they 
who were dominant in terms of setting the agenda for change during the neoliberal era; 
and it is they who reaped the greatest material benefit from that change. There is no 
indication as yet that their dominance is under threat from a rising professional class.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter represents a contribution to the task of filling a gaping hole in New 
Zealand’s sociological literature left by the demise of class analysis in the 1980s. A first 
step in this has been the design of a class model representing the major lines of 
economic inequality created by relations of production and divisions of labour. Using 
this model to analyse two decades worth of census data, we have seen that the post-
Fordist period of New Zealand’s capitalist development was characterised by 
considerable change in the country’s class structure, most of which occurred during the 
restructuring phase of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The most notable feature was the 
movement from working-class to middle-class jobs, although the former still constituted 
the majority of the workforce by the end of the period. Within this pattern, we have also 
seen the rise of professionals and managers to numerical dominance within the middle 
class, and a shift from blue-collar to grey-collar employment and from semi-skilled to 
routine jobs within the working class. This has been associated with a deterioration in 
income levels for those at the lower end of the class structure, and a widening income 
gap between the most privileged and least privileged class locations. While accentuating 
class inequalities, the structural changes have probably weakened the potential for class 
formation, particularly among those employed in working-class locations. Although all 
these changes are significant, they support neither the idea of a complete transformation 
of class structure proposed by post-industrial theory, nor arguments about the death of 
class proposed by postmodernist theory. Rather, they provide an example of how class 
is restructured when capitalism is restructured, but without altering the significance of 
relations of production and divisions of labour as major axes of inequality. There are, of 
course, also other important dimensions of inequality which we have not explored yet, 
the most notable being gender and ethnicity, which provide the focus of the next 
chapter. 
 
 7 
 
Gender and Ethnic Inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While class is the defining axis of inequality in capitalism, it is one element in complex 
and multi-dimensional patterns of social division which include gender, ethnicity, 
nationality, religion, age, locality, sexuality and disability. Of these, gender and 
ethnicity tend to be the most significant and the most closely enmeshed with class. It 
was argued in Chapter Five that the best way to approach the relationship between class, 
gender and ethnicity is through analysis of the gendered and ethnicised divisions of 
labour which are integral to capitalist class relations. Historically, these divisions of 
labour have played critical roles in the development of capitalism as particular 
trajectories of growth have relied on the incorporation of greater numbers of workers of 
a particular gender or ethnicity within particular spheres of production. These processes 
have helped to shape the contours of class structure as well as the inequitable 
distribution of different groups within that structure and the nature of relations between 
those groups. Gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour tend to become entrenched 
and persist over time, but they may also undergo considerable flux as disadvantaged 
groups struggle to achieve more equitable representation in the better jobs and as 
capitalism moves through cycles of crisis, restructuring and growth which alter demand 
for different types of labour.  
This chapter looks at how these processes have played out in the New Zealand 
context, beginning with brief accounts of the historical development of gendered and 
ethnicised divisions of labour in this country, before examining the ways in which they 
were reshaped and reproduced during the post-Fordist period in the context of both 
economic and social change. It must be noted at the outset that gender and ethnic 
inequality are both complex and wide-ranging topics which can barely be covered 
adequately within the confines of a single chapter, and so the focus here is limited to the 
realm of work and to a fairly high level of analysis which on a broader canvas would 
benefit from greater detail. 
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The gendered division of labour: historical background 
 
There are two dimensions to the gendered division of labour within capitalism which 
are closely inter-related: the gendered division of labour within the household, in which 
women tend to shoulder the major responsibility for the roles of nurturing, caring and 
housework; and the gendered division of labour within commodity production, which is 
characterised by a horizontal segregation between occupations traditionally regarded as 
either men’s or women’s work, and a vertical segregation in which women are under-
represented in positions of authority and seniority (Bradley 1989). The division of 
labour between these two spheres – between the domestic and the industrial or the 
realms of unpaid and paid work – was itself gendered at its inception in the Industrial 
Revolution. In pre-industrial times, the household was a site of both subsistence and 
commodity production in which women had central roles, but industrial capitalism 
shifted the focus of production from households to factories and offices, drawing men 
into wage labour and leaving women with the primary responsibility for domestic 
labour, which went unpaid because it produced only use value rather than exchange 
value (Sayer and Walker 1992: 41-46). Those women who became wage labourers were 
concentrated in jobs that conformed to their domestic roles and social constructions of 
femininity – domestic service, nursing, teaching, textile production and so on – and 
which were more poorly paid than comparably skilled male-dominated occupations. 
The domestic division of labour and the inequalities it entailed were therefore 
reproduced in a modified form within commodity production. 
In colonial New Zealand, circumstances were initially more akin to those of pre-
industrial Britain, with both the settler household and the Maori whanau operating as 
sites of production in which women played significant roles (James and Saville-Smith 
1994: 23-26). However, New Zealand did acquire the ideal of female domesticity 
prevalent in nineteenth-century Britain, and this was invested with new meaning in the 
colonial setting where women’s role as a domestic ‘helpmeet’ was encouraged as a 
civilising influence (Dalziel 1977). As the capitalist economy developed and 
subsistence production gave way to wage labour, a ‘cult of domesticity’ developed 
based on a division of labour between male breadwinners and female homemakers – 
promoted at various times and for various reasons by the state, employers, organised 
labour and women’s organisations (Nolan 2000). By the end of the nineteenth century 
just one in four adult women were in paid work, the vast majority of whom were 
unmarried. Those who were employed were overwhelmingly in jobs which conformed 
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to conventional female roles: by far the largest proportion were in ‘domestic’ 
occupations (domestic service, accommodation and personal ‘attendance’), and most of 
the remainder in either light manufacturing (predominantly textiles and food 
processing) or lower professional occupations (mainly nursing and teaching).1  
The first half of the twentieth century saw gradual increases in female labour force 
participation, which received added impetus during the Second World War when 
women were recruited to fill labour shortages in key industries (Carmichael 1975). But 
contrary to popular perceptions women did not take over men’s jobs en masse during 
the War, and the organisers of industrial conscription were careful to preserve the 
existing gendered division of labour in the paid workforce as much as possible 
(Montgomerie 1992). Labour force participation dipped again immediately after the 
War and by 1951 there was still only one in four adult women in paid employment, 
including just one in ten married women. There had been some occupational change 
over the previous half century thanks largely to the decline of domestic service and the 
growth of clerical work – which had gone from being a male-dominated occupation to 
one in which women had a strong presence.2 However, there was still a highly gendered 
division of labour in paid employment, with female workers concentrated in a narrow 
range of mostly traditional occupations – around 70 percent worked as clerks, typists, 
sales workers, textile workers, domestic service workers, nurses or teachers.  
The post-War decades saw a more significant and sustained rise in women’s 
employment. The proportion of adult women in full-time employment increased 
gradually in the 1950s and more rapidly thereafter, rising from 25 percent in 1951 to 37 
percent in 1981, primarily due to increasing employment among married women. The 
trend was an outcome of both economic and ideological change, and of factors in both 
the demand and supply of labour. On the demand side, the Fordist boom not only lifted 
aggregate demand for labour which encouraged greater employment of women (along 
with increased internal and international migration), but in particular it generated 
growth in occupations where women already had a strong presence: administrative jobs 
both in productive sectors and in the expanding state sector; and lower-professional jobs 
in health, welfare and education. On the supply side, the rise of feminism in the 1960s 
and 1970s challenged the ideal of female domesticity and institutional barriers to 
                                                 
1
 Based on 1896 Census data. 
2
 The proportion of the female workforce employed in clerical work increased from less than one percent 
in 1896 to 27 percent in 1956, while the proportion of male workers in clerical occupations remained 
virtually unchanged at seven percent. 
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women’s participation in employment, while advances in birth control allowed women 
more control over reproduction and thus greater independence. There was also some 
reduction in the labour time involved in domestic work thanks to mass-produced 
consumer goods – from processed foods to labour-saving appliances – as well as the 
expansion of health and welfare services.  
But while feminism may have been successful in initiating attitudinal changes and 
securing anti-discrimination legislation,1 the gendered division of labour was too 
entrenched to be broken down in the space of a few short decades. Women still 
shouldered the major responsibility for unpaid domestic labour, and this continued to 
constrain their labour force participation and shape the division of labour in paid 
employment. By the start of the 1980s women were just over half as likely as men to be 
in paid work, those employed were eight times as likely as males to work part-time, and 
occupational segregation was such that around six in every ten female workers would 
have had to change jobs in order to achieve an occupational distribution similar to that 
of males.2 Women remained significantly under-represented in most managerial, higher 
professional and skilled manual occupations and over-represented in a range of lower 
professional, clerical, sales and service jobs. 
 
 
Restructuring and women’s employment 
 
The restructuring of the 1980s briefly interrupted the long-term rise in women’s 
employment rates, but women were not as badly affected as men by the job losses of 
that period and enjoyed stronger employment growth over subsequent years. The result 
was a further narrowing of the gap between male and female employment rates, as 
shown in Figure 7.1. The gap which had halved from 50 to 25 percentage points over 
the two decades between 1966 and 1986 halved again to just 12 percentage points over 
the subsequent two decades to 2006. By that year, 59 percent of women were in paid 
employment compared with 71 percent of men. As the convergence of the recent period 
was a continuation of a longer-term trend, so some of its underlying causes were the 
                                                 
1
 The Equal Pay Act of 1972 legislated for equal rates of pay for men and women doing comparable jobs; 
the Human Rights Commission Act of 1977 prohibited employment discrimination against women; and 
the Maternity Leave and Employment Protection Act of 1980 established provisions for maternity leave 
and prohibited dismissal for reasons of pregnancy or maternity.  
2
 Based on a dissimilarity index of 58 percent at the minor group level of the New Zealand Standard 
Classification of Occupations, using 1981 Census data (Statistics New Zealand 1993: 93). The minor 
group level contains 80 occupational groups. Disaggregation to a finer level of the classification would 
give a higher index of dissimilarity. 
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same. Feminism had an enduring, if increasingly uncredited, influence in breaking 
down institutional and attitudinal barriers to women’s employment and ensuring a new 
generation of women were socialised in a world where their aspirations were less 
constrained by the bounds of domesticity. Changes in patterns of family formation were 
also significant, with declining fertility rates, delayed childbearing, declining marriage 
rates and increasing rates of marital dissolution all contributing to a lessening of 
women’s dependence on male breadwinners. 
At the same time, there were several aspects of the restructured economy that 
encouraged greater employment rates among women, and which may in turn have been 
accentuated by the growing supply of female labour. These included structural shifts 
from male-dominated goods-producing industries to female-dominated consumer 
service industries, destandardisation of employment which allowed more flexibility in 
combining paid and unpaid work, and increasing commodification of domestic activities 
which saw more household work transferred to the market. Another factor was the 
combination of slow wage growth and rapidly rising property prices which stretched 
family budgets and increased the need for dual incomes in family households.1 We will 
                                                 
1
 Between 1987 and 2007 the average house price rose from around two and a half times to around six 
times the average household disposable income, despite the increasing likelihood of households having 
dual incomes. Over the same period, household debt grew from 46 percent to 159 percent of household 
disposable income (data from Reserve Bank of New Zealand, retrieved on 26/09/2010 from 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics).  
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return to these issues after looking at some demographic aspects of female employment 
growth. 
Changes in employment rates by age, marital status and parental status suggest that 
women have been taking shorter periods out of the paid workforce after having children 
or, if taking extended breaks, have been more likely to return to paid employment as 
their children become less dependent. In the 1960s and 1970s, women’s age-specific 
employment rates resembled an ‘m-shaped curve’: increasing in young adulthood as 
women left education and entered the workforce, dropping as they reached the prime 
childbearing ages, increasing again as many re-entered the workforce after raising 
families, and dropping once more as they approached retirement age (Davies and 
Jackson 1993: 68-71). But as Figure 7.2 shows, the drop in employment during the 
childbearing ages was becoming less pronounced by the 1980s and had gone completely 
by 2006, when employment rates merely levelled off at what were now the slightly 
older ages of childbearing. There were also marked increases over the two decades in 
employment among women aged over 45, suggesting an increasing tendency to return 
to the workforce after raising families – although in the upper age ranges increases in 
the age of eligibility for superannuation and a trend towards partial rather than total 
disengagement from the workforce at retirement age were important factors.  
These trends, in combination with declining rates of employment among younger 
women due to increasing educational participation, transformed the historical pattern in 
which paid employment among women was largely the preserve of those who were 
Figure 7.2: Women's employment rates by age 
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young and/or single. By 2006, women under the age of 25 had lower rates of 
employment than all other age groups under 60, and women who had never married 
were less likely to be in paid work than those who were presently married. Perhaps most 
significantly, there was a marked rise in the employment rates of mothers with 
dependent children, from 53 percent in 1986 to 66 percent in 2006.1 Proportionately, the 
greatest increases were among mothers of younger children: employment rates 
increased from 21 percent to 35 percent for those with children under one year old, and 
from 34 percent to 54 percent for those whose youngest child was aged one or two.2 
Unsurprisingly though, employment rates remained higher for women whose children 
were older, increasing with the age of the youngest child to peak at 81 percent in 2006 
for those with a youngest child aged 15–17.3  
Women with pre-school children are more likely to work part-time than full-time, 
and the fact that at all ages women have much higher rates of part-time work than men 
indicates the importance of this form of employment as a means of balancing paid work 
and domestic labour. We saw in Chapter Three that other forms of non-standard work 
which are often done on a part-time basis – temporary work, multiple-job holding and 
homeworking – are also more common among women than men. It might be expected, 
therefore, that the destandardisation of work and the associated rise in part-time 
employment in the 1980s and 1990s would be key factors in the growth in women’s 
employment and the narrowing of the gender gap in employment rates. This appears to 
have been the case during the restructuring phase in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
when we saw the greatest shift from standard to non-standard work, but not during the 
subsequent consolidation phase when destandardisation stalled and reversed slightly. 
Part-time work accounted for most of the growth in the employment of women (with or 
without dependent children) between 1986 and 1996, but over the subsequent decade 
full-time work accounted for most of the increase. Taken over the full period from 
1986–2006, by far the greatest increases in part-time employment among women were 
not in the age groups where they were most likely to be raising children, but in the 
younger and older age groups where people were likely to be working part-time because 
they were engaged in study or approaching retirement.  
                                                 
1
 Dependent children are those living with parents, aged under 18 years and not in full-time employment. 
2
 Despite this, employment rates for mothers with pre-school children were relatively low compared with 
other OECD countries in 2001 (Johnston 2005). 
3
 Census data compiled by Kay Goodger, Ministry of Social Development. 
Gender and Ethnic Inequality     199 
The trend for more women to combine paid employment with the unpaid work of 
raising families undoubtedly means an increase in the total workload for many women – 
particularly those working full-time. However, it has also involved changes in the 
division of domestic labour both within the household and between the household and 
the market. Within most households it is likely that men have been making a greater 
contribution to domestic work than in the past, although the extent of this change is 
impossible to gauge in the absence of reliable time series data. New Zealand’s only 
major time use survey in 1998/99 certainly found that the domestic division of labour 
was far from equitable, with women spending an average of 4.8 hours a day on unpaid 
work inside or outside the household compared to an average of 2.8 hours for men.1 
Overall, both sexes spent about the same amount of time working, but for men the 
majority of work (60 percent) was paid, while for women the majority (70 percent) was 
unpaid (Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Women's Affairs 2001). We will be in a 
better position to judge how this has changed when results from a repeat survey in 
2009/10 become available, but overseas evidence suggests western countries have seen 
a significant long-term trend towards greater participation by men in domestic labour – 
although women continue to shoulder the majority of the burden (Gershuny 2000; 
Bianchi et al 2000; Sullivan 2000; Hook 2006). Redistribution of work within the 
domestic division of labour is likely to have made paid employment a more viable 
option for many women, but equally the fact that women still do most of the domestic 
work is undoubtedly a critical factor in the persisting gap between male and female 
employment rates and the high incidence of part-time employment among women.  
For some households – particularly the more affluent – having both partners in paid 
employment is also likely to involve some redistribution of domestic work from the 
household to the market. We have already noted that in the Fordist period new types of 
consumer goods resulted in some reduction in the time required for domestic labour. 
This has continued in subsequent years as labour-saving goods have become more 
ubiquitous and more technologically advanced, but additionally we have seen increasing 
substitution of domestic labour by consumer service industries. As we saw in Chapter 
Four, some of the fastest growing industries in the 1990s and 2000s were those 
providing services which might otherwise be performed as unpaid work within 
households or communities – most notably childcare services, pre-school education, 
residential and non-residential care services, accommodation for the aged, cleaning 
                                                 
1
 This included household work, caregiving for household members, purchasing goods and services for 
the household, and unpaid work outside the home (both formal and informal).  
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services, cafés and restaurants, and takeaway food retailing. While none of these 
industries are new, their rapid expansion in recent years has been built on the growing 
commodification of activities as they have moved from the household to the market. 
Just as many of those activities were mainly performed by women within the household, 
so they are predominantly performed by women within the paid workforce, and this 
means that the growth in women’s employment has a self-perpetuating effect: as more 
women enter the paid workforce, demand for household and personal services increases, 
providing further stimulus for employment of women in the female-dominated 
industries which provide those services. This also involves a redistribution of domestic 
work within the class structure: the households which are most likely to purchase 
domestic labour services are middle-class households in which both partners are 
professional or managerial workers with insufficient time (or inclination) to perform 
their own domestic work but sufficient income to pay others to do it for them, while 
many of those who provide the labour are in the least-skilled fractions of the working 
class (Bradley 1989: 236).1 
The expansion of domestic services has of course been just one element of the 
structural shifts in employment since the mid-1980s. The broad thrust of those shifts, as 
we saw in Chapter Four, was the contraction of employment in primary and secondary 
goods-producing industries and the expansion of both producer and consumer service 
industries. Given the very different gender profiles of the workforces in these two 
groups of industries, this involved a redistribution of work not just between sectors but 
also between sexes. This is most graphically illustrated in the contrast between 
secondary industries and consumer service industries: men accounted for 75 percent of 
the massive fall in employment in secondary industries between 1986 and 1991, while 
women accounted for 74 percent of the similarly large increase in employment in 
consumer service industries between 1996 and 2006. In the latter period, women also 
accounted for most of the growth in government and non-profit industries (77 percent) 
and in circulation industries (53 percent), while men accounted for most of the growth 
in producer service industries (54 percent).  
This is not to say that restructuring benefited all women. The fall in women’s 
employment rates observed earlier reflected the fact that their unemployment rate more 
                                                 
1
 Callister et al (2009b) suggest that the increasing incidence of “income rich but time poor” couples 
along with other factors such as population ageing may be stimulating a revival in demand for paid 
domestic labour, which had been a major source of employment for women in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. As migrant workers tend to provide a significant proportion of this labour, there may 
also be an ethnic dimension to this redistribution of domestic work.  
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than doubled between 1987 and 1991, peaking at 9.8 percent. This was well below the 
male peak of 11.4 percent in 1992 but still extremely high by historical standards.1 It 
was not until 2004 that the female unemployment rate returned to its mid-1980s levels 
(as was the case for men). Most of the job losses for women, as for men, were in goods-
producing and circulation industries, with women being particularly hard-hit in textile 
production where they made up the majority of the workforce. But women were under-
represented in most of the industries decimated by restructuring and over-represented in 
most of the growth industries, so they were on the whole better placed to benefit from 
the structural shifts. Figure 7.3 shows that, with the notable exception of construction, 
women accounted for most of the employment growth in each of the fastest growing 
industries between 1996 and 2006. This was particularly pronounced in education, 
health services, and community and welfare services – industries in which women have 
always had a strong presence and where they accounted for over 80 percent of the 
increases. In light of the subsequent and ongoing economic crisis, it is significant that 
these industries tend to be much more ‘recession-proof’ than the construction industry, 
which was by far the largest growth industry for males during this period.  
                                                 
1
 It should also be noted that the official unemployment rate tends to conceal a greater degree of 
joblessness among women. More women than men are without jobs and want to work, but are not 
counted as officially unemployed as they do not meet the stringent criteria of being available for and 
actively seeking work. When unemployment peaked in 1991, there were 72,000 women officially 
unemployed and a further 56,000 otherwise jobless, compared with male figures of 107,000 unemployed 
and 34,000 other jobless (Statistics New Zealand, Household Labour Force Survey, December year 
averages). 
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Gender, occupation and class 
 
Increasing employment rates among women have been accompanied by changes to 
long-established patterns of occupational segregation. Horizontal segregation has 
reduced as a result of women moving into a wider range of occupations and fields of 
work traditionally dominated by men, while vertical segregation has lessened as 
increasing numbers of women have moved into management and other positions of 
seniority. Again, feminism has played a significant role by raising the vocational 
aspirations of women, challenging the discriminatory attitudes and practices of 
gatekeepers, and advancing anti-discrimination legislation and equal employment 
opportunity policies – even if these are not always effectively implemented. Improving 
levels of education have also been critical to expanding the opportunities available to 
women, with females now outperforming males in both participation and attainment in 
most types of secondary and tertiary education (Statistics New Zealand 2005: 43-58). 
But despite this progress, gender equity in employment remains a distant goal. There is 
still a strongly gendered division of labour within the paid workforce which bears the 
imprint of the domestic division of labour and conventional notions of masculinity and 
femininity. Women remain heavily over-represented in occupations orientated towards 
caring, helping and domestic work, and under-represented in the traditional male 
domains of the higher professions, senior management and skilled manual occupations. 
It has been argued that many women have a preference for the types of occupations 
which best allow them to combine paid work with domestic roles by allowing more 
flexible work arrangements and accommodating periods out of the workforce (Hakim 
2000). But such choices have to be seen within the context of the gendered division of 
labour which imposes this dual burden on women and constrains aspirations and 
opportunities by shaping ideological representations of what constitutes appropriate and 
desirable work for women.   
Table 7.1 illustrates the extent of segregation in a selection of major sex-typed 
occupational groups and the degree to which this changed between 1991 and 2006.1 The 
list of female-dominated occupations reflects the abiding connection of ‘women’s work’ 
with nurturing, caring, domesticity and helping. Occupations such as nursing, teaching, 
social work, housekeeping, health care, textile production and cleaning are all 
associated in various ways and to varying degrees with gendered domestic  roles,  while 
                                                 
1
 Comparison over a longer period is not possible because of changes in the standard classification of 
occupations.  
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Table 7.1: Gender composition of selected occupational groups 
1991 and 2006 
1991 2006 Occupational group 
Women Men Women Men 
 
Percent 
Female-dominated occupations     
Nurses and midwives 94.2 5.8 93.0 7.0 
Primary and early childhood teachers 83.4 16.6 89.1 10.9 
Special education teachers 86.8 13.2 81.9 18.2 
Archivists, librarians and information professionals 83.9 16.2 78.2 21.7 
Social and related science professionals 55.2 44.9 63.0 36.9 
Life science technicians and related workers 65.5 34.4 67.1 32.9 
Health associate professionals 78.9 21.0 79.1 20.8 
Administrative associate professionals 54.2 45.8 68.6 31.4 
Social workers 71.6 28.4 82.3 17.7 
Secretaries and keyboard operating clerks 96.2 3.8 94.3 5.7 
Numerical clerks 82.7 17.3 81.2 18.8 
General clerks 79.3 20.7 81.8 18.2 
Cashiers, tellers and related clerks 78.2 21.8 77.6 22.4 
Receptionists and information clerks 95.0 5.0 91.4 8.6 
Housekeeping and restaurant services workers 71.7 28.3 65.7 34.3 
Health care assistants 87.7 12.3 89.3 10.7 
Other personal services workers 88.2 11.8 90.4 9.6 
Salespersons and demonstrators 63.0 37.0 61.7 38.3 
Textile products machine operators 80.9 19.0 74.8 25.1 
Cleaners and caretakers 63.4 36.6 61.4 38.6 
     
Male-dominated occupations      
General managers 17.6 82.4 30.1 69.9 
Information technology professionals 22.6 77.4 25.3 74.7 
Architects, engineers and surveyors 4.9 95.1 13.2 86.8 
Life science professionals 21.7 78.5 39.3 60.7 
Health professionals (except nurses) 31.7 68.3 46.8 53.2 
Legal professionals 24.8 75.2 44.8 55.2 
Physical science and engineering technicians 14.2 85.8 16.1 83.9 
Protective services workers 9.6 90.4 19.0 81.0 
Livestock farmers and farm workers 28.8 71.2 30.9 69.1 
Forestry workers 3.8 96.3 5.8 94.3 
Building frame and related trades workers 0.8 99.2 1.3 98.7 
Building finishers and related trades workers 3.1 96.9 4.9 95.1 
Electricians 1.3 98.8 1.3 98.6 
Metal moulders, sheet-metal and related workers 3.2 96.8 1.6 98.4 
Machinery mechanics and fitters 1.0 99.0 1.6 98.4 
Metal and mineral products processing machine operators 9.5 90.6 12.5 87.5 
Assemblers 23.5 76.5 18.9 81.0 
Motor vehicle drivers 7.4 92.6 7.5 92.5 
Agricultural, earthmoving and lifting machinery operators 2.0 97.9 5.2 94.8 
Labourers 15.0 85.0 16.7 83.3 
     Total workforce 43.2 56.8 47.1 52.9 
     
     Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings 
Notes: Occupational categories are selected from the third level of the standard classifications (NZSCO90 and 
NZSCO99) but some of the category names have been changed slightly for purposes of clarity and brevity. Selection 
of categories was limited to those employing 3,000 or more workers in 2006 and having a significant over-
representation or under-representation of either sex in one of the two years. The list of male-dominated occupations is 
far more selective than the female list as there are many more male-dominated than female-dominated occupations.  
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other jobs such as secretarial and reception work also reflect traditional gender roles in 
that they involve assisting others (traditionally males) in positions of seniority. Several 
of the female-dominated occupations are professional jobs, but they are generally in the 
category of lower professions, requiring lesser qualifications and commanding lower 
incomes than the more prestigious professions in which women tend not to be as 
strongly represented. Women also predominate in a number of sub-professional white-
collar occupations in the clerical and sales fields. Outside of white-collar employment, 
women are much more strongly represented in grey-collar service jobs than in blue-
collar production jobs, with the greatest imbalances being in the categories of health 
care assistants (including nurse aides, home aides and caregivers) and other personal 
service workers (including hairdressers, beauty therapists and childcare workers). 
Despite a general decline in gender segregation over this period, the gender imbalance 
in several female-dominated occupations actually increased between 1991 and 2006 due 
to the increasing numbers of women in paid employment. This was particularly evident 
in professional or associate professional fields such as primary and early childhood 
teaching, social science occupations, administration and social work. The greatest 
movement of males into female-dominated occupations occurred in some of the less-
skilled categories, perhaps as a result of the decline of low-skilled employment in 
traditionally male-dominated secondary industries.  
The most significant movements of women into male-dominated occupations 
between 1991 and 2006 occurred in management and the higher professions. Women 
made considerable inroads into management but were still very much under-represented 
among general managers, while achieving almost equitable representation in lower 
management positions. In the higher professions, women made up almost half of all 
health and legal professionals by 2006 but did not have such a strong presence in some 
of the more technologically-orientated fields such as architecture, engineering and 
information technology. Protective service occupations also remained male-dominated, 
but there were signs of change here due to the increasing recruitment of women into the 
police and armed forces. The predominance of males tends to be strongest in manual 
occupations and this changed little over the period. The skilled manual trades along 
with lower-skilled jobs involving heavy machinery remain almost exclusively male 
preserves, although women are better represented in some other low-skilled manual jobs 
such as labouring and assembling, as well as in livestock farming.  
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Overall, the decline in occupational segregation which had been evident in earlier 
years continued through to 2006. Between 1991 and 2006, the index of dissimilarity 
(the proportion of women who would have to change occupations in order to achieve a 
distribution similar to that of men) fell from 52 percent to 45 percent, continuing a 
gradual trend since the early 1970s.1 There is some evidence to suggest that the 
convergence between male and female occupational distributions has slowed over 
recent years (Newell 2009), although this might be expected to occur as the disparities 
reduce. The census data is somewhat limited in that it only tells us about the distribution 
of men and women between occupational categories and nothing about distribution 
within those categories, which may themselves conceal further horizontal and vertical 
segregation. In particular, vertical segregation within occupations remains a major 
impediment to gender equity in employment – while more women have moved into 
male-dominated occupations, they still face obstacles to progressing within those 
occupations into positions of seniority and authority. Even in female-dominated 
occupations men often hold the most senior positions, and it is a paradoxical effect of 
the decline of occupational segregation that as more men move into female-dominated 
occupations it may become harder for women to progress into the top jobs. Vertical 
segregation within occupations may result from a range of factors: discrimination by 
gatekeepers who are more likely to identify the qualities deemed suitable for 
advancement in male workers than female workers; the difficulties faced by many 
women in combining the commitment required for career advancement with heavy 
domestic workloads; and horizontal segregation within occupations which may see 
women concentrated in niches which offer less opportunity for advancement (Acker 
2009). There is unfortunately a dearth of good research on these matters in New 
Zealand, although the Human Rights Commission (2008) has identified under-
representation of women in a range of senior positions including law-firm partners, 
senior police officers, university professors and associate professors, and newspaper 
editors.  
                                                 
1
 These calculations are based on the third or minor group level of the New Zealand Standard 
Classification of Occupations, which contains 96 occupational groups. It is not possible to obtain a 
consistent series going back earlier than 1991 owing to changes in the standard classification. However, 
using an earlier classification with 80 minor groups, Statistics New Zealand (1993: 93) calculated that the 
index of dissimilarity fell from 63 percent to 53 percent between 1971 and 1991 among those working 20 
or more hours per week.  
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Gendered divisions of labour within the paid workforce produce a gendered class 
structure, with men and women distributed inequitably across class locations as 
illustrated in figures 7.4 and 7.5. Despite the increasing movement of women into 
management, they remain significantly under-represented in capitalist-class locations: 
less than two percent of employed women were either executive employers or higher 
managers in 2006, compared with over four percent of men. This meant that women 
made up just 27 percent of people in these categories in 2006, although this was more 
 
Figure 7.4: Class locations of employed men
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Figure 7.5: Class locations of employed women
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than double the proportion 20 years earlier (13 percent).1 Representation in middle-class 
jobs is more equitable thanks to the strong movement of women into lower management 
and the professions. By 2006 a slightly higher proportion of women than men were in 
the lower managerial category (both around nine percent), while considerably more 
women than men were in the professional category (24 percent compared with 17 
percent). The relatively high proportion of women in professional positions is not new 
and is largely due to their over-representation in lower professions – in 2006 over three-
quarters of all female professionals were in lower professional jobs compared with less 
than half of all male professionals. Men were also almost twice as likely as women to be 
working proprietors, reflecting not only the fact that many in this category work in 
manual occupations such as skilled trades and farming, but also that women generally 
are less likely than men to be self-employed, either with or without employees.2 
Nonetheless, the movement of women into professional and lower managerial jobs 
meant that by 2006 they were almost equitably represented in middle-class 
employment, making up 47 percent of people in these categories compared with 35 
percent two decades earlier.  
Women are slightly more likely than men to be in working-class jobs, although for 
both sexes these jobs represent a declining share of employment. Most of the decline for 
both men and women has been in semi-skilled work, predominantly in production jobs 
which suffered as a result of restructuring. While similar proportions of men and 
women were in semi-skilled jobs at the end of the period, women were markedly under-
represented in skilled jobs and over-represented in routine jobs. This is because the 
skilled category includes the manual trades where men predominate, while the routine 
category includes the low-skilled service jobs in fields such as hospitality, caring and 
cleaning where women predominate. The shift in composition of working-class 
employment from blue-collar to grey- and white-collar jobs, which we observed in 
Chapter Six, also entailed something of a gender shift as the female share of working-
class employment rose from 43 percent to 49 percent between 1986 and 2006. However, 
this is similar in scale to the gender shift within the workforce as a whole and not as 
great as the shift within middle-class employment.  
                                                 
1
 Women are likely to be even more under-represented in the top positions within the capitalist class. 
Research by the Human Rights Commission shows that in 2007 women made up just 8.6 percent of 
directors of companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Market (Human Rights Commission 2008). 
2
 In 2006, 10 percent of men and 5 percent of women were employers, while 15 percent of men and 9 
percent of women were self-employed without employees. 
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The inequitable distribution of men and women within the class structure is 
reflected in income inequality between the sexes, although it does not wholly explain 
that inequality. In 2006, the median income of workers in full-time employment was 
$34,600 for women and $41,500 for men. There was some narrowing of this gap 
between 1986 and 2006, with the median income for female full-time workers 
increasing from 71 percent to 83 percent of the male median. However, most of this 
change occurred during the initial restructuring period between 1986 and 1991, and was 
the combined result of a rise in real incomes for women and a simultaneous fall in real 
incomes for men. Since that time, women’s incomes have risen faster than those of men 
and so the gap has continued to narrow, but at a slower rate. The narrowing of the gap 
no doubt reflects the progression of more women into professional and managerial 
occupations, while the fact that a gap persists is a reflection of continuing occupational 
segregation and pay inequities between comparably skilled male-dominated and female-
dominated occupations. However, occupational distribution does not fully account for 
income inequality. Even within most occupational categories men tend to earn more 
than women – in 2006 there was only a handful of occupations in which the median 
income for full-time female workers was similar to that of their male counterparts.1 A 
number of factors could account for this, including intra-occupational segregation, 
differences in education or skill levels, differences in the number of hours worked, the 
effects of women taking time out of the workforce to raise children, and discrimination 
in the setting of remuneration levels. 
Because census income data relates to annual income from all sources rather than 
just from employment, gender income gaps may also be affected by differences in 
income from other sources and by differences in the likelihood of having had time out 
of the workforce during the year. Data on hourly earnings from wages and salaries from 
the New Zealand Income Survey eliminates these factors and shows a smaller gap than 
the census data, with the median hourly earnings for women being 88 percent of the 
male median in 2006 – up from 83 percent in 1997. Regression analysis on this data 
from the late 1990s suggested that between 40 and 80 percent of the earnings gap could 
be explained by gender differences in occupational and industrial distribution, 
experience (measured by accumulated years in the full-time workforce) and education 
                                                 
1
 Of the 363 occupations employing at least 50 full-time workers of both sexes in 2006, only 10 had a 
full-time median income for females which was equal to or greater than that of males. In a further 20 
occupations the female median was within five percent of the male median. In another six occupations 
both sexes had a median in the highest band of over $100,000, meaning comparisons could not be made.  
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(Dixon 2000). It is therefore fair to speculate that the residual or unexplained 
component of the gap is largely attributable to intra-occupational segregation and pay 
discrimination, but this residual element appears to be declining as the earnings gap 
narrows.  
 
Ethnicised divisions of labour: historical background 
 
Like gendered divisions of labour, ethnicised divisions of labour are not unique to 
capitalism but have been an integral feature of various stages of capitalist development 
and have helped to shape the course of that development. The nature of these processes 
has varied considerably according to time and place, but the New Zealand experience 
has commonalities with other settler societies colonised in the course of the global 
expansion of European capitalism between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, 
and with other developed capitalist nations which received large waves of immigration 
in the latter half of the twentieth century (Pearson 2001). In settler societies, non-
European peoples were incorporated into divisions of labour which sustained the 
emerging capitalist economies in several different ways: as independent producers of 
goods for exchange with traders or settlers, as slaves, as indentured workers or as free 
wage labourers (Miles 1987). In New Zealand, Maori initially engaged economically as 
independent producers during the early years of contact and increasingly as wage 
labourers as colonisation progressed and the capitalist economy gained ascendancy. In 
the first instance this did not involve direct incorporation into capitalist class relations, 
but rather an articulation between the traditional Maori mode of production based on 
lineage relations and the emerging capitalist mode of production (Bedggood 1979; 
Bedggood and de Decker 1977). During this period, the Maori economy produced 
commodities in the form of food and raw materials along with services such as shipping 
which were traded within the emerging capitalist economy in a mutually advantageous 
division of labour, providing settlers and traders with means of provisioning and profit 
and providing Maori with European goods and mana (Petrie 2006). However, as 
colonisation gathered pace and Maori land was increasingly alienated – through either 
voluntary sale, fraudulent appropriation or forcible seizure – the capitalist economy 
became increasingly dominant and the Maori economy increasingly unviable. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, only a fraction of the country’s productive land remained 
in Maori hands and the indigenous population was largely consigned to a precarious 
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rural subsistence, supplemented where possible by waged employment – usually casual 
or seasonal labouring in agriculture or public works programmes (Sorrenson 1992).1   
Employment opportunities for Maori in the early part of the twentieth century were 
limited given their overwhelmingly rural location, low levels of formal education, and 
racism among Pakeha who controlled access to employment (Ballara 1986). The 
situation was exacerbated by the onset of the Great Depression, and by 1933 around 
three-quarters of adult Maori males were registered as unemployed (King 1992: 293). 
Those Maori who obtained waged employment mostly worked in occupations which 
conformed to their roles in pre-capitalist production, just as women’s occupations 
tended to reflect their roles in the domestic division of labour. In 1936, 88 percent of 
employed Maori males worked in agriculture, forestry, construction (largely public 
works) or other labouring jobs, while 86 percent of employed Maori women worked in 
agricultural, labouring or domestic occupations.2 At this time 83 percent of Maori lived 
in rural areas, but with a growing population and declining employment opportunities 
due to mechanisation and rationalisation of agriculture and the scaling down of public 
works, the stage was set for large-scale migration to the cities.  
There had been some urbanisation of Maori before the Second World War and this 
gained further impetus from urban labour shortages during the War, but migration really 
gathered pace during the post-War decades when the Fordist boom stimulated labour 
demand in urban secondary industries (Ongley 1990). In the fifty years from 1936 to 
1986, the Maori population was transformed from one in which eight out of ten people 
lived in rural areas, to one in which a similar proportion lived in urban areas – although 
not necessarily in the major cities as many migrated to smaller cities and towns nearer 
their tribal regions. In the process, Maori migrants were channelled into semi-skilled 
and low-skilled manual work, predominantly in secondary industries. By 1976, 56 
percent of employed Maori males and 38 percent of employed Maori females worked in 
secondary industries, compared with 41 percent and 22 percent of the total male and 
female workforces respectively. They were also over-represented in primary production 
and transport, as large numbers were employed by state-sector enterprises in forestry 
and railways, but they remained strongly under-represented in most service industries. 
In terms of occupations, most were performing low-skilled manual jobs – 65 percent of 
Maori males and 52 percent of Maori females were in low-skilled manual work in 1976, 
                                                 
1
 It is not possible to quantify Maori participation in waged employment at this time as the Census did not 
collect employment data on Maori until 1926. 
2
 All employment data in this section is from Ongley (1990). 
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compared with 30 percent and 23 percent of the total male and female workforces 
respectively. Conversely, they were under-represented in all major categories of white-
collar work, particularly managerial and professional occupations.  
The post-War boom was also fuelled by international migration from two major 
sources – Europe and the Pacific Islands. New Zealand’s preferred sources of new 
settlers were Britain, other Western European nations and the ‘old commonwealth’ 
countries. People of British and Irish birth and parentage had unrestricted rights of 
residence in New Zealand until the economic reversals of the 1970s, while other 
immigrants required ministerial approval – a system which was used to restrict 
immigration of non-Europeans in what effectively amounted to a ‘white New Zealand’ 
policy (Farmer 1985). The growing demand for labour after the War saw significant 
increases in immigration from Europe, particularly the UK. These immigrants were 
mostly skilled manual or white-collar workers and became dispersed throughout the 
industrial and occupational structure rather than being concentrated in particular sectors. 
The situation was quite different for Pacific migrants, who were the only non-European 
group to migrate in large numbers to New Zealand during the Fordist period. This 
migration flow had significant commonalities with Maori migration, despite being 
international rather than internal: in the island nations as in New Zealand, the intrusion 
of capitalism had undermined subsistence modes of production and displaced 
indigenous labour, which was then drawn into expanding secondary industries during 
the post-War boom. The difference was that capitalism in the islands remained under-
developed and unable to provide sufficient employment and income for growing 
populations, so migrants had to look overseas for opportunities – and there was a ready 
demand for their labour in New Zealand (Ongley 1990; 1991).  
Pacific migrants entered through a number of channels: citizens of the Cook 
Islands, Niue and Tokelau (which had been New Zealand territories or protectorates) 
held New Zealand citizenship and unrestricted rights of residence; Western Samoa was 
allowed a quota of permanent immigrants in recognition of its colonial relationship with 
New Zealand; and other migrants from that country along with Tonga and Fiji mostly 
entered New Zealand on temporary permits and often overstayed – with the 
acquiescence of employers and the state as long as their labour was needed (Trlin 1987). 
This changed with the onset of economic crisis and reversals in the labour market in the 
early 1970s, leading to efforts to round up and deport Pacific overstayers and introduce 
more formalised and restrictive guestworker schemes – with limited success as some 
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continued to overstay and others were eligible for residence under family reunification 
provisions (Bedford 1984). Pacific migrants, like Maori, generally had low levels of 
formal education and skills, and became heavily concentrated in low-skilled jobs in 
manufacturing industries, as did their New Zealand-born children. In 1976, 74 percent 
of males and 54 percent of females of Pacific ethnicity worked in secondary industries, 
with 59 percent of males and 53 percent of females working in low-skilled manual 
occupations. Like Maori, they were significantly under-represented in all other 
industries with the exception of transport, and in white-collar occupations, particularly 
management and the professions. By comparison with Maori they were more likely to 
work in manufacturing, and particularly in import substitution industries producing 
goods such as textiles, consumer durables and industrial equipment. 
Colonialism and labour migration – aspects of two different phases of capitalist 
development – thus combined to create ethnicised divisions of labour in which there 
was a disproportionate clustering of Maori and Pacific workers in low-skilled manual 
occupations in production industries. These were also racialised divisions of labour, as 
the racism which had helped to legitimate colonialism was reshaped into stereotypes 
which characterised Maori and Pacific people as naturally suited to the low-skilled 
manual work in which they were concentrated, and with limited aptitude or inclination 
for other types of employment. The combined effects of class, racism and ethnicity 
ensured the reproduction of this pattern over time, as the factors which restrict inter-
generational class mobility – a cycle of low-wage employment, socio-economic 
disadvantage, lack of cultural capital and low educational achievement – were 
compounded by exclusionary practices ranging from a monocultural education system 
to discrimination in the job market. This all placed Maori and Pacific people in a 
particularly vulnerable position when the crisis of the 1970s and the restructuring of the 
1980s eventuated: concentrated at the lower end of the labour market in the most 
vulnerable sectors of production, and ill-placed to take advantage of the new areas of 
employment growth in skilled white-collar work. 
 
 
Restructuring and ethnicity  
 
Before looking at the effects of restructuring on ethnic inequalities it should be noted 
that the analysis in this and the following section is constrained by limitations of space 
and availability of data. Consequently, it compares only the very broad ethnic categories 
from the highest level of the standard classification of ethnicity: European, Maori, 
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Pacific and Asian.1 Each of these categories conceals considerable heterogeneity in 
three respects. Firstly the European, Pacific and Asian categories are aggregations of a 
diverse range of ethnic groups with distinctive cultural and national origins. Secondly, 
within particular ethnic groups there may be significant differences in cultural 
orientations and socio-economic outcomes between those of a single ethnicity and those 
of multiple ethnicities – for instance between those of sole Maori ethnicity and those of 
combined Maori and European ethnicity. Thirdly, in the case of migrant ethnic groups 
there may be similar differences between the overseas-born and New Zealand-born, and 
between recent migrants and established migrants. To take account of all this variation 
is beyond the scope of this exercise and so the analysis must be largely confined to the 
four major categories. These categories do reveal some marked contrasts, but it should 
be borne in mind that they also conceal some important differences.2  
The neoliberal restructuring project had two major consequences in terms of the 
relationship between ethnicity and the labour market. The first was soaring levels of 
unemployment among Maori and Pacific workers in the late 1980s and early 1990s as 
production industries were hit by the removal of protection along with a slump in 
domestic demand, while major state-sector employers in forestry and railways were 
corporatised and privatised. The second was the diversification of New Zealand’s 
immigration streams as the country sought to attract more skilled immigrants to satisfy 
the new areas of labour demand and turned increasingly to Asia and other ‘non-
traditional’ source countries. Despite recovery in employment rates and increasing 
upward mobility among Maori and Pacific workers, existing ethnicised divisions of 
labour persisted and were overlaid with new divisions as New Zealand’s new immigrant 
streams were channelled into different types of work (Ongley 1991; 1996; 2004). 
The effect of restructuring and recession on Maori and Pacific unemployment is 
graphically illustrated in Figure 7.6. The Maori unemployment rate rose from 10.4 
percent to 25.4 percent between 1987 and 1992, while the rate for Pacific people rose 
                                                 
1
 The categories of ‘Middle Eastern/Latin American/African’ and ‘Other Ethnicity’ have been excluded 
because they are too small and diverse to provide useful data. At the 2006 Census the ‘Other’ category for 
the first time included those who reported their ethnicity as ‘New Zealander’, but for the purposes of this 
exercise and to maintain consistency with the practice in earlier censuses these responses have been 
recoded to the European category. The term ‘European’ is used in preference to ‘Pakeha’ because this is 
the terminology used in the standard classification and the Census questionnaire. Census data used here is 
based on total response counts, which means that people who report more than one ethnicity are counted 
in each ethnic category they specify, so the categories are not mutually exclusive. The unemployment 
data from the Household Labour Force Survey is based on a prioritisation system whereby people 
reporting more than one ethnicity are allocated to a single ethnic category. 
2
 For discussion of these and other issues relating to the conceptualisation, measurement and reporting of 
ethnicity see Callister et al (2006; 2009a).  
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even more sharply from 6.6 percent to 28 percent between 1986 and 1991. In both cases 
the peak was more than three times as high as the European peak of 7.9 percent. Despite 
considerable falls over subsequent years – interrupted only by a brief reversal following 
the Asian crisis in the late 1990s – unemployment for Maori and Pacific people 
remained markedly higher than the European rate. The rates in 2007 stood at 7.7 percent 
for Maori, 6.5 percent for Pacific people and just 2.6 percent for Europeans.1 Although 
these disparities are affected to some extent by the younger age profiles of the Maori 
and Pacific populations, the unemployment rates for these groups are considerably 
higher than the European rates across all age groups.  
Most of the job losses for Maori and Pacific workers during the restructuring period 
were in production industries – the sectors in which they were over-represented and 
which were the worst affected by restructuring and recession. Between the 1986 and 
1991 censuses, the number of Maori employed in secondary industries fell by 22,200, 
with a fall of a further 5,800 in primary industries. Even within these industries, Maori 
workers bore a disproportionate share of the job losses: in 1986 they made up 10 
percent of workers in the primary sector and 13 percent of those in the secondary sector, 
but over the next five years they accounted for 28 percent and 21 percent of the fall in 
                                                 
1
 Changes to the way ethnicity data is reported in the HLFS mean it is not possible to extend this series 
beyond 2007, but based on total responses for each ethnic category the annual average unemployment 
rates in 2009 were 13.4 percent for Pacific peoples, 12.7 percent for Maori, 8.0 percent for Asians and 4.8 
percent for Europeans, indicating that the latest recession is again being felt particularly severely by 
Maori and Pacific workers. 
Figure 7.6: Unemployment rates by ethnicity
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employment in the primary and secondary industries respectively. For Pacific workers – 
who by comparison with Maori were more disproportionately concentrated in 
manufacturing industries – the secondary sector accounted for almost all the decline 
with a fall of 8,700. Their job losses were more in proportion to their representation in 
the sector – they made up six percent of the workforce in secondary industries in 1986 
and accounted for eight percent of the job losses over the next five years.   
At the same time as Maori and Pacific workers were being expelled from declining 
sectors of production, New Zealand was liberalising its immigration policies to attract 
new workers for expanding sectors. If Maori and Pacific labour migration had been a 
characteristically Fordist form of migration providing low-skilled labour for production 
industries, the new immigration policies had a decidedly post-Fordist character – a 
liberalised regime geared towards attracting professional and technical skills and capital 
unhampered by non-economic considerations such as national origin and ethnicity. The 
first step was the removal in 1986 of the ‘traditional source country’ preference, which 
had previously restricted migration from Asia and other non-European countries. This 
was accompanied by some easing of restrictions on family migration and a new 
business immigration scheme designed to attract entrepreneurs and capital to New 
Zealand. The second step involved opening up the skilled migration stream in 1991 
from a restrictive regime which had only admitted those with skills in short supply in 
New Zealand, to an expansive programme aimed at enhancing the country’s human 
capital and stimulating economic growth by attracting large numbers of highly skilled 
and educated immigrants – to be selected by a points system which emphasised 
qualifications and work experience. This did not, however, mean that all immigrants 
would be skilled or wealthy – family reunification and humanitarian admissions 
remained important components of New Zealand’s intakes and these included many 
who were unskilled or economically inactive. Following upsurges in Asian 
immigration, there were further policy changes in 1995 and again in 2002 and 2003 
which introduced tougher English language requirements and adjusted the points system 
in order to more effectively regulate the level and composition of immigration flows. 
However, the principles of the 1986 and 1991 reforms continued to provide the 
foundation of New Zealand’s immigration policy through the 1990s and 2000s (Trlin 
1986; 1992; 1997; Bedford et al 2005).1  
                                                 
1
 While selection of permanent immigrants emphasised skills and capital, New Zealand showed that it 
was still prepared to utilise low-skilled temporary migrants when necessary with the introduction in 2007 
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Figure 7.7 illustrates the effects on levels and sources of immigration.1 Permanent 
and long-term arrivals of non-New Zealand citizens climbed from 17,000 in 1985 to 
56,000 in 1996, dropping subsequently due to economic downturn and policy changes 
before rising again to a peak of over 70,000 in 2002. Migrants from Asia accounted for 
most of the increase, particularly those from the northeast Asian countries of China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan. From around 2,000 migrants a year in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, arrivals from the Asian region rose to over 25,000 by 1995 
and almost 37,000 by 2002. These upsurges were accompanied by growing anti-Asian 
sentiment in New Zealand (Spoonley and Trlin 2004) along with more legitimate 
concerns about settlement outcomes, as many migrants had difficulty finding suitable 
employment and often did not stay in New Zealand (Winkelmann and Winkelmann 
1998). Such concerns no doubt influenced the policy changes of 1995 and 2002/03 
which put more emphasis on English language ability and settlement potential – with 
the result that intakes from Asia fell while those from Europe (particularly the UK) rose. 
Although migration from Asia picked up again in the buoyant labour market of the mid-
2000s, it did not reach anything like the earlier peak. Meanwhile, migration from the 
                                                                                                                                               
of the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy, a guestworker scheme to recruit mainly Pacific 
workers to fill seasonal labour shortages in the horticulture and viticulture industries.   
1
 These figures do not represent the number of new permanent residents, but include all those arriving in 
New Zealand with the intention of staying for a period of 12 months or more (excluding New Zealand 
citizens). The regional breakdowns are based on country of last permanent residence, not nationality or 
ethnicity.  
Figure 7.7: Permanent and long-terms arrivals of non-New Zealand 
citizens by country of last residence
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Oceania region remained fairly steady throughout the period – the points system 
disadvantaged low-skilled Pacific migrants, but many still had access through other 
provisions. Arrivals from other countries (the Americas, Africa and the Middle-East) 
increased in the early 1990s but not greatly thereafter, meaning that a large number of 
countries contributed a relatively small proportion of total immigration flows.  
The growth and diversification of immigration meant increasing ethnic diversity in 
the labour force and further ethnicisation of the division of labour, as new non-European 
migrants were mostly channelled into expanding sectors of production which were quite 
different from those into which earlier Maori and Pacific migrants had been drawn. 
Figure 7.8 gives some indication of this in terms of the industries which in 2006 were 
the largest employers of immigrants who had lived in New Zealand for less than 20 
years (ie those who had arrived since liberalisation of immigration policy began in 
1986). Although manufacturing and construction were among these industries, migrants 
from this period were generally under-represented in goods-producing industries and 
over-represented in most other categories of industry. Among service industries, the two 
largest employers were the relatively low-skilled industries of retailing and 
accommodation and food services, which offer significant opportunities for self-
employment and low-wage employment among newly-arrived or low-skilled migrants – 
particularly those from Asia. Most of the other large employers are industries which 
tend to employ more highly-skilled workers, including education, health, finance and 
Figure 7.8: Industry by ethnicity
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insurance, public administration, and management and marketing. Most of these 
industries employed more European than Asian migrants, and relatively small numbers 
of Pacific migrants. People of Pacific ethnicity who migrated over these twenty years, 
like earlier Pacific migrants, were most likely to be employed in manufacturing.  
 
 
Ethnicity, occupation and class 
 
We saw earlier that many occupations are highly segregated by sex, and are sex-typed 
in that they are conventionally regarded as either men’s or women’s work due to their 
association with gendered domestic roles and traditional ideals of masculinity and 
femininity. This is less true of ethnicity – occupations tend not to be ethnically- or 
racially-typed to the same degree, except in instances of slavery and indenture or where 
a dominant ethnic group effectively excludes others from the most desirable jobs. 
However, it is common for workers of particular ethnicities to be strongly over-
represented in certain types of jobs and equally under-represented in others, and for this 
to generate and reinforce ideological perceptions about the groups concerned. This 
ethnicisation of the division of labour tends to arise initially as a consequence of the 
way ethnic groups are incorporated into capitalist relations of production through 
colonialism and migration, and is reproduced over time as barriers of class, culture and 
racism impede social mobility. Thus, contemporary occupational and class distributions 
in New Zealand still bear the imprint of the incorporation of Maori and Pacific people 
as low-skilled production workers, the subsequent movement of Asian migrants into 
both low-skilled and high-skilled jobs in expanding service industries, and the strong if 
diminishing hold which the European majority established over the most privileged 
positions within the division of labour from the time of its colonial ascendancy. 
The legacy of these historical patterns can be seen by looking at a selection of 
occupational groups in which workers from one or more of the major ethnic categories 
were disproportionately located at the 2006 census (Table 7.2). Europeans dominate 
most occupations simply by virtue of the fact that they make up the vast majority of the 
workforce. But in many occupations they predominated to a disproportionate degree, 
making up around 90 percent of workers in a range of managerial, professional, skilled-
manual and agricultural occupations. Conversely, Europeans were most significantly 
under-represented in semi-skilled and routine manual jobs. These were the jobs in 
which Maori and Pacific workers tended to  have a  disproportionate  presence,  as  they 
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Table 7.2: Ethnic composition of selected occupational groups 
 2006 
Ethnicity 
Occupational group Euro- 
pean Maori Pacific Asian 
 
Percent 
Chief executives and managing directors 90.0 4.9 1.0 6.8 
General managers 89.0 5.8 1.3 7.2 
Specialised managers 86.8 7.6 2.4 8.1 
Information technology professionals 81.1 5.5 2.2 14.9 
Architects, engineers and surveyors 88.7 4.6 1.7 7.9 
Life science professionals 89.2 6.4 1.2 6.1 
Health professionals (except nurses) 82.0 3.0 1.1 15.2 
Secondary teachers 89.1 8.1 2.1 5.3 
Business professionals 84.5 5.8 2.3 11.6 
Legal professionals 90.5 7.4 2.5 5.4 
Archivists, librarians and related information professionals 90.0 7.7 2.2 4.9 
Computer equipment controllers 79.1 6.0 3.0 16.0 
Ship and aircraft controllers and technicians 95.1 4.5 1.3 2.4 
Life science technicians and related workers 82.6 7.6 2.2 11.8 
Social workers 76.3 20.7 7.6 4.2 
Writers, artists, entertainers and sportspeople 89.2 9.3 2.8 5.2 
Secretaries and keyboard operating clerks 89.3 7.8 3.4 4.7 
Material recording and transport clerks 72.4 15.1 12.9 7.6 
Cashiers, tellers and related clerks 74.7 9.7 5.7 16.9 
Travel attendants and guides 79.4 9.8 3.9 12.8 
Housekeeping and restaurant services workers 69.9 14.3 5.9 18.3 
Personal care workers 76.9 14.6 7.6 6.8 
Protective services workers 80.5 17.9 7.4 2.9 
Livestock farmers and farm workers 93.4 8.9 0.7 1.2 
Forestry workers 67.2 38.9 4.7 0.6 
Fishery workers, hunters and trappers 89.7 14.7 1.5 1.5 
Electricians 90.9 7.0 2.3 4.2 
Food trades workers 70.0 16.2 7.1 13.4 
Metal-processing plant operators 68.8 16.0 15.6 6.1 
Wood-processing and papermaking plant operators 61.2 39.0 8.6 1.9 
Metal and mineral products processing machine operators 57.9 19.5 20.0 9.9 
Textile products machine operators 62.7 12.1 12.0 18.0 
Food and beverage processors 64.3 28.4 9.6 6.7 
Assemblers 69.4 16.8 10.3 10.1 
Motor vehicle drivers 74.8 19.7 5.8 5.5 
Agricultural, earthmoving and lifting machinery operators 76.4 23.0 6.6 1.7 
Building and related workers (non-trades) 76.2 23.9 8.1 2.5 
Cleaners and caretakers 72.1 17.3 7.9 9.2 
Packers and freight handlers 60.3 20.8 17.4 9.4 
Labourers 71.2 22.8 9.7 5.3 
     Total workforce 81.5 11.4 4.9 8.0 
     
     Source: Statistics New Zealand, Census of Population and Dwellings 
Notes: Occupational categories are selected from the third level of the standard classification (NZSCO99) but some 
of the category names have been changed slightly for the purposes of clarity and brevity. Selection of categories 
was limited to those employing 3,000 or more workers and having a significant over-representation or under-
representation of one or more ethnic groups. Row totals may add to more than 100 percent as respondents may 
select more than one ethnic group and are counted in each ethnic group they select.   
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have since being drawn into these types of work during the labour migrations of the 
Fordist period.  
In 2006, Maori made up just 11 percent of the total workforce but between 15 and 
40 percent of workers in a number of low-skilled jobs in primary production, primary 
product processing, manufacturing, driving and construction. Pacific workers were 
similarly over-represented in a number of production jobs, particularly in metals, 
textiles, assembly and packing. By comparison with Maori, they were more highly 
represented in manufacturing jobs and less so in primary production or construction, 
reflecting the legacy of different migration patterns which drew Pacific workers more 
disproportionately into manufacturing industries in the larger cities, particularly 
Auckland. Both Maori and Pacific workers were also over-represented in a number of 
routine service occupations such as housekeeping and restaurant services, personal care 
and cleaning – which are also highly gendered occupations performed mainly by 
women. Maori also had a strong presence in the protective services, with the armed 
forces providing a valuable source of stable employment and career progression for 
low-skilled recruits. Despite increasing movement of Maori and Pacific workers into 
higher-skilled occupations in recent years, both groups remained under-represented in 
managerial and professional occupations. A notable exception in the professions is 
social work, where Maori and Pacific workers play an important role in providing social 
services to members of their own communities. 
Asian workers present a more disparate pattern, being over-represented in a mixture 
of high-skilled and low-skilled, manual and non-manual occupations. This reflects the 
diversity of the Asian population, which includes a number of different ethnicities, 
different categories of migrants (skilled, business, family and humanitarian), established 
and recent immigrants and locally-born people. There are, for instance, significant 
differences in the occupational profiles of immigrants from northeast Asian countries 
such as China, Taiwan and South Korea, who have tended to enter under skilled and 
business provisions, as opposed to those from countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia 
who first migrated to New Zealand as refugees (Ongley 1996). Unlike Maori and 
Pacific workers, some Asian ethnic groups are well represented in professional 
occupations, particularly in the fields of health, information technology and business. In 
low-skilled production jobs, Asian workers are over-represented in textile production 
and assembly work but under-represented in primary production and construction. The 
importance of Asian businesses as a source of employment is reflected in the high 
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proportions of Asian workers in the categories of housekeeping and restaurant service 
workers, cashiers and tellers, and food trade workers. Although many Asians are 
employed in a number of routine and semi-skilled occupations, not all of the workers in 
these categories are themselves low skilled. A number of professionally-qualified Asian 
immigrants work in lower-skilled occupations due to difficulties in finding employment 
commensurate with their qualifications for a period after arrival, whether because of 
settlement issues, language difficulties, non-recognition of overseas qualifications, lack 
of relevant experience or discrimination (Trlin and Watts 2004). However, for most of 
those who stay in New Zealand this is likely to be a transitional rather than a long-term 
situation as employment outcomes for skilled immigrants tend to improve with time 
(Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998; New Zealand Immigration Service 2003; 
Statistics New Zealand 2004; Stillman and Mare 2009).   
These occupational differences are reflected in inequitable distribution within the 
class structure, as figures 7.9 and 7.10 show. The trends for each ethnic category 
between 1986 and 2006 were broadly similar, and generally follow those previously 
identified for the full workforce: increasing proportions in capitalist and middle-class 
locations, particularly in the professional and lower managerial categories; and 
declining proportions in working-class locations, particularly in the semi-skilled 
category. However there are some marked disparities, particularly in terms of the 
distribution of Maori and Pacific workers in comparison to Europeans and Asians.  
At both the beginning and end of the period, Maori and Pacific workers were 
markedly under-represented in capitalist and middle-class locations and correspondingly 
over-represented in the lower-skilled fractions of the working class. These disparities 
reduced somewhat between 1986 and 2006 due to a combination of the structural 
changes which wiped out many of the lower-skilled jobs in which Maori and Pacific 
workers were concentrated, along with increasing social mobility among younger 
workers due to improving levels of educational attainment, the influence of bicultural 
and multicultural policies, and economic development initiatives by Maori and Pacific 
communities and the state.1 The proportion of Maori and Pacific workers in higher and 
lower managerial and professional positions more than doubled during this period, and 
they also went from being under-represented to over-represented in  the  skilled  fraction  
                                                 
1
 Given the increasing levels of education among younger Maori and Pacific people and the fact that these 
groups have younger age profiles than the European population, it may be that age-standardised figures 
would show less inequality in the class profiles. However, this would certainly not eliminate the 
disparities. Age-specific data was not available in sufficient detail to investigate this question. 
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of the working class.1 Despite improving mobility, by 2006 just 31 percent of Maori and 
23 percent of Pacific people in employment were in capitalist or middle-class locations, 
compared with 50 percent of Europeans and 45 percent of Asians. We can expect these 
                                                 
1
 It is notable, however, that among those in professional positions Maori and Pacific workers were much 
less likely than their European or Asian counterparts to be in higher professional jobs and much more 
likely to be in lower professional jobs. Similarly, among lower managers Maori and Pacific people were 
more likely than Europeans or Asians to be operations managers and less likely to be executive managers.  
 
Figure 7.9: Class locations by ethnicity
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Figure 7.10: Class locations by ethnicity
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disparities to reduce further as more young Maori and Pacific people with higher levels 
of education and training enter the workforce and older generations of predominantly 
low-skilled workers retire. But despite the improvements, levels of educational 
attainment among young Maori and Pacific people are still considerably lower than 
those of Europeans and Asians, and the possibility of eliminating class disparities 
between these groups remains a distant prospect.1   
The class distribution of Asian workers is much closer to that of Europeans, 
although in 2006 they were slightly less likely than Europeans to be in capitalist or 
middle-class locations and correspondingly more likely to be in working-class locations. 
This was largely because Asians were under-represented in managerial positions (both 
higher and lower) and over-represented in routine jobs. The proportion of Asians in the 
managerial and professional categories increased between 1986 and 2006, but so too did 
the proportion in routine working-class jobs – in contrast to the slight falls for other 
ethnic groups. It is also notable that the increase in the professional category was not as 
great for Asians as it was for Europeans, and that there was a fall in the proportion of 
Asians who were working proprietors – probably due to the increased numbers of recent 
immigrants who are less likely to have established their own businesses. The result of 
these trends was that whereas in 1986 Asians were more likely than Europeans to be in 
middle-class positions, by 2006 the situation had reversed. This was despite 
immigration reforms which opened the doors to skilled and wealthy Asian migrants and 
might have been expected to improve the class profile of the Asian population relative 
to that of the European majority. That this has not happened is probably attributable to 
the fact that along with the skilled migrants have come many unskilled migrants, while 
many of those who are skilled have encountered obstacles to finding appropriate 
employment or establishing businesses. Regardless of this, Asians still have a much 
more favourable distribution within the class structure – with much higher proportions 
in capitalist and middle-class locations – than Maori and Pacific workers whose class 
profile still bears the legacy of earlier labour migrations during a different phase of 
capitalist development.  
As might be expected from their class profile, Europeans also tend to have higher 
incomes than other ethnic groups, receiving a median income of $40,100 for full-time 
workers in 2006. Perhaps more surprising is that the median income for Asian full-
timers was similar to those of their Maori and Pacific counterparts in 2006 – at $32,300 
                                                 
1
 Education comparisons based on Ministry of Education data from http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/.  
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they were situated between the Maori median of $33,100 and the Pacific median of 
$31,400. Asian incomes deteriorated relative to those of other groups between 1986 and 
2006, increasing by just three percent in real terms as compared with increases of 21 
percent for Pacific people, 18 percent for Maori and 15 percent for Europeans. This 
meant that the Maori and Pacific medians grew slightly closer to the European median 
over the two decades while the Asian median fell further behind. The improvement in 
Maori and Pacific incomes is to be expected given the increasing proportions moving 
into managerial and professional work – as is the persisting disparity with Europeans, 
given that they remain under-represented in such jobs. The surprisingly low median 
income of Asian workers and its relative deterioration during this period may again 
reflect the high proportion of recent immigrants in the population, as well as the 
reasonably high proportions of routine workers, high rates of self-employment and 
relatively high proportions of unpaid relatives assisting in family businesses. These 
factors probably account for the fact that higher proportions of Asians than Maori or 
Pacific workers were in the lowest income bands, which brings down their median 
income. On the other hand, Asians were more likely than Maori and Pacific workers 
(but less likely than Europeans) to be in the highest income bands – eight percent of 
Asian full-time workers earned in excess of $70,000 in 2006 compared with four 
percent of Pacific workers, six percent of Maori and 16 percent of Europeans.  
It is not possible to analyse intersections between class, ethnicity and gender in any 
depth here due to a lack of sufficiently detailed data. However, some very general 
observations can be made based on the limited data that is available.1 This suggests, not 
surprisingly, that gendered divisions of labour are evident within all the major ethnic 
categories and ethnicised divisions of labour are evident among both sexes. It would be 
expected therefore that the combination of these two dimensions of inequality would 
result in European men being the most advantaged group in terms of class locations, 
while Maori and Pacific women would be the most disadvantaged. European men 
certainly seem to have the highest representation among capitalists and working 
proprietors as they are the most likely to be employers, self-employed or higher 
managers. However, European women have a stronger representation in the professional 
fraction of the middle class – albeit with a greater concentration in the lower professions 
rather than the higher professions, and in salaried rather than self-employed positions.  
                                                 
1
 This consists of separate, rather than cross tabulated, information on occupation and employment status, 
with the occupation data classified at a much higher level of aggregation that that used for the preceding 
analyses.  
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Similar gender differences are apparent among Maori and Pacific workers, with 
men more likely to be employers, self-employed or managers, but women more likely to 
be professionals. Among both sexes, Maori and Pacific workers appear to be very much 
under-represented in capitalist and middle-class locations and have the highest 
representation in the semi-skilled and routine fractions of the working class – although 
within those fractions Maori and Pacific men are much more concentrated in blue-collar 
production jobs than women, who are more likely to work in white- or grey-collar 
occupations. Asian workers of both sexes appear to be well-represented in middle-class 
locations, having high rates of self-employment (with or without employees) and a 
strong presence in managerial and professional occupations. However, Asian women 
are more likely than Asian men to occupy working-class locations as they have lower 
rates of self-employment and greater representation in semi-skilled and routine jobs, 
particularly in white- and grey-collar occupations.  
These observations are indicative only and merit more detailed analysis, but they do 
perhaps hint at the complexity of inequality where divisions of class, ethnicity and 
gender intersect and overlap to produce multi-dimensional systems of stratification. 
This fragmentation has become more pronounced over recent decades as a consequence 
of increasing labour force participation by women and rapid population growth among 
non-European ethnic groups due to both migration and natural increase. All classes have 
become increasingly diverse in terms of their gender and ethnic composition, and this 
affects the possibilities for class formation as the commonalities of class tend to be 
weakened by cross-cutting interests and orientations related to gender and ethnicity. The 
working class is more heterogeneous than the capitalist or middle classes in terms of 
both ethnicity and gender: of people in working-class jobs in 2006, 78 percent were 
European and 51 percent male – down from figures of 85 percent European and 56 
percent male in 1986. Increasing gender and ethnic diversity has accompanied shifts in 
the nature of working-class employment over recent decades as blue-collar production 
jobs have declined relative to grey- and white-collar jobs, along with institutional 
changes which have diminished levels of collective organisation. All these changes in 
combination mean that the post-Fordist working class is very different from its Fordist 
incarnation. But the commonalities remain in terms of workers’ positions within 
relations of production and divisions of labour and the consequences of this for their 
economic circumstances and material interests.  
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Conclusion 
 
Gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour emerged in the early stages of New 
Zealand’s colonial history and have been reproduced and reshaped as the economy has 
moved through successive modes of development. The Fordist period saw large-scale 
labour migrations of Maori and Pacific workers and increasing labour force 
participation by women, which respectively helped to sustain the growth of secondary 
goods-producing industries and expansion of the division of labour surrounding 
production. In the process, Maori and Pacific workers became concentrated in low-
skilled manual jobs, and women were drawn predominantly into lower professional, 
administrative and service work. The neoliberal restructuring project, with its 
devastating effects on production industries, was felt most severely by Maori and 
Pacific workers and more strongly by men than women because of their different 
locations within the division of labour. The subsequent employment growth in producer 
and consumer services and in non-standard work encouraged further growth in female 
employment, and was fuelled by new immigration flows from Asian and other non-
European countries, which have added further ethnic dimensions to the division of 
labour.  
But this should not give the impression that women and non-European workers 
have been passively manipulated by the needs of capital. These groups have had their 
own diverse economic and social motivations for entering employment at particular 
junctures and in particular locations, and these supply factors have been active forces in 
shaping the course of capitalist development in New Zealand. Were it not for the labour 
migration of Maori and Pacific workers after 1945 the Fordist boom may not have been 
possible, and were it not for the increasing supply of female workers and Asian 
migrants since the 1980s the New Zealand workforce may have been deficient in the 
skills and flexibility required for the post-Fordist growth model. Moreover, throughout 
these processes women and non-European ethnic groups have been actively struggling 
to break down the gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour which have constrained 
their opportunities and material wellbeing. In this they have had some success – more so 
in the case of women than Maori and Pacific people – but gendered and ethnicised 
divisions of labour have proved remarkably resilient and the patterns of inequality we 
have observed here are likely to endure to some degree for some time to come.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the introduction it was indicated that this thesis would set out to answer two 
questions. Firstly, to what extent have patterns of employment and social stratification 
changed over recent decades in New Zealand? And secondly, to the extent that they 
have changed, does this signify the emergence of a distinctive type of economy and 
society? We can now bring together the threads of the empirical analysis to answer the 
first question and offer some concluding thoughts on the second.  
To begin with, we can dismiss any idea that work itself is in decline as some were 
speculating in the 1980s and 1990s. The combined effects of crisis, restructuring and 
technological change certainly created large labour surpluses in this period, but the 
consolidation of the new mode of development and a resurgence in economic growth 
absorbed most of those surpluses in the years before the latest crisis. In fact the new 
growth model exhibited a voracious demand for labour, based as it was on extensive 
accumulation fuelled by increasing volumes of labour rather than intensive 
accumulation based on productivity gains. By 2006 employment rates in New Zealand 
were at record levels, thanks largely to increasing labour force participation among 
women and older people, while large numbers of workers were putting in long hours, 
making the 40-hour week the exception rather than the rule. We also saw the emergence 
of labour shortages, even though levels of joblessness and underemployment remained 
relatively high by comparison with the Fordist period. This apparent paradox reflected a 
mismatch between the skills in demand and those in supply among the jobless and 
underemployed, and also a certain amount of frictional unemployment caused by high 
labour turnover as people moved between jobs or in and out of the labour force. While 
high labour turnover might indicate a certain level of insecurity in employment and a 
diminishing attachment to stable long-term jobs, it is important not to overstate this 
given that the majority of the workforce in 2008 had been in their jobs for more than 
three years. 
Much has been said and written about the growth of non-standard employment 
since the 1980s, and there is certainly evidence of this in increased rates of part-time 
work, self-employment, multiple-job holding and homeworking. There has probably 
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also been an increase in temporary work in the form of both casual and fixed-term 
employment, although there is no historical data to confirm this. Growth in all these 
types of work reflects a combination of changes in both the nature of production and the 
preferences of workers. It is difficult to calculate the overall proportion of people in 
non-standard work, but it is likely that by 2006 they made up around half of the 
workforce and perhaps more. While this represents a significant shift away from the 
traditional model of permanent and full-time waged employment, much non-standard 
work is in most respects little different from standard employment and we certainly 
should not assume that it is all precarious and low-quality employment – although some 
of it undoubtedly is. By far the most common form of non-standard work is part-time 
employment, much of which is relatively secure and a preferred option for many 
employees who are balancing paid employment with other activities such as raising 
families or studying. The evidence also shows that the destandardisation of employment 
was greatest during the years of restructuring and recession in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and reversed slightly as the economy improved, so it is not necessarily indicative 
of a long-term trend – although it may well have been given renewed impetus by the 
latest recession.  
Structural shifts in employment from goods-producing to service industries and 
from manual to non-manual work and lower-skilled to higher-skilled occupations are 
trends of long standing. However, they were accentuated during the restructuring period 
when a process of creative destruction wiped out vast numbers of jobs in sectors which 
had been favoured under Fordism and eventually delivered renewed job growth in quite 
different sectors. Employment in manufacturing industries suffered the most due to 
removal of import protections, increasing internationalisation of production and 
technological change. Producer and consumer service industries enjoyed the greatest 
proportional job growth as investment was redirected away from goods production and 
a growing range of services was increasingly commodified, while the extended division 
of labour surrounding commodity production continued to expand through increasing 
specialisation. By 2006 less than a third of workers were employed by goods-producing 
industries, but this belies the extent to which economic activity remained focused on 
material goods, with well over half of the workforce employed in industries concerned 
with either making, distributing or selling goods, along with many more in service 
industries contributing indirectly to these activities.  
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Changes in the division of labour between production and service industries 
obviously meant a decline in manual production jobs, and this was accentuated by 
changes in the division of labour within production industries as the work involved in 
directly producing goods diminished relative to the indirect work performed by 
managers, administrators, experts, salespeople and service workers of various kinds. 
Even within secondary industries, production workers made up little more than half of 
the workforce by 2006, while across the total workforce less than a quarter of all 
workers were employed in either primary or secondary production jobs. In all sectors 
the greatest expansion was in managerial and professional occupations, with a less 
pronounced shift towards sales and service work, while clerical and administration work 
declined in most sectors. The trends indicate rising skill levels as the routine labour of 
physical production and clerical support was relocated offshore or eliminated by 
technology, while management and professional expertise became more important in 
the context of new production models and more competitive markets, which together 
placed greater emphasis on strategy and innovation. However, this should be qualified 
with the observation that much of the expansion was in lower managerial and lower 
professional work, and may partly reflect the inflation of job titles in occupations 
involving relatively low levels of authority and expertise. And despite these trends, it 
was still the case in 2006 that six in every ten workers were employed in non-
managerial, non-professional and non-technical occupations.   
These trends were reflected in a changing class structure, of which the most notable 
feature was a significant shift from working-class to middle-class employment. Middle-
class job growth was concentrated among lower managers and professionals rather than 
in the traditional ‘petty-bourgeois’ category of working proprietors, with corporate 
managers and salaried lower professionals exhibiting the most growth. Although in 
decline, working-class employment as defined here – positions which lack ownership of 
the means of production, authority over other workers and professional expertise – still 
accounted for just over half the workforce in 2006. Within the overall decline, there was 
also a notable change in the composition of working-class employment from semi-
skilled to routine occupations and from blue-collar to grey-collar work – reflecting the 
loss of semi-skilled production work and growth in low-skilled service occupations. 
This contributed to widening income inequalities within the class structure due to the 
very low income levels among routine workers and falls in their real median incomes 
over the two decades under analysis. 
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Gendered and ethnicised divisions of labour are still very much in evidence despite 
some reduction in levels of gender and ethnic segregation within the workforce. 
Employment rates among women continued to increase in this period, and this was a 
critical factor in the growth of non-standard work and employment in consumer service 
industries. Women made some inroads into the traditional male preserves of 
management and the higher professions, but remained significantly under-represented in 
higher management, some of the higher professions and most types of manual 
production work. Maori and Pacific workers were the most severely affected by 
restructuring due to their disproportionate concentration in manual production jobs, and 
despite increasing social mobility they remain over-represented in such jobs and 
correspondingly under-represented in most types of skilled employment – and therefore 
especially vulnerable in times of economic crisis. The liberalisation of immigration 
policy added more complexity to patterns of ethnic inequality, bringing new waves of 
migration from Asia in particular and resulting in the disproportionate concentration of 
Asian workers in a range of occupations of varying skill levels.  
Clearly then, the last two to three decades have seen significant changes in 
production, employment and social stratification. While it is prudent to sound some 
cautionary notes about exaggerating the extent and novelty of the observed trends, we 
should also be wary of underestimating their importance. It is, however, debatable 
whether those shifts are of sufficient magnitude and consequence to support theories of 
epochal social transformation – whether it be to post-industrialism, informational 
capitalism or some other variation on these themes. The discussion in Chapter One 
adopted a sceptical stance regarding such theories, and the empirical analysis of the 
New Zealand context in subsequent chapters does not provide sufficiently compelling 
evidence to revise that position.  
Most of the trends we have observed here are not fundamentally new, but of long 
standing. Some can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution and have been evident in 
New Zealand from early in its colonial history, and more particularly since the 
industrialisation of the Fordist period. Sayer and Walker’s work highlights the fact that 
the shift from the direct labour of producing goods towards the indirect labour which 
augments, supports and organises that work within extended social and technical 
divisions of labour is an inherent and enduring feature of the evolution of industrial 
capitalism. It reflects a number of factors: the ongoing development of labour-saving 
technology in production; increasing commodification of non-productive activities in 
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the quest for profit; the demand for services generated by increasing levels of wealth 
and income; increasing utilisation of expert knowledge to enhance rationalisation and 
innovation; and increasing specialisation within the division of labour, which 
accompanies growth in the scale and complexity of economic activity. These forces 
have driven the development of both social and technical divisions of labour over the 
long term. The social division of labour has evolved as activities surrounding the 
production, circulation and consumption of commodities have increasingly been divided 
between specialised enterprises and industries. Technical divisions of labour have 
changed as production processes have come to involve less direct labour and greater 
elaboration of the surrounding tasks within extended, hierarchical and mental divisions 
of labour. In terms of the social division of labour we therefore see long-term shifts in 
employment from goods-producing industries to those concerned with circulation and 
producer and consumer services. And within technical divisions of labour we see long-
term movements from routine production work to various types of white- and grey-
collar work, especially in managerial and professional fields. These changes affect the 
class structure as middle-class employment expands and moves from the traditional 
petty-bourgeoisie to managerial and professional occupations, while working-class 
employment declines and shifts from the traditional blue-collar to white- and grey-collar 
occupations. 
While these are long-term trends that date back to well before the supposed 
emergence of the post-industrial or informational economy, they have also been 
significantly affected by disjunctural periods of intensive economic and social change, 
of which the most recent was the restructuring which followed the crisis of the 1970s 
and 1980s. In this period we saw an accentuation of the long-term trends described 
above, as well as a greater shift towards non-standard employment and greater levels of 
surplus labour within the economy. A number of features of the post-Fordist mode of 
development account for this. The transition to a more marketised variety of capitalism 
involved deregulation of product markets, which removed the protections previously 
enjoyed by manufacturing industries and subjected them to international competition. 
That competition was accentuated by the internationalisation of production, allowing 
more goods to be produced in low-wage countries and enabling some local producers to 
move production operations offshore. Lack of profitability in goods-producing 
industries encouraged a redirection of investment into service industries and greater 
commodification of services, a trend accentuated by displaced workers seeking self-
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employment in household and personal services. New technologies encouraged further 
displacement of low-skilled labour, not only from production jobs but also from white-
collar jobs which could be automated or performed offshore via telecommunications 
networks. Greater levels of competition in deregulated markets and new production 
models placed greater priority on flexibility and innovation, and increased demand for 
managers and experts of various kinds. Flexible production models and pressures to 
minimise labour costs also encouraged more flexible use of labour, facilitated by labour 
market deregulation, which stimulated the growth of non-standard work and increased 
rates of labour turnover. The empirical analysis in this thesis has repeatedly shown that 
changes in the labour market and the division of labour were most pronounced during 
the restructuring period in the latter half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. As 
the restructuring project wound down and the new mode of development was 
consolidated over subsequent years, the trends generally slowed and in some cases 
reversed slightly. 
To understand the changes in production and employment we clearly need an 
approach which addresses both long-term trends associated with the development of 
industrial capitalism and more concentrated upheavals related to episodes of 
restructuring. The approach in this thesis has been to bring together Sayer and Walker’s 
perspective on the evolution of the division of labour with that of the regulation 
approach on the ways in which new models of capitalism emerge from periods of crisis 
and restructuring. It has been argued that this provides a more balanced perspective on 
themes of change and continuity than epochal theories, which propose decisive breaks 
between industrial capitalism and post-industrial or informational capitalism. This 
perspective illuminates important changes in the nature of capitalism, but interprets 
them in terms of a transition between Fordist and post-Fordist modes of development 
which accentuates long-term trends in the division of labour within industrial 
capitalism. From this perspective, what we experienced in the last decades of the 
twentieth century was the demise of Fordism, not the end of industrial capitalism. 
This does not preclude the possibility that capitalism may eventually evolve to a 
point where material production is a sufficiently minor component of economic activity 
for us to safely pronounce the end of industrial capitalism, but it is difficult to assess at 
what point this might eventuate. If it is gauged in terms of employment, it might be 
argued that it occurs when service activities account for the majority of the workforce, 
but in New Zealand this happened around four decades ago when the industrial 
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economy had barely matured. Or it might be argued that it occurs when the majority of 
the workforce is engaged in informational production, but even using Castells’s liberal 
definition of informational labour we are still a long way from that. Alternatively, it 
may be judged not in terms of employment but in terms of the sectors which drive 
economic growth and the trajectory of economic development, as in Castells’s argument 
that informationalism has already superseded industrialism because economic 
dynamism now lies in the generation, processing and application of information. All 
these measures, however, bring us back to the problematic nature of dualistic 
distinctions between goods and services or between industrial and informational 
production. When so many service activities and so much informational production is 
directly or indirectly concerned with enhancing and augmenting the production, 
circulation and consumption of material goods, it seems mistaken to interpret their 
expansion in terms of the demise of industrial capitalism. And when these processes are 
driven by the same dynamics of accumulation, rationalisation, commodification and 
technological change which have driven the development of industrial capitalism since 
its inception, it seems unnecessary to fundamentally revise our understandings of the 
nature of capitalism.  
These issues clearly relate not just to New Zealand, but to developed capitalist 
economies in general. While the empirical analysis in the thesis has been restricted to 
New Zealand, the findings have broader relevance for countries which experienced 
similar restructurings in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, as New Zealand’s neoliberal 
project was arguably the most transformational and the most intensive of those 
restructurings, it may provide a prime example of the effects restructuring can have on 
the labour market, the division of labour and social stratification. It also opens up some 
interesting possibilities for comparative research, not just involving those countries 
which adopted similar market-oriented varieties of capitalism, but also those where 
there was greater compromise between class interests and the effects of the market were 
mitigated by a more interventionist state. 
Because this thesis has adopted a very broad canvas and has had to rely on official 
statistical sources which are not always ideally suited to the purpose, there are many 
topics which would benefit from more in-depth attention and purpose-designed 
research. These include research into the nature of extended, hierarchical and mental 
divisions of labour within particular labour processes and how they are affected by new 
technologies and production models. Understandings of the social division of labour 
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would be enhanced by studying interdependencies between enterprises within networks 
of collaborative production or exchange at both national and transnational levels, and 
the ways in which these are evolving. A further dimension of the social division of 
labour that deserves more attention is the relationship between work performed in 
different institutional spheres – the market, the household, communities and the state – 
and the way work is redistributed between those spheres over time. In the field of 
stratification there is considerable scope for both qualitative and quantitative 
investigations of the relationship between class structure and class formation, and the 
intersections between class, gender and ethnicity. These are all neglected areas of 
research in New Zealand, and while the paucity of material on these topics has imposed 
some constraints on this thesis, it is hoped that the issues which have been raised here 
may stimulate research which will help to address these gaps. 
Finally, the narrative of this story largely concluded in 2006 when the economy 
appeared healthy, the labour market was buoyant and the trajectory of development 
seemed to be firmly set. Since then, we have experienced a major crisis in capitalism 
which has not only had severe short-term effects on businesses and workers, but may 
yet prove to have long-term consequences for the course of capitalist development 
comparable to those resulting from the crises of the 1930s and 1970s. Results from the 
next Census will provide a more detailed picture than we currently have of the 
immediate effects of the crisis on different groups of workers, and would provide a 
useful post-script to the story told here. It is likely to be several years before we can 
discern the long-term effects on the nature of production, the regulation of the economy, 
the operation of the labour market, the contours of the division of labour and structures 
of social inequality. But when the picture becomes clearer, it is hoped the approach 
developed in this thesis will provide a useful perspective on the next episode in the 
constantly evolving relationship between capitalist development and the division of 
labour.  
 
 Appendix: 
Operationalising the stratification model 
 
 
The stratification model outlined in chapter five was operationalised in chapters six and 
seven using cross-tabulations of occupation and employment status data from New 
Zealand censuses. The following is a brief description of the variables and the process 
involved.  
 
Employment status 
The employment status variable in the census divides people in paid employment into 
four categories: those who employ others in their own business; those who are self-
employed and don’t employ others; paid employees; and those who work in family 
businesses without pay. Those in the last category have been omitted from the analysis 
as our interest here is in the stratification of the paid workforce, and the inclusion of 
unpaid workers who tend to cluster in certain occupations may distort the analysis. 
People who did not specify their employment status are also omitted from the analysis. 
 
Occupation 
The occupational data used for the analysis is taken from the most detailed level of the 
standard occupational classification NZSCO99 which consists of several hundred 
occupational categories (562 in the version used for the 2001 and 2006 censuses). The 
model could also be operationalised using data from the next level of the classification, 
which aggregates occupations into a smaller number of ‘unit groups’ (257 in 2001 and 
2006), but with some loss of sensitivity to differences in skill levels. The model is not 
suitable for use with data from the more highly aggregated levels of the classification as 
these are not sufficiently detailed. Again, people who have not specified their 
occupation are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Reclassifying the occupation data 
The detailed occupations were re-aggregated into six groups to enable a breakdown by 
authority and skill: two categories of managers (higher managerial and lower 
managerial) and four skills categories for non-managers (professional, skilled, semi-
skilled and routine). The allocation of occupations to skill levels was based on an 
assessment of the level of skill typically required to perform the job to a reasonable 
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level of competence, drawing on information from two main sources: the NZSCO99 
manual (Statistics New Zealand 2001b), which provides a description of the tasks 
involved in each occupation and the level of training and/or experience typically 
required; and an analysis of cross-tabulated data on occupation and educational 
qualifications from the 2006 Census. Definitions of the skill levels can be found in the 
description of the class model in chapter five.  
 
Identifying the class locations 
Once the occupational data was reclassified in this way, it was cross-tabulated with 
employment status to produce the class locations as shown in Figure A1. The rationale 
for the class locations is discussed in chapter five; the following simply outlines the 
method by which those locations were operationalised: 
• executive employers are employers in higher managerial occupations 
• higher managers are employees in higher managerial occupations 
• lower managers are employees in lower managerial occupations 
• working proprietors include all employers except those in higher managerial and 
professional occupations and all self-employed people except those in 
professional occupations 
• professionals include all those in professional occupations regardless of 
employment status 
• skilled workers are employees in skilled occupations 
• semi-skilled workers are employees in semi-skilled occupations 
• routine workers are employees in routine occupations. 
 
 
Figure A1: Method for operationalising class locations using occupation and 
employment status variables 
 
Employment status 
Occupation 
Employer Self-employed Employee 
Higher managerial Executive employers Higher managers 
Lower managerial 
  
Working proprietors 
Lower managers 
Professional Professionals 
Skilled Skilled workers 
Semi-skilled Semi-skilled workers 
Routine 
Working proprietors 
Routine workers 
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Time series issues 
Constructing time series using this method is complicated by frequent revisions to the 
standard occupational classification. The procedure used here is based on the NZSCO99 
classification, which is the version used to code 2001 and 2006 census data.1 Data from 
earlier censuses has been reclassified in a manner which ensures time series data is as 
consistent as possible, using concordances produced by Statistics New Zealand. This 
presents little difficulty with censuses between 1991 and 2006 as changes to the 
classification over that period were relatively minor. However, there was a major 
classification change between the 1986 and 1991 censuses when the old NZSCO68 
classification was replaced by NZSCO90. Data from the 1991 census was coded to both 
classifications, which allows us to assess the effects of the classification changes. 
Comparison of the number of workers enumerated in each class location using the two 
classifications shows that they differ by between 300 and 6,000 workers. This is not 
considered significant enough to invalidate comparisons of 1986 data with that of later 
years, although it is a factor to be borne in mind when looking at movements between 
1986 and 1991. 
The time series can go back no further than 1986 as detailed cross-tabulations of 
occupation and employment status from earlier censuses are available for the full-time 
workforce only. The omission of part-time workers would have a significant effect on 
the distribution of the workforce in the stratification model as they are not distributed 
evenly, but are disproportionately concentrated in particular types of jobs, particularly 
low-skilled service, sales and clerical work. Counting only full-time workers would 
therefore under-represent the numbers of workers in those categories and distort the 
time-series trends. While having to exclude pre-1986 data is unfortunate, it is not a 
major problem as analysis indicates that changes in employment patterns prior to 1986 
were relatively minor compared to those which came after.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 NZSCO99 has since been superseded by a new classification, ANZSCO06, but 2006 Census data was 
dual-coded to both classifications. ANZSCO06 involved a major overhaul of the classification and has 
been disregarded for the purposes of this exercise, as NZSCO99 is more compatible with earlier 
classifications.  
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